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Abstract 
 
 
 
Research Questions: 
 
What determines the level of environmental sustainability in national level analyses? How can the 
quality of governance be defined, measured and applied in the dynamics of political processes? And, how 
does the quality of governance influence the level of environmental sustainability? 
 
Model proposed and a priori Expectations: 
 
Model Summary   
   
ES = β0+ QGβ1+ DEMβ2+ EGβ3+ GEIβ4+ PGβ5+ ε     
   
a priori Expectation of Relationships 
   
QG +  
DEM +  
EG - ES 
GEI -  
PG -  
 
Where ES denotes Environmental Sustainability; QG, Quality of Governance; DEM, Level of Democracy; EG, Annual 
Economic Growth Rate; GEI, Global Economic Integration; and PG implies Population Growth Rate. 
 
Methods: 
 
The cross-national design adopted in this study attempts to investigate some of the general 
mechanisms of environmental sustainability and its multifaceted conditions, using bivariate descriptive 
statistics (correlation matrix) and multivariate analyses (OLS regression). Bivariate descriptive statistics 
addresses the zero-order correlations among all variables, which consist of one for all 122-sample country 
and six regional-economic groups, i.e. Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, The Middle East and North 
Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, East and Central Europe and the OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) member states. And then, multivariate analyses with five independent 
variables are examined.  
 
Conclusion: 
 
Being aware of the inconclusiveness and the nature of multifaceted characteristics of 
environmental sustainability, this study proposes the concepts of governance, political software and 
political elasticity theory as a political and institutional condition for articulating the determinant of the 
 v
level of environmental sustainability and argues that the quality of national governance is intrinsically 
related to, and even generates pressure for, environmental sustainability. 
 
Suggestions for Further Research: 
 
Although the cross-national design research can provide not only a context to interpret the case 
studies but also hypotheses for further studies, further research should try to combine cross-national studies 
with longitudinal and case studies to encompass the complex and multidimensional nature of environmental 
studies. Moreover, endless efforts have to be put into improving conceptual and operational definitions and 
measurements. 
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Chapter One. Introduction 
Concerns with environment are the issues likely to dominate the international arena in decades to 
come. This is already being reflected in the proliferation of academic and popular writings, especially in the 
West, on environmental issues. “Think globally, act locally” is a popular slogan. Nature is a seamless 
global whole. The world’s natural environment is intricately interwoven. A small change in a faraway place 
may have major consequences on the amount of our rainfall or the severity of our summer storms. 
Destruction of Brazilian rainforests, deforestation in Thailand or air pollution in Mexico all has worldwide 
consequences: global warming, a hole in the ozone layer and the destruction of biodiversity. These, in turn, 
affect human health and well-being across the globe. Our growing knowledge of the interconnectedness of 
the global environment inevitably leads to the study of environmental problems and policies in countries 
around the world. The complex web of interrelations among global and national governance, public 
policies, and environmental and socio-economic issues will require scholarly attention as the environment 
becomes the focus of international concern in the next century. Although the term “sustainable 
development” or “environmental sustainability” dates back to the 1970s, accompanied by liberal 
democracy and free markets, sustainable development is now a pillar of contemporary universalism, 
embraced from the industrialized north, to the less-developed south, to the post-communist east.1  
The concept of global environmental change arises from concerns about the sustainability of an 
“earth transformed” and has led to international mandates and protocols seeking to reduce the changes in 
question: examples are Berlin mandate (FCCC/CP 1995); Montreal protocol (UNEP 1987); Agenda 21 
(UNCED 1992); Kyoto protocol (UNFCCC 1994). It complements sustainable development by elevating 
issues of “sustainable” to the biosphere itself and those of “development” to humankind over the long term 
(Clark and Munn 1986). 
The sustainability principle has been accepted at the highest levels of decision and policy making. 
Woven into the fabric of international agendas, it blurs the distinctions between environment and 
development and fosters a fusion of sustainable development and global change research. This fusion, 
however, creates a paradox that may be resolved not only by reframing the meaning of sustainable and, 
hence, the sustainability principle but also recapturing the dynamics of environmental politics.  
                                                          
1 Sustainable development became a buzzword during the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (the “Earth Summit”) in Rio in 1992. The World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) defined the term as development that “meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (1987, 43) and development 
without growth. At the time, this was a major shift in thinking about environment and development. 
Sustainable development has since been touted as the solution to the problems of economic development 
and environmental degradation. It has been adopted as a major framework for the design of programs by 
international aid agencies and lenders, such as the United States Agency for International Development and 
the World Bank. The emergence of the concept came at the same time that environmental problems were 
being framed as “global problems.” Biodiversity loss, the greenhouse effect, and the thinning of the ozone 
layer are examples of such problems.  
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Using new sets of data on environmental sustainability and governance, this study examines 
critically the thesis, voiced by journalists and policymakers as well as academics, that the quality of 
national governance is intrinsically related to, and even generates pressure for, environmental 
sustainability.2 It, specifically, asks whether (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored, 
and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, 
and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions 
among them strengthened or undermined environmental performance and sustainability. Its central premise 
states that better governance improves resource allocation, enhances efficiency and effectiveness, and 
increases the prospects for sustainability. The quality of governance functions more efficiently in 
environmental agendas and performances in national level analyses.  
In the recent literature on environmental sustainability, lack of good governance is cited as one of 
the factors that either caused or contributed to the prolonged national environmental degradations. The 
literature also highlights the possible links between good governance, economic stability, and 
environmental sustainability. Greater government capacity and wider openness enable the public to make 
informed political decisions, improve the accountability of governments, and reduce the scope for 
environmental degradation.        
Drawing from research and theoretical approaches, as well as assessments of original hypotheses 
and empirical examinations, this study suggests that environmental politics is an example of a distinction 
between government and governance. Governance encompasses much broader public policy considerations 
than assessment of government structure or location of public service production or provision. Governance 
integrates institutional incentives, interests, information, and relations with the public (Werlin 2000; 
Stillman 2001). It is, accordingly, conceptualized as an institutional framework of government: that is, 
traditions and institutions that determine how authority is exercised in a particular country.    
In fact, this study starts with recognizing three research questions. First, what determines the level 
of environmental sustainability in national level analyses? Second, how can the quality of governance be 
defined, measured and applied in the dynamics of political processes? And third, how does the quality of 
governance influence the level of environmental sustainability? Examining the determinants of 
environmental sustainability with cross-national statistical comparisons using national aggregates from 122 
countries, this study argues that the level of environmental sustainability is largely due to the degree of 
good governance measured by six indicators: accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory framework, rule of law and corruption control. The testing model also encompasses democracy 
as a social condition, growth rate as an economic function to environmentalism, globalization as an 
                                                          
2 The term of governance applied here should be differentiated from global governance of neo-institutional 
approach in IR literature (Nye 2001; Slaughter, et al. 1998) and corporative governance of neo-corporatist 
approach (Crepaz 1992; Opschoor and Straaten 1993). The definition and scope of the governance will be 
discussed through the rest of this chapter.  
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international factor and population growth as a control variable. Table 1.1 and 1.2 summarize the proposed 
model and the variables.  
 
1. Environmental Sustainability 
Sustainable development, popularized by the Bruntland Commission (WCED 1987), has become 
the most familiar concept and objective based upon the sustainability principle (Aniansson and Svedin 
1990; HMSO 1994; UNCSD 1996). What sustainable development means remains elusive, however (Lele 
1991; Worster 1993). The expert literature alone is filled with numerous conflicting definitions (Adams 
1990; Brady and Geets 1994; Cruz, et. al. 1996; Karshenas 1994; Munasinghe and Shearer 1995; Redclift 
1993; Trzyna and Osborn 1995), within which are embedded yet more “fuzzy” concepts, for example 
human carrying capacity (Allan 1965; Brush 1975; Cohen 1995; House and Williams 1975). The elusive 
and elastic qualities of sustainable development are precisely those that resonate with a post-modern, global 
community. Irrespective of its inadequacies for research and practice (Redclift 1993), sustainable 
development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs” (WCED 1987, 43) is an ideal political formulation, providing the global community 
with the illusion of a broad, coherent consensus, within which an almost endless array of objectives may be 
pursued (Jacob 1994).  
Sustainable development is challenged on many grounds: as an oxymoron (O’Riordan 1985; 
Paehkle 1995; Trzyna and Osborn 1995), a Western value from the political right (Lele 1991) and left 
(DiLorenzo 1993), or a capitalist invention diverting attention from more pressing socio-economic issues 
(Jacob 1994). It may also be challenged in terms of the history of human-environment relationships 
(Goudie 1994; Meyer 1996).  The defining character of sustainable development consists of two different 
conceptual entities. “Development” is understood as increasing consumption, through escalating 
production, achieved by advancing technological control of nature (Ausubel and Langford 1997; Ausubel 
and Sladovich 1989; Grubler 1994). “Sustainable,” in contrast, implies that the use of nature is in some sort 
of long-term balance with natural biogeochemical processes, including their flux. A nature so transformed 
that technological substitutes match or surpass nature's biogeochemistry is, by most definitions, 
unsustainable. In this history, “development” and “sustainable” constitute a paradox.  
Giving more structure to the definition of sustainable development, it has been described as 
focusing on the "triple bottom line," the need to balance the three E's in the global economy: economic 
prosperity, environmental quality, and social equity. In other words, economic growth must be pursued in a 
manner that ensures the protection of both social and environmental systems. These system considerations 
have intergenerational and intragenerational components. In the former, future generations must be left 
with an ecologically viable and socially stable planet upon which to live. In the latter, present generations 
must be accorded an equal opportunity for economic security as well as the fair distribution of 
environmental costs and benefits (Farrell and Hart 1998). For this to happen, the links between  
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Table 1.1. An Environmental Sustainability Model proposed and a priori Expectations 
 
Model Summary   
   
ES = β0+ QGβ1+ DEMβ2+ EGβ3+ GEIβ4+ PGβ5+ ε     
   
a priori Expectation of Relationships 
   
QG +  
DEM +  
EG - ES 
GEI -  
PG -  
 
Where ES denotes Environmental Sustainability; QG, Quality of Governance; DEM, Level of Democracy; 
EG, Annual Economic Growth Rate; GEI, Global Economic Integration; and PG implies Population 
Growth Rate. 
 
Table 1.2. Dependent and Explanatory Variables   
 
Label Description Data Sources 
    
Dependent Variable    
ES Environmental 
Sustainability 
2001 Environmental 
Sustainable Index 
2001 Environmental 
Sustainable Index 
(WYC 2001) 
    
Explanatory Variables    
QG The Quality of 
Governance 
6 aggregate Governance 
Indicators referring to 1997-
98. 
Governance Matters 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton 1999) 
    
DEM The Level of 
Democracy 
Freedom Index for 1999-
2000. 
Freedom in the World 
(Freedom House 2000) 
    
EG Economic Growth  Average rate of economic 
growth for 1990-1998. 
World Development 
Report (World Bank 
1999) 
    
GEI Globalization 
(Global economic 
Integration) 
Trade share of GDP (%) in 
1998. 
World Development 
Report (World Bank 
1999) 
    
Control Variable    
PG Population Growth  Average annual growth rate 
of population for 1990-1998. 
World Development 
Report (World Bank 
1999) 
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environmental degradation and economic activity in the developing world must be severed (Hart 1995). In 
short, the concept strives for a perpetually stable resource base, involving no depletion of resources or 
ecosystems (and possibly even an expansion of those benefits), and a perpetually stable social system, with 
no unfair inequities in standards of living, personal security, and income distribution.  
To simplify the subject drastically, sustainable development has been defined in terms of four 
conditions (WCED 1987; World Bank 1992). A key assumption is that underdeveloped and economically 
unstable countries cannot control depredation and pollution of natural resources. Resources must be 
exploited as cheaply as possible and in large quantities in order to maintain socioeconomic and political 
order. This assumption determines four conditions for sustainable development. The first condition is that 
building healthy economies should be based on technologies that minimize damage to the environment. 
Second, given the often-observed connection between poverty and environmental degradation that drives 
poor people to strip resources for survival, it is crucial that attention should  be paid to the basic needs of 
impoverished peoples with environmentally friendly approaches. Addressing these concerns generates a 
third condition for sustainable development. It is that environmental sustainability will provide for present 
generations without depleting environmental quality for future generations. The fourth condition of 
sustainable development is ample participation by civil society in decision-making and implementation of 
policies.  
Despite general agreement on these broad principles, there, unfortunately, remains no clear 
definition of exactly how people will meet these objectives because no practical definition of sustainable 
development yet exists. Academics, government agencies, and activists define it in diverse and often 
conflicting ways. For instance, sustainable development is defined as development without growth beyond 
the regenerative and adsorption capacities of the environment (Daly 1996); the maintenance of 
environmental quality without sacrificing socio-economic development (Daly and Cobb 1993); improving 
the quality of human life while living within the carrying capacity of supporting ecosystems (WCU 1993); 
qualitative growth without increasing the total consumption of energy and materials beyond a level that is 
reasonably sustainable (Goodland, et. al. 1991).  
Especially since the 1992 Earth Summit, many environmental policy objectives have been 
formulated in terms of sustainability.3 The proliferation of these objectives has even spawned considerable 
discussion about how to measure sustainability. Yet actual conceptualizing and operationalizing the term 
are exceedingly rare. And nowhere are they more rare than at the national and international level where 
political suspicions and data gaps frequently conspire to derail even the most modest efforts to compare 
environmental circumstances and performances among countries.  
To be useful, environmental sustainability must be conceptually defined, and an environmental 
sustainability index must be created in a systematic, transparent, and reproducible manner. It should be 
                                                          
3 In 1992, the leaders of the world met at the Earth Summit in Rio, Brazil to set out an ambitious agenda to 
address the environmental, economic, and social challenges facing the international community. 
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faithful to the scientific literature as well as relevant to the major policy debates. It should be applicable to 
a wide range of situations and conditions. And it should make use of what can actually be measured today 
while leaving room for movement toward what ought to be measured tomorrow.  
The first challenge in utilizing sustainable development is to define the scope in conceptual terms. 
What are we trying to measure? Unlike many efforts to think about characteristics of sustainable 
development, this study will focus on environmental sustainability, which is a more narrow formulation 
than sustainable development. This choice was made deliberately, based on a conclusion that the failure of 
measuring sustainability is that the efforts seek to fold too many disparate phenomena under the same 
conceptual umbrella. While we accept the premise that politics, economics, and social values are important 
factors worthy of being sustained, there is no sufficient scientific, empirical and socio-political basis for 
constructing metrics that combine all of them along with the environment. In fact, the environment often 
gets overshadowed in triple bottom line analyses and other sweeping sustainability efforts.  
In this stage of the discourse, a milestone study by the World Economic Forum (WEF), the Yale 
University Center for Environmental Law and Policy (YCELP), and the Columbia University Center for 
International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) provides sound criteria on sustainability and 
focuses on the narrow term of environmental sustainability rather than the broad term of sustainable 
development. The formulation of conceptual and operational definition for the narrow term, environmental 
sustainability, used here is inspired by the collaborative work of WEF, YCELP, and CIESIN (WYC 2001). 
Even having the more narrow focus of environmental sustainability, however, we are still dealing 
with a complicated, multi-dimensional concept. At the most basic level, following the collaborative work, 
this study contends that environmental sustainability can be presented as a function of five phenomena: (1) 
the state of the environmental systems, such as air, soil, ecosystems, and water; (2) the stresses on those 
systems, in the form of pollution and exploitation levels; (3) the human vulnerability to environmental 
change in the form of loss of food resources or exposure to environmental diseases; (4) the social and 
institutional capacity to cope with environmental challenges; and finally (5) the ability to respond to the 
demands of global stewardship by cooperating in collective efforts to conserve international environmental 
resources such as atmosphere. In short, while this study recognizes the well-known definition of sustainable 
development constructed by the 1987 Bruntland Commission of WCED, environmental sustainability is, as 
the dependent variable here, defined as the ability to produce high levels of performance on each of these 
five dimensions in a lasting manner. As seen in Table 1.3, it refers to the five dimensions as the core 
components of environmental sustainability.  
Scientific knowledge, however, does not permit us to specify precisely what levels of performance 
are high enough to be truly sustainable, especially at a worldwide scale. Nor are we able to identify in 
advance whether any given level of performance is capable of being carried out in a lasting manner. In 
other words, although we can formulate the conceptual definition of environmental sustainability, we still  
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Table 1.3. Components and Logics of Environmental Sustainability  
 
Component  Logic 
   
Environmental 
Systems 
 A country is environmentally sustainable to the extent that its vital 
environmental systems are maintained at healthy levels, and to the extent to 
which levels are improving rather than deteriorating.  
   
Reducing 
Environmental 
Stresses 
 A country is environmentally sustainable if the levels of anthropogenic stress are 
low enough to engender no demonstrable harm to its environmental systems. 
   
Reducing Human 
Vulnerability 
 A country is environmentally sustainable to the extent that people and social 
systems are not vulnerable (in the way of basic needs such as health and 
nutrition) to environmental disturbances; becoming less vulnerable is a sign that 
a society is on a track to greater sustainability. 
   
Social and 
Institutional 
Capacity 
 A country is environmentally sustainable to the extent that it has in place 
institutions and underlying social patterns of skills, attitudes and networks that 
foster effective responses to environmental challenges.  
   
Global Stewardship  A country is environmentally sustainable if it cooperates with other countries to 
manage common environmental problems, and if it reduces negative extra-
territorial environmental impacts on other countries to levels that cause no 
serious harm.   
 
Source: 2001 Environmental Sustainability Index (WYC 2001, 9).  
 
have difficulty converting the conceptual entity into a relevant, scientific, and objective one. It is our 
challenge to construct such an operational definition.  
The Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) composed by the collaborative work of WYC, 
provides excellent indicators for empirical research to address the shortcomings. These indicators were 
deemed the most relevant constitutive elements of the five core components and the central element of 
analysis. In turn, each of the indicators is associated with a number of variables that are empirically 
measured.  After building up the complete database, WYC selected countries for inclusion in the index 
based on the extent of their data coverage. As seen in Table 1.4, the collaborative work generates a full set 
of 22 indicators for environmental sustainability (WYC 2001).   
In fact, the ESI enables: (1) identification of issues where national environmental results are above 
or below expectations; (2) policy tracking to identify area of success or failure; (3) benchmarking of 
environmental performance; (4) identification of best practices; (5) investigation into interactions between 
environmental and economic performance; and (6) comparative studies of interactions of socio-political 
conditions and environmental sustainability. The ESI also permits cross-national comparisons of 
environmental progress in a systematic and quantitative fashion. It represents a first step towards a more 
analytically driven approach to environmental decision-making and environmental sustainability in the 
national level analyses. 
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Table 1.4. Components and Indicators of Environmental Sustainability 
 
 
Component 
 
Indicators 
     
Environmental 
Systems 
 (1) Air quality. 
(4) Biodiversity.  
(2) Water quality. 
(5) Terrestrial 
systems. 
(3) Water quantity. 
     
Reducing 
Environmental 
Stresses 
 (6) Reducing air 
pollution.  
(9) Reducing waste & 
consumption pressures. 
(7) Reducing water 
stress 
(10) Reducing 
population pressure. 
(8) Reducing ecosystem 
stress. 
     
Reducing Human 
Vulnerability 
 (11) Basic human 
sustenance. 
(12) Environmental 
health. 
 
 
     
Social and 
Institutional 
Capacity 
 (13) Science/technology. 
(16) Private sector 
responsiveness. 
(19) Eco-efficiency. 
(14) Capacity for 
debate. 
(17) Environmental 
information. 
 
(15) Regulation & 
management. 
(18) Reducing public 
choice distortions. 
     
Global 
Stewardship 
 (20) International 
commitment. 
(21) Global-scale 
funding/participation. 
(22) Protecting 
international commons. 
 
Source: 2001 Environmental Sustainability Index (WYC 2001,10-11) 
 
2. The Quality of Governance 
In order to organize the argument and identify the causal relationship between the quality of 
governance and environmental sustainability, we require a working definition of governance per se.4 
Following the approach of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, this study defines governance as an 
institutional framework of government: that is, traditions and institutions that determine how authority is 
exercised in a particular country. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, held 
accountable, monitored, and replaced; (2) the capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently and 
formulate, implement, and enforce sound policies and regulations; and (3) the respect of citizens and the 
state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. More specifically, this 
study starts from the assumption that available indicators shed light on a fairly small number of broad 
concepts of governance, which include the following six characteristics: accountability, political stability, 
                                                          
4 There does not appear to be a single accepted definition of governance in political science, especially in 
the field of comparative politics. The definition of governance, used here, is inspired by and formulated 
from the various research of the Institute for Governance, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 
(1999), and Werlin (1995, 2000).   
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government effectiveness, regulatory framework, rule of law, and corruption control.5 Although a wide 
variety of cross-country indicators elucidate the various dimensions of governance, this study adopts 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton’s work.6 Their conceptual and operational definitions of governance 
do offer excellent guides to cross-country differences and comparisons in governance. They do not attempt 
to compile or present the wide array of available quantitative and descriptive data on cross-country 
differences in political and social institutions; instead, in order to identify important determinants of the 
cross-country differences in the quality of governance, their focus was limited to measuring the perceptions 
of interested parties such as residents of a country, entrepreneurs, foreign investors, and civil society at 
large, regarding the quality of governance in a country.  
According to them, although this kind of data is inherently subjective, there are several reasons 
why it is useful in measuring governance. First, for many issues such as the prevalence of corruption, 
objective data is almost by definition rather difficult to obtain. There are few alternatives to subjective 
indicators if one wishes to measure these aspects of governance. Second, perceptions of the quality of 
governance may often be as important as objective differences in institutions across countries. While a 
country may nominally enjoy a set of sound institutions according to certain standards, the confidence of 
residents of a country in these institutions is also required if they are to contribute to good governance. 
Third, it has been proven that data based on subjective perceptions have significant explanatory power for 
various studies and a sound analytical basis7 (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999, 2).   
Following the method of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, the operational measurement of 
governance is, here, organized by a subset of governance indicators into six clusters, seen in Table 1.5. 
There are two key aspects of the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and replaced 
with clusters labeled accountability and political stability. Two clusters, referred to as government 
effectiveness and regulatory framework, represent the capacity of the state to implement sound policies. 
Finally, two clusters, labeled rule of law and corruption control, capture the respect of citizens and the state 
for the rules that govern their interactions.  
Although students in political science are suffering from a lack of literature investigating the 
quality of governance as an explanatory variable, economists have conducted a growing empirical survey 
documenting the relationship between various aspects of governance and economic outcomes. This  
                                                          
5 A series of country governance indicators was developed by the World Bank in order to foster research on 
the relationship between governance and development. A detailed description of these data can be found in 
Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). While the authors of this report caution that the governance 
indicators carry with them large standard errors, thus limiting cross-national comparisons, they do offer 
reliable guides to the good and bad governance of countries. 
6 A database of such objective institutional indicators is currently being complied as a joint effort by 
Keefer, Bates, Epstein, and O’Halloran, in an effort coordinated by the Center for International 
Development at Harvard University (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999, 1).   
7 For example, in the context of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, Kaufmann, Mahrez, and Schmukler 
(1999) find that investor perceptions of future financial instability had significant explanatory power for 
future actual volatility.  
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Table 1.5. The Conceptual and Operational Definition of Governance and Indicators. 
 
Conceptual Definition  
  
 Intuitional framework of government: traditions and institutions that determine how authority is 
exercised in a particular country. 
     
Operational Definition 
  
(A) The process by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored, and replaced. 
 Indicators measured by (1) accountability and (2) political stability. 
     
(B) The capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently and formulate, implement, and 
enforce sound policies and regulations. 
 Indicators measured by (3) government effectiveness and (4) regulatory framework. 
     
(C) The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions among them. 
 Indicators measured by (5) rule of law and (6) corruption control. 
 
Source: Governance Matters (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999) 
 
literature includes Mauro (1995) on the effects of corruption on economic growth and investment; Loayza 
(1996) on the determinants of the unofficial economy; Ades and DiTella (1996) on the causes and 
consequences of corruption; Knack and Keefer (1997) on the importance of institutions for economic 
growth; Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) on corruption and public investment; Wei (1997) on the effects of 
corruption on foreign direct investment; Rodrik (1997) on the role of institutions in the success of East 
Asia; Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (1998) on the effects of corruption on the unofficial 
economy; Hall and Jones (1999) on the relationship between levels of per capita income and a measure of 
what they call, social infrastructure; and Chong and Calderon (1999) on the Granger-causality between 
institutions and economic growth. It is, accordingly, worthwhile for students of politics to examine and 
emphasize what governance is in terms of conceptual formulation as well as practical application, and how 
good governance acts in various political processes. Using the six aggregate governance indicators 
described above and constructing a model of environmental sustainability, this study contributes to the 
literature of environmental politics by examining a causal relationship from improved governance to better 
environmental sustainability.    
 
3. Democracy and Economic Development 
In popular thinking democracy is friendly to, and sometimes even necessary for, the protection of 
the environment. Political democracy allows citizens to influence public policy by participating, 
individually and collectively through interest groups, in their formulation and implementation. Fair periodic 
elections, freedom of speech, assembly and organization, and generally free press seem essential for 
citizen’s ability to influence their government and keep it accountable. The vast scale of environmental 
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destruction in the ex-communist countries of East and Central Europe and the old Soviet Union has 
strengthened the idea that democracy is better able to protect the environment than authoritarian regimes 
(Albrecht 1987; Alcamo 1992; Bolan 1992; Feffer 1992; Singleton 1987; Ziegler 1987). The lack of 
freedom for citizens to openly organize and oppose environmental destruction in the ex-communist 
countries has been considered a major reason for this unchecked destruction. The lack of political rights 
and civil liberties in these countries contributed significantly to the lack of environmental protection 
(Debardeleben 1991; Jancar-Webster 1993; Singleton 1987). Protests against environmental destruction 
became an important part of the general opposition to the communist regimes in East and Central Europe 
that eventually resulted in their collapse (Jancar-Webster 1993). 
Non-communist authoritarian regimes seem to be equally unfriendly to the environment (Desai 
and Snavely 1998). In Nigeria and Indonesia the military dictatorships have paid little attention to the vast 
environmental destruction in their drive to exploit resources: oil and forests.8 Lack of openness and lack of 
information about the government policies along with lack of freedom of speech and organization in 
authoritarian regimes make it very difficult to deal effectively with the problems of environmental pollution 
and destruction. Political democracy, with its freedoms and its openness and free flow of information, 
seems better designed and more likely to deal effectively with environmental problems.9 
Democracy itself seems to be at least partly dependent on the level of a country’s economic 
development. Lipset argued that democracy is related to the state of economic development. The more 
well-to-do a nation-state, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy (Lipset 1960: 31; Diamond, 
Linz, and Lipset 1989). The studies over the last four decades seem generally to support the causal 
relationship between economic development and democracy (Diamond 1992). As sustaining democracy is 
dependent on economic development, and since economic growth and prosperity generally result in 
environmental pollution and ecological destruction, democracy would not necessarily be protective of the 
environment. Freedoms associated with democracy perhaps provide a better potential for environmental 
protection, if and only if protection of the global environment becomes a highly desired value over a long 
and sustained period of time, for a large majority of the people. However, democracy’s dependence on 
economic development means that for democracies to be friendly to the environment would require 
fundamental changes in the individual values and the dominant social paradigm that justify ever increasing 
material wealth and prosperity even at the expense of the environment (Desai 1993; Inglehart 1997). The 
                                                          
8 The recent hanging of a Nigerian poet and playwright, Ken Saro-Wiwa, and eight other members of his 
Ogoni tribe underlined among other things the dangers of protest against environmental destruction in a 
military dictatorship.  
9 The connection between political democracy and environmental protection appears less compelling when 
focus is on the rich industrial countries. Environmental pollution and ecological destruction have reached 
very high levels in the Western democracies. Most of the greenhouse gasses responsible for global 
warming, most of the chemicals responsible for the hole in the ozone layer, and most of the hazardous and 
toxic wastes are produced by the democratic industrial countries.  
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historical record of ecological destruction in democracies does not inspire much confidence in their ability 
to protect the environment.   
Notwithstanding the current popularity of the market as a solution for all social problems, much of 
the argument for the environmental regulations enacted over the last twenty-five years in market 
democracies is based on the need for government action to counter the limitations inherent in the working 
of the market (Hardin 1968; Hodge 1995; Tietenberg 1992). Problems of environmental pollution and 
destruction are, in neoclassical economics, a result of a market failure (Samuelson 1983). In economic 
theory, environmental pollution in a market economy is a problem of externality, a result of the fact that not 
all the costs and benefits of the use of environment are reflected in market transactions (Hodge 1995; 
Andersen 1994). However, continued environmental pollution and ecological destruction in spite of 
environmental regulations have in recent years brought increasing attention to the failure of government 
regulations to protect the environment. Many explanations have been advanced for continuing ecological 
destruction and for inability of environmental regulations to stop it. Some environmentalists blame it on the 
continuing dominance of belief in perpetual economic growth and unchecked industrial expansion (Rogers 
1994; Sachs 1992; Tokar 1987). However, believers in the superiority of the market have blamed it on the 
self-interested behavior of bureaucrats and the inherent inefficiency of administrative regulations (LeGrand 
1991; Wilson 1980; Niskanen 1971). They argue that government regulations are not only ineffective and 
inefficient, but are also counterproductive. They believe that more extensive property rights to natural 
resources (including the natural environment) would protect more efficiently the environment people want 
to protect. They advocate “free market environmentalism” instead of environmental regulation (Andersen 
and Leal 1991). 
Many of those between the true believers in the magic of an unfettered market and those who 
completely reject the market and the modern industrial order attribute the continuing environmental 
degradation both to market failure and to state failure (Janicke 1990; Cairncross 1994). Many policy 
makers and academics, especially economists and political scientists, have increasingly advocated use of 
the “polluter pays” principle through market mechanisms such as green taxes and levies as effective ways 
of dealing with market failure to protect the environment (Andersen 1994; Barde 1994; Baptist 1994; 
Mitnick 1980; Marcus 1982). While there have been relatively few empirical studies of the effectiveness of 
these economic instruments (Andersen 1994; Hidefumi 1990; OECD 1989; Hudson, Lake, and Grossman 
1981), there is increasing evidence that such economic instruments produce more mixed results than 
economic-rationale predict (Andersen 1994; OECD 1989; Majone 1989). Market-based instruments have 
serious limitations in protecting the environment in practice. Their effectiveness depends on the 
institutional setting, including national policy style (Andersen 1994). 
The willingness and capacity of governments in poor countries to enforce environmental policies 
and regulations are often questionable. Corruption among politicians as well as bureaucrats is widespread 
in many poor countries. Polluting industries and businesses fend off and ignore environmental regulations 
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by routinely bribing or buying off government officials. In poor countries, there is often a general lack of 
scientific knowledge about the environment in the very agencies that are entrusted with protecting it. These 
agencies also often lack the professionalism, independence, and resources necessary to effectively enforce 
the regulations. In addition, the centralized nature of environmental protection agencies and policies reduce 
the government’s capacity to control pollution and protect the environment. Some environmentalists and 
scholars suggest that grass-roots community and nongovernmental organizations provide a more effective 
alternative to government agencies in protecting the environment and in using natural resources wisely 
(Reilly 1993; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom, Schroder, and Wynne 1993). 
 
4 Organization of the Study 
This study is to examine the determinants of environmental sustainability with cross-national 
statistical comparisons using national aggregates in 122 countries. It hypothesizes and tests the thesis that 
the quality of governance is intrinsically related to, and even generates pressure for, environmental 
sustainability. Although a wide variety of research has tried to construct a general theory for 
environmentalism, inconclusive findings about the dynamics of environmental politics have still emerged 
in the literature. Based upon the inconsistencies of existing theories and previous comparative research on 
environmental sustainability, this study constructs a critical test of original hypotheses and analyzes 
multifaceted dynamics of environmentalism. Chapter one explores the problem and challenges of different 
degree of environmental sustainability and identifies conceptually and operationally the two main variables, 
environmental sustainability and governance, in order to enhance the clarity of the presentation. It also 
explains the interconnectedness of democracy, economic growth and the environment. Chapter two 
examines theoretical orientations, focusing on various arguments and determinants of good governance. 
Recognizing the multi-dimensional complexity of environmental politics, this chapter elaborates political 
elasticity theory to ground the proposed thesis: the better the governance, the better the environmental 
sustainability. The main assumption of political elasticity theory says: “the more governments or those in 
authority can integrate and alternate soft forms of political power (e.g., incentives to persuasion) with hard 
forms of power (e.g., disincentives and coercion), the more effective they will be” (Werlin 2000, 582). 
Chapter three delineates the impacts of democratic, economic, and international factors on the environment. 
They include (1) the function of democracy and civil liberties as social conditions, (2) the economic impact 
of growth on environmentalism, and (3) the consequences of global economic integration and UN 
environmental conferences as international factors. Chapter four consists of a discussion of the data and 
method used. It constructs an environmental sustainability model and investigates empirical surveys of 
multiple regression analyses. This model identifies the causal relationship between explanatory variables 
and the dependent variable, environmental sustainability. Chapter five presents findings and discussions. 
The empirical results elaborate and confirm the main proposition that environmental sustainability is 
largely due to the degree of governance quality. And more, the dynamics of regional environmental politics 
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will be presented.10 Last, summarizing findings and their implications, Chapter six offers brief concluding 
observations on both theory and future of environmental politics and suggests some guides to further 
research of governance and environmental sustainability.  
                                                          
10 Along with testing the general hypotheses (sampled in all 122 target countries), reduced hypotheses are 
also analyzed in the basis of six regions: Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; Middle East and North 
Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; East and Central Europe; and the OECD member states. Countries in the six 
groups are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For more details, see the section of Sample Selection in 
chapter four.  
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Chapter Two. A Comparative Perspective of Governance 
This chapter will investigate theoretical foundations of governance, its relevance and implications. 
Let us look at the following comparative questions: What explains the capacity of countries to perform both 
environmental sustainability and economic development?11 What explains the different degrees of 
environmental sustainability among countries and/or among similar types of regimes (i.e., democratic, 
authoritarian, and totalitarian)? Why is economic globalization good for environmental sustainability for 
some countries, but not for others? Then, there are more general comparative questions: What explains the 
capacity of countries to change their political culture? Why is it that autocratic governments are sometimes 
more effective in promoting development than their more democratic counterparts? Why is it that More 
Developed Countries (MDCs) are both more centralized and more decentralized than Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs)? Why is it that corruption is devastating for poor countries, but not rich countries?  
One group of students in political science might begin their answers with a description of political 
systems (authoritarian, totalitarian, democratic, single-party, multiparty, parliamentarian, presidential, 
federal, military, etc.); another would introduce a variety of concepts (conflict, choice, structure, function, 
leadership, culture, participation, attitudes, values, processes, opinions, rationality, etc.). I believe the 
students in both groups would fail to provide satisfactory answers because they would neglect the nature of 
governance.12  
While the students might discuss the selection of leaders (who governs?) and policies (rational 
choice or cognitive frame)13 they would tend to ignore issues like the quality of governance and the 
implementation of policies. Specifically, the issues are (1) the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored, and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions among them.  
In this chapter, we will discuss conceptual discourses of governance and introduce the notions of 
political elasticity and software. And then, I will show how political elasticity theory explains the 
differences of governance quality among countries. Finally, I will survey and delineate comparative 
analyses of governance on national levels and summarize the chapter.  
 
                                                          
11 Economic development should be differentiated from economic growth, although two terms are often 
interchangeable in both economic and economics-oriented environmental studies literature. Economic 
development, here, implies “increased human welfare without increased use of materials or waste,” while 
economic growth denotes “increased use of materials and waste” referring to expanding economic scale 
and the monetary value of output (Daly 1995).    
12 Following the works of Werlin (1998), Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999), Newland (2000), 
and Pei (2002), this study conceptualizes governance as an institutional framework of government: that is, 
traditions and institutions that determine how authority is exercised in a particular country. (see table 1.5 in 
Chapter one). 
13 Influenced by psychological studies, prospect theory in IR literature is the most significant policy 
formula in cognitive frame (Berejikian 1997, Berejikian and Dryzek 2000).  
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1. Conceptual Discourses 
Although students in political science are suffering from lack of literature investigating the quality 
of governance as an explanatory variable, economists have conducted a growing empirical survey 
documenting the relationship between various aspects of governance and economic performances.  
Comparative political studies fail to consider governance research for two reasons. First, 
conceptualizing and quantifying the objects of governance are difficult. Although the concept of 
governance has become pervasive in social sciences over the past two decades, its meanings adapt to 
context and purposes, just as chameleons change according to their surroundings. Flexibility and ambiguity 
are part of its virtues. The concept of governance, however, has proved useful in dealing with the 
complexities of the exercise of authority in societies (CGG 1995; Casaburi et al 2000). A body of literature 
has attempted to circumscribe the uses of the term and define more precisely its meaning (UNESCO 1998; 
Werlin 1998; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 1999, Stillman 2001). From this literature, we are able 
to identify a common ground among the different uses of the term. It refers to situations in which several 
actors play different roles to achieve a given goal in a context where power is legitimately exercised with 
the endowment of public consensus. This implies that the exercise of power and authority lies not only in 
objective forms of government such as regime types, governmental regulations and procedures but also in 
subjective relationships between government and the citizens. In this respect, an objective form of 
governmental functions and interrelational functions of government to the public are both important. 
Consequently, governance can be conceptualized and operationalized by understanding the fundamental 
nature of politics,14 including objective functions of government, here named political hardware, and 
subjective functions of government, called political software (Wolin 1960; Werlin 2000).15  
Second, many view governance as a technical subject without political significance and linkage. 
However, for encompassing nonstate actors such as firms, business associations, Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) and advocacy groups, good governance deals effectively with complex public policy 
issues in which a two-way flow of communications between government and its social spheres in decision-
making processes is guaranteed. A wider role of civil society organized by local and functional 
organizations should help public policy overcome the lack of legitimacy and representation of many 
governments in LDCs. In this more general use, governance involves building consensus and obtaining the 
acquiescence necessary to carry out a program in an arena where many different interests are in play 
(Alcantara 1998). Furthermore, the more recent questioning of the effective capacities of traditional state 
                                                          
14 According to Wolin (1960), politics can be understood from two angles: partisanship politics and 
statesmanship politics. The former is about the “struggle for competitive advantage,” while the latter 
connotes the “struggle for consensus” in the interactions with the public (Wolin 1960, 434; Werlin 2000).   
15 Political hardware and software will be more explicitly defined later in this chapter. 
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structures to fulfill their obligations and achieve their goals enables a smooth transition of the use of the 
term governance not only in cross-national comparative studies but also in the global agenda.16  
Consequently, the notion of governance addresses issues of power distribution and political 
consensus that allow the easing of political conflicts and tensions in a nonideological fashion.17 Good 
governance includes much broader public policy considerations than assessment of government structure or 
location of public service production or provision. Good governance integrates institutional incentives, 
interests and information with citizens’ involvement in political processes.    
Despite the conceptual complexities of governance, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) 
such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) have incorporated the notion of 
good governance into their lending programs.18 Good governance has become acknowledged as being for 
the benefit of the subjects that are governed.19 In a notable deviation from its traditional support of 
neoclassical economic frameworks for economic development in the Third World, the World Bank argues 
that state capability in promoting efficient collective actions ensuring the maintenance of law and order, 
public health and basic infrastructure is essential for development. The Bank implies that state capability 
means combating entrenched corruption, subjecting state institutions to greater competition, making the 
state more responsive to people’s needs and bringing government closer to the people through broader 
participation and decentralization of government activities (Tussie and Fernanda 1997).  
Accordingly, the notion of good governance serves as the main criterion to measure state capacity 
in comparative research. The Bank uses a definition of governance that turns it into a problem-solving tool 
                                                          
16 In fact, the concept of governance has been applied to different units of analysis: an industry, an issue 
area, an international regime, or a country. Analyzing governance on the national level is often seen when 
international development institutions refer to conditionality of international loans and aid. It is said; 
“improving governance in borrowers” is the main criterion for international aid programs (World Bank 
1994, 2000).   
17 Although this feature has contributed to its rapid acceptance, the concept curiously has no Spanish 
equivalent. The Latin American political tradition tends to consider the formal and objective forms of 
government as the epicenter of all struggles and processes (Stillman 2001, 250).     
18 International lending programs in Latin American states illustrate a good example. Political consensus 
among governments and international communities led the IDB to suspend consideration of loans to 
Allende’s Chile in the early 1970s and to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua in the 1980s. On the 
other hand, Chile under Pinochet after Allende’s regime was considered as one of the most favored 
countries in the region, although the regime was anti-democratic and severely authoritarian. In the 1990s, 
with a new consensus on democratic governance rule after the fall of President Aristide in Haiti, the IDB 
suspended all further country planning. When President Fujimori suspended constitutional rule in Peru in 
April 1992, the IDB’s board blocked all new loans to the country, and management froze the signature of 
loans already approved by the board. The block was lifted when a new plan of governmental reform was 
announced in September, and the Bank subsequently led an international rescue package for Peru (Tussie 
1995). 
19 Although MDBs intend to play within the limits of the so-called technical understanding of governance, 
they also expect to achieve results coherent with a wider definition of governance: better governments that 
are more transparent, more honest, and more representative of the popular will. In this wider sense, we can 
see the roles of the MDBs in the last decade at three different levels of governance: global, local 
(borrowing countries), and their own institutional governance. 
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to make projects more effective or to help borrowing countries use scarce resources better to move along 
the development path. Thus governance is the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a 
country’s economic and social resources for development (Laateef, 1992; Murphy 1994). In this way, 
governance becomes a process of political compromising and a set of conditions that facilitates not only 
economic development but also socio-political development. This process and these conditions are 
consistent with the original mandates of the World Bank and, in principle, stripped of political significance 
(Boeningher 1992). Good governance is, consequently, a political manifesto about efficiency and 
effectiveness of public policies and governmental capacity (Werlin 1998; 2000; Stillman 2001).   
Analyzing comparative political systems, Pei articulates the notion of governance in the context of 
regime changes. According to him, there are three fundamental functions of governance (Pei 1998; 2002, 
97-99). In most political systems a regime’s capacity to govern is measured by how it performs three key 
tasks: managing internal tensions, providing public good, and mobilizing political support. These three 
functions of governance, named as conflict resolution, performance, and legitimation, are, in reality, 
intertwined. A regime capable of providing adequate public goods such as education, public health, law and 
order, is more likely to gain popular support and keep internal tensions low. Strong organizational 
discipline, accountability, and a set of core values with broad appeal are essential to effective governance. 
Unlike MDBs’ institutional approach to defining governance where societal conditions and public 
participations are key explanatory variables, this statist approach relies on the condition that a regimes’ 
willingness and capability are essential for constructing a good governance. 
In a context of public service in a globalized world, Newland (2000) illustrates three interrelated 
notions of governance: facilitation of collective actions by public institutions (capacities), public values-
oriented social self-governance where individuals and communities organize to express and pursue their 
collective values and priorities (socio-political processes), and reliance on the disciplines of market 
systems and civil society (interactions).20 All this occurs in a context of the exacerbation of global trends in 
economic and financial, technological, environmental, and socio-political areas (Brinderhoff and Coston 
1999; Farazmand 1999). 
In this stage of debates, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton’s research shows not only a 
conceptual stretch but also an operational articulation in the study of governance. Including the 
                                                          
20 De Tocqueville identifies civil society with the premodern trans-class network of mutual aid and social 
service rooted in local villages and neighborhoods. He employs the notion of “political association” in 
order to capture the new dimension of social life characterized by autonomous groups able to articulate and 
to defend their needs and interests through public discussion and other forms of collective action 
(Tocqueville 1848 1969, 189-95). The notion of political association resembles Diamond’s definition of 
civil society as “the realm of organized social life that is voluntary ... [and] autonomous from the state” in 
which “citizens act to express and defend their ideas, interests, and needs” (Diamond 1994, 5). The 
difference between these concepts stems from the nature of the mediating function each performs. While 
the Tocquevillian notion of political association implies mediation between the traditional network of 
mutual support and the state, the contemporary notion of civil society, posited in the horizontal parallelism 
with political society, connotes mediation between the private lives of individuals and the state. 
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perspectives of diverse observers (political experts, businesses, and private citizens) and covering a wide 
range of topics (political stability and the business climate, the efficacy of public service provision, 
experiences with corruption, and so on), they defines governance as “an institutional framework of 
government” and identity three attributes to governance: political process, government capacity, and 
interrelationships between government and the citizens (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999, 1). 
More specifically, assuming that available indicators shed light on a fairly small number of broad concepts 
of governance, they operationalize governance with the following six characteristics: accountability, 
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory framework, rule of law, and corruption control. 
Their conceptual and operational interpretations of governance do offer excellent guides to cross-country 
differences and comparisons in governance. In keeping with the emphasis on the facilitative state, 
according to them the concept of governance can be a favored solution for exploring ways to improve the 
efficiency, effectiveness, and feasibility of public services.  
Good governance, accordingly, offers significant potential to (1) enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness by relying on comparative advantages and a rational division of labor; (2) provide the 
multiactor, integrated solutions sometimes required by the scope and nature of the problems being 
addressed; (3) move from a no-win situation among multiple actors to a compromise and potential win-win 
situation in response to collective action problems or the need for conflict resolution;21 and (4) open 
decision-making processes to promote a broader operationalization of the public good (Brinderhoff 2002, 
325).    
In sum, although there are virtually innumerable definitions of governance among practitioners 
and political scientists, governance conceptually defined as an institutional arrangement with six 
quantifying indicators shows positive heuristic characteristics in research programming. The concept of 
governance encompasses much broader public policy considerations than assessment of government 
structure or location of public service production or provision. Table 2.1 shows a wide variety of notions of 
governance and its attributes. We turn now to considerations of political elasticity and software. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 The evolution of collective-action theories reflects an increasing acknowledgment of its complexities. 
Originally, it was assumed that individual actors would rationally choose to engage in collective action 
because of their acknowledged interest in doing so. From the individual perspective, this constitutes self-
interest. In the organizational context, this can be viewed as instrumental rationality (Machado and Bums 
1998). The organization will participate in collective action if it presents an opportunity to further its own 
objectives. Because there are opportunities to free ride, collective action may actually be irrational and, 
therefore, incentives and sanctions must be created to ensure compliance with collective-action objectives 
(Olson 1965). More recently, scholars have begun to recognize that utility and rationality can also be based 
on moral grounds (Etzioni 1991, 1988; Frank 1990).  
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Table 2.1. Comparing Notions of Governance and Its Attributes 
 
 Cluster (Function) Attribute (Operational Indicator) 
   
Hybrid Aspect Accountability  
Effectiveness  Administrative 
Function Efficiency  
Citizen Participation  
 
Governance in Political Elasticity 
Theory 
Political Feature 
Transparency  
Conflict Resolution Managing Internal Tension 
Performance  Providing Public Goods 
 
Governance in Pei’s Study 
Legitimation  Mobilizing Political Support 
Accountability  Processes  
Political Stability 
Government Effectiveness Capacities  
Regulatory Framework 
Rule of Law 
 
 
Governance in This Study 
Interactions  
Corruption Control  
 
 
2. Political Elasticity Theory and Political Software 
Permitting equal consideration of political science and public administration, Werlin implants 
“political elasticity” as a theory of governance. The principles of political elasticity theory are employed to 
answer not only comparative political questions but also general political science research (2000, 582-3).22 
According to Werlin, political elasticity theory consists of the following five propositions: First, the more 
governments or those in authority can integrate and alternate soft forms of political power, linking 
incentives to persuasion, with hard forms of power, including disincentives and coercion, the more 
effective they will be. Second, as leaders integrate and alternate soft and hard forms of power, their 
political power takes on “rubber band” and “balloon” characteristics,23 allowing them (1) to decentralize or 
delegate power in various ways without losing control and (2) to expand their influence, reliably and 
predictably affecting the behavior of wider circles of citizens, participants, and subordinates. Third, 
political elasticity depends partly on the selection of appropriate political hardware, including “objective” 
forms of organization, but mostly on political software, recognizing the “subjective” quality of 
relationships between a government and its citizens. In other words, political software articulates the 
interrelationships between leaders and followers, while political hardware implies an “objective” form of 
organization, regulation, procedure, and technology. In this demarcation, what is as important as “the 
determination of rational choice” is “the implementation of rational choice,” and this inevitably brings us 
into “politics” in its classical meaning: “the relationship of leadership to followership for the purpose of 
                                                          
22 We have seen the sample comparative questions in the beginning of this chapter. 
23 These characteristics can be compared with the Lakatosian notion of a “protective belt” of auxiliary 
hypotheses where adjustments are made in the face of anomalies (Lakatos 1970).  
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governance” (Werlin 2000, 439-42). Fourth, political software can be made more effective in the 
commonsensical ways suggested by typical public administration and business administration studies. They 
include establishing acceptable goals, hiring qualified personnel, delegating responsibility, stimulating 
motivation and competition, encouraging training, paying attention to morale, expanding two-way flows of 
communication, promoting legitimacy, maintaining supervision, protecting independent spheres of 
authority, cultivating contractors, and developing conflict-resolution procedures. These steps are 
increasingly referred to as “good governance.” Last, the enhancement of political software requires a 
balancing of the two meanings of political power identified by Wolin (1960, 10-11, 434): the struggle for 
competitive advantage (partisanship) and the struggle for consensus (statesmanship). This demarcation is 
derived from Wolin’s definition of politics understood with three venues: partisanship, statesmanship and 
governance. This makes it possible to distinguish primary and secondary democracy and primary and 
secondary corruption (Sartori 1962; Wolin 1960). Whereas primary democracy has to do with elections, 
multiparty systems, and majority rule (i.e., when there is a meaningful struggle for competitive advantage), 
secondary democracy refers to the consensus-building essential for successfully managing the competition. 
Primary corruption, accordingly, denotes excessive partisanship or greed, while secondary corruption 
indicates a governmental inability to control or mitigate this situation.24     
These assumptions depart from two theoretical foundations. The first is Weberian theory, partly 
because of Weber’s mechanistic conception of hierarchy, qualifications, responsibilities, and privileges, but 
more because of his idealization of impersonal rationality, with expertise and rules, rather than humans, 
being in control (Chung, Shepard, and Dollinger 1989). For Werlin, politics is essential for administration, 
whereas, for Weber, depoliticizing administration (in which bureaucracy is built as a political formation 
frequently referring to the “system of social domination”) is essential (Harmon and Mayer 1986, 310). The 
difference between Weber’s and Werlin’s theories stems from the multidimensional conception of politics, 
linking politics to consensus-building, rather than limiting its meaning to maximizing personal or partisan 
advantage. Consequently, complex relationships between political and other social spheres25 must be 
                                                          
24 As an analogy, we might think of basketball fouling under two situations: one in which there is normal 
refereeing, so that “fouling is meaningful, punishable, and tolerable”; the other in which refereeing is 
corrupt, “causing fouling to be pervasive, essential, and destigmatized” (Werlin 2000, 451). 
25 An analytical frame for the interrelationships among various societal spheres can be found in the 
following diagram.  
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In this interrelational dynamics, good governance should function in all four dimensions. According to 
Diamond, civil society is the autonomous and voluntary realm where citizens act to express and defend 
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developed to improve administrative governance, whereas Weber, except in his ambiguous use of the word, 
“legitimacy,” would consider such relationships dangerous and, thus, to be suppressed. In Weber’s theory, 
we can see a vicious circle emerging, with leaders increasingly fearful of delegating responsibility, more 
reliant on coercive and corrupt forms of power, and less certain of cooperation. This explains why the so-
called “predatory regimes,” while powerful enough to be highly repressive, are not powerful enough to 
promote development. Indeed, they are also likely to be uninterested in various forms of development.  
The second theoretical foundation is Easton’s concept of political community and authority. 
Easton delineates boundaries of political community, which include both persons in government and 
persons outside of government, as they provide demands (lobbying, advocacy, etc.) and supports (loyalty, 
compliance) that energize and sustain the political system and its function. The “units of political system” 
are “political actions as they structure themselves in political roles and political groups,” according to “at 
least some minimal division of labor” (Easton 1957, 386-7). Hence, the political system and social spheres 
are interdependent, and both construct the political community, which is more than merely the political 
system or governing institutions within the system understood as political hardware in this study, while 
political community is based on the flow of two-communication (input and feedback) between citizens and 
government conceptualized as political software here. From this perspective, and in our conception of 
political software, the political community of a given territory is the collection and dialogue of citizens in 
and out of government who recognize the government as the legitimate decision maker for that territory, 
generally comply with its decisions, and cooperate toward shared purposes.26 Embedded within the 
community is the political system: the interacting set of private associations and governmental institutions 
involved in the decision-making process for the society that forms the political community (Easton 1957; 
1965).     
Furthermore, political elasticity theory can bridge a quantitative approach to a qualitative one, 
getting closer to “triangularity” fashion (King, Keohane and Verba 1994; 1995, 479; Tarrow 1995). 
Subjective processes of interrelations with citizens give a necessary counterbalance to the political 
hardware perspective that aims at objectivity, consuming so much of political science research. It can 
sensitize us to “the value problems” or governing, interrelational and cultural issues that may often seem 
invisible in the background simply because it is hard to be quantified, but are no less critical to making 
sound process of public policy. As an individual moves up the bureaucratic hierarchy, one must navigate 
through increasingly complex “competing ethical codes” (Barnard 1938, 272). In this vein, Werlin 
                                                                                                                                                                             
their ideas, interests, and needs, whereas political society represents political parties and other 
organizations whose formal goals are to seize state power. Hence, it functions as an intermediary between 
civil society and the state (Kim 1996; Diamond 1994, 4-5) and is embedded with political community, 
conceptualized as the interrelationships and “collection of persons in and out of government” (Easton 1957, 
386).  
26 In this respect, political communities are also conceived by Deutsch as “social groups with a process of 
political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance” 
(Deutsch 1954; 1970, 5).  
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introduces political elasticity theory as a unified theory in two ways: (1) reconciling contradictory theories 
between behavioralists and post-positivists and (2) presenting a single direction for political development, 
regardless of culture or form of government. Whether or not Werlin succeeds at making a convincing case 
for his theory of political elasticity, he demonstrates how political processes, government capacity, and 
interactions with citizens can be mixed, analyzed, and then judiciously related to seminal academic issues 
of our time for theory building as well as problem solving. He also suggests that the quality of relationship 
and values should be “imposed,” emphasizing the importance of alternating and blending persuasive forms 
of power and coercive forms of power, understood here as political software and hardware, respectively.  
Werlin draws together an impressive swath of theoretical research and practical firsthand observations to 
synthesize and advance a political elasticity theory or political software that emphasizes what works has to 
do more with “subjective factors” than “objective ones” (Stillman 2001, 248). Let us now turn to specific 
cases illustrative of the above theories of governance. 
 
3 Comparative Analyses of Governance: Cases of Environmental Management  
We begin by considerations how governance functions differently in environmental management 
with two extreme cases, Japanese and Nigerian governances.  While I believe that the comparison of 
governance in Japan and Nigeria illustrates the difficulty of generalizing what and how governance is from 
a MDC to a LDC, these two extreme cases can explicitly articulate the functions of political software and 
the quality of governance. All in all, Japanese political software tends to be extremely strong, and three 
components of good governance - processes, capacities, and interactions - are very elastic. On the other 
hand, in Nigeria, political software tends to be extremely weak. That is why Nigeria, in particular, and most 
of sub-Saharan African states in general, appears to the outsider so confusing, characterized simultaneously 
as “overdeveloped” and “underdeveloped” or “soft” and also “authoritarian” (Callaghy 1994, 200, 202). 
 
Nature of Bureaucracy 
The meritocratic nature of the Japanese bureaucracy is obviously an important explanatory factor 
in the success of Japanese sustainable development.27 While Japan’s public sector is relatively small,28 it 
attracts the best educated. In 1982, there were more than 40 applicants for each position; and in 1988, only 
6.3% of those taking the higher civil service examinations passed (Pempel 1982, 269; Koh 1989, 80). It 
                                                          
27 Analyzing comparative environmental management, Kenney and Florida (1993) articulate the Japanese 
environment management model with a number of aspects: careful selection of public servants, self-
management work teams, job rotation, overlapping functions, flexible and limited job classification and 
specialization, employment commitment and job security, close alignment between work and home life, 
social control rather than control from above, social reinforcement of norms and practices, use of 
persuasion rather than commands, good community relations, welfare corporatism, single cafeterias, labor-
management cooperation, quality circles, innovation from below, perpetual innovation and continual 
training. 
28 Japanese public sector figures 4.4 employees per 100 inhabitants, which is one-third the figure for Great 
Britain and just over half for the U.S.A. and Germany (Werlin 1995, 127). 
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should also be noted that most of these applicants come from Japan’s top universities, which are 
notoriously difficult to get into. Although its small size compared with most other nations and its stringent 
processes of selection, the elitism of the Japanese bureaucracy has aroused public animosity as well as 
admiration. In Nigeria, in contrast to Japan, there has been an intensification of mistrust within the Nigerian 
political system since independence. According to Williams (1992, 114), “much of the acrimony among 
elites is attributable to intemporate personality conflicts and quarrels dating back to the First Republic.” 
Positions in public administration are seen primarily as opportunities for private enrichment (Koehn 1990, 
274). Thus, politics is nothing more than a way of distributing public patronage in appointments and 
expenditures (Forrest 1993, 7).  
 
Capacity: Effectiveness and Regulatory Framework 
Respect for Japan’s central government bureaucracy is essential in explaining the success of 
environmental management program because of its systematic regulatory framework. Most environmental 
regulations and policies including anti-pollution initiatives are primarily developed by the Japan 
Environment Agency in consultation with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and 
other competent authorities (MEIP 1994, 43). Eventually these initiatives must be approved by the Central 
Pollution Control Council, which consists of representatives from academia, industry, public interest 
groups, and local government, prior to submission to the Diet. MITI plays a central role in all this, using its 
Industrial Technology Institute to facilitate negotiations over standards, financing mechanisms, and 
technology development. Japan’s capacity for implementing public policies has to do with the political 
elasticity of its administrative system. Experts on Japan describe how political elasticity and software 
function in different ways. MacDougall writes: “Japanese-style democracy … emphasizes equality in 
human welfare as well as in participation” (1989, 155). Keehn (1990, 1034) notes an informal exchange 
mechanism within the bureaucracy that “is intended to balance institutional interests and maintain avenues 
of information exchange, negotiation, and compromise between powerful ministerial actors and clients.” 
Koh (1989, 256) refers to the consensus-building devices of ringisho and nemawashi, by which the 
administrative elite undertake “a painstaking process of touching bases with all important persons who 
probably will impinge upon a decision.” This is not to deny the Japanese ability to use coercion and 
sanction; but, as Haley (1991, 191) points out: “They must be recognized as fair,” adding: “For all the 
conflict, inefficiency, and dysfunction manifested in so many aspects of postwar Japanese social, political 
and economic life, Japan maintains a remarkably just as well as stable social order.”  
On the other hand, Phillips (1991) delineates the following five deep-rooted political and 
administrative weaknesses in Nigeria. The first issue is lack of measurable objectives. Because most 
Nigerian agencies lack clear and measurable objectives, administrators must work within an environment 
of consistent instability. Long term planning, therefore, becomes impossible. The second is the process of 
inadequate evaluations. Nigeria operates a political culture that places no premium on performance or 
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achievement. Since access to governmental power has come through the barrel of a gun or through rigged 
elections, those in power are not motivated to provide good public services and are unable to compel the 
civil service to do so. Although annual performance evaluation forms were introduced in 1975, little use is 
made of them, with across-the-board automatic annual salary increments defeating the purpose of 
rewarding achievement. The third problem is mismanagement of time. The emphasis of the Nigerian civil 
service is largely on form, strict hierarchy, and subservient obedience to superiors, not on time-
management. With numerous links in the bureaucratic chain and excessive caution in the processing of 
decisions, the public can expect long delays even on trivial matters. To speed up the process, the public is 
encouraged to make illegal payments. The fourth is a disorganizational function. The internal structure of 
most ministries is confusing. Consequently, there is little control over what goes on and much conflict 
between professional and administrative personnel. What has contributed to the confusion is the conflict 
among the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, and the Ministry of National Planning, resulting in 
serious deficiencies in data collection, information management, coordination of agencies, and decision-
making. The last is about personnel Mismanagement. Because the Federal Civil Service Commission 
consists of nearly illiterate political cronies of the president, members lack the knowledge, experience, and 
reputation to command the respect of civil servants. Staff is wasted, with too few qualified personnel hired 
and retained at the top levels and excessive reliance on underpaid and untrained clerical cadres for routine 
operations and contact with the public. Little formal training exists, and it tends to be sporadic, poorly 
funded, and at the whim of departmental heads or permanent secretaries. Those who are trained have no 
guarantee that their training will be respected or used, particularly in as much as they are frequently shifted 
among ministries.  
Nigerian officials rely far more on coercion than their Japanese counterparts. For example, the 
military government in 1984 declared “War Against Indiscipline,” requiring civil servants to spend 
Saturdays cleaning the streets and citizens, the last Saturday morning of each month, to clean up their 
environment (Peil 1991, 133-189). Mobile courts were set up to enforce the regulations emerging from this 
“War Against Filth.” While this program had temporary and limited success in Lagos, the capital city, it 
proved unsustainable. The Waste Disposal Board seldom supplied garbage bins or emptied the “refuse 
houses” that were constructed. It could not maintain its vehicles and other equipment. While sanitary 
inspectors were supposed to educate people about cleanliness and punish the uncooperative, their 
reputation as bribe-takers undermined their authority. Since industrial firms continued to dump their wastes 
wherever it was convenient, ordinary citizens were uninclined to take environmental cleanliness very 
seriously. Thus, by the early 1990s, “the disposal of refuse is hardly ever done correctly, with garbage 
being dumped in valleys or swamps, and untreated industrial liquid being pumped into public drains and 
surface water bodies (Aina, Etta, and Obi 1994, 208).  
 
 26
Interactions with the Public 
The Japanese administration is sometimes presented as “overbearing,” with corruption and 
favoritism, arbitrary and secretive authority, suppression of individuality and conflict, excessive promotion 
of obedience and passivity, intimidation of minorities and women, and disregard of the public (Van 
Wolferen, 1989). Hershkowitz and Salerni (1987), however, suggest that Japanese officials are just as 
concerned about public opinion as those in other MDCs and perhaps go to greater lengths to satisfy the 
public.  
During the early 1970s, in the response to Tokyo citizens’ opposition to constructing incinerators, 
because of the concern about accidents, garbage truck traffic, air pollution, and lowering of property values, 
the Prefecture’s officials had to learn the hard way to respect public opinion in the handling of solid waste. 
Through this “garbage war,” housewives and other concerned citizens sat down in front of garbage trucks 
and bulldozers until officials responded constructively to their protests. This opposition is responsible for 
the fact that Tokyo now needs twice as many incinerators as constructed in recent years (MacDougall 1989, 
140). To mollify neighborhoods willing to accept incinerators, they are often equipped with heated 
swimming pools, recreation facilities, greenhouses, workshops, and other amenities desired by the public. 
Some also provide energy to sewage treatment plants, homes for the aged, schools, public buildings, and 
car wash or snow melting machinery. Tokyo's new city hall and a number of other public buildings are now 
heated from its Urban Garbage Heat System (Linden, 1993: 38). All plants and equipment, including 
garbage trucks, are kept spotless and in top shape. Plant interiors are beautifully designed, and the 
surrounding areas, attractively landscaped. To alleviate citizens’ concerns about emissions, data recorded 
by the plants are displayed on outside billboards. Thus, despite citizen opposition, there are 13 incinerators 
operating in Tokyo, as against only two in New York where there is far more justifiable concern about air 
emissions29 (Transatlantic Perspectives 1987).  
The lack of public cooperation in Nigeria stems in part from the lack of interactions with citizens 
and services provided by local government. According to Lee and Anas, “the capacity, regularity, and 
quality of infrastructure vary from bad to worse within and across Nigerian cities” (1992, 1-3). The 
unreliability of electricity supplied by the Nigerian Electric Power Authority, for example, means that firms 
with more than 20 employees, must invest an average of US $130,000 for stand-by generators, making the 
cost of power to them about nine times higher than is observed in MDCs. Poor public telephone and postal 
services require the use of messengers on motorcycles or radio transmitters. Because of the lack of spare 
parts and maintenance capacity for repair equipment, roads are often in bad condition. For the reasons 
indicated, we find in Nigeria, on the one hand, the use of force as “a prevalent method of governance” 
(Agbese 1990, 244) and, on the other hand, the unenforceability of laws. Policemen and soldiers often set 
up illegal tollbooths on highways to extort bribes, ransack markets to loot goods, steal the proceeds of 
                                                          
29 In parts of the United States, incinerator emissions run at a hundred times acceptable levels (Transatlantic 
Perspectives 1987). 
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sporting events, and in other ways maximize their income. Aina, Etta, and Obi (1994, 214) point out that 
“the urban poor, who are the main victims of weak and ineffective environmental planning and 
management, are made the scapegoats of environmental policies and laws.” For example, following the 
enactment of the 1984 War Against Indiscipline programs, members of the Sanitation Task Force in Benue 
State used a vague law that was then enacted, disallowing coughing, spitting, or improper nose blowing, to 
harass numerous people, particularly those unable to come up with adequate bribes. However, such 
sanctions can hardly lead to sustainable development.  
 
Comparative Analyses of Governance 
One might, however, properly object to the effort to compare the degree of governance in Japan 
and Nigeria because of the “cultural gap” between these countries. After all, whereas Japan is a relatively 
homogeneous country, Nigeria includes about 250 ethnic groups, a large number of languages, and a 
dangerous Christian/Muslim division, along with a sizable number of traditional religions. Because of the 
disparity in education and income between Nigeria’s largely “Christian South” and its “Muslim North,” an 
increasingly meritocratic administration in Nigeria might be seen as “discriminatory.” Furthermore, it is 
also true that the comparison of governance in Japan and Nigeria hardly illustrates a universal model of 
environmental management. However, these two extreme cases demonstrate that Japanese political 
software tends to be extremely strong, and three components of good governance (processes, capacities, 
and interactions) are very elastic - unlike the Nigerian case. 
Let us look at another comparison - Nigeria and Indonesia. The comparison between Nigeria and 
Indonesia is worth looking at briefly in trying to understand how governances have functioned and what 
has to happen for not only socio-economic development but also sustainable development to take place.  
Indonesia, it can be argued, with its many islands and ethnic groups, its problem with ethnic 
Chinese economic domination, and its village-oriented system of authority, came into independence in 
1949 with even less of a concept of national power and national administration than did Nigeria in 1960 
(Pye 1985, 112). Whereas Indonesia’s GDP was below that of Nigeria in 1965 and not much ahead in 1980, 
it was three times that of Nigeria in 1990 (World Bank 1994, 17) and the level of sustainable development 
is much higher than that of Nigeria in 2000, by 42.6 and 31.8, respectively (WYC 2001, 14). While 
Nigeria’s per capita GNP fell by 75 percent in the 1980s, Indonesia’s per capita GNP, which has sustained 
4.4 percent growth since 1965, ended the 1980s twice that of Nigeria (Lewis 1994, 10). Despite recent 
improvements in agricultural productivity in Nigeria, Indonesian agriculture has grown roughly three times 
faster than the Nigerian output. Likewise, in manufacturing, Indonesia was able to sustain a 12 percent 
annual growth during the 1980s, while Nigeria’s production increase remained almost stagnant. Thus, 
Indonesian manufacturing comprised 20 percent of its GDP in 1990, as against about 8 percent of Nigeria’s 
GDP (Werlin 1995, 130). Nigeria has declined from a country of relative affluence (about $1,000 per-
capita annual income) in 1980 to poverty (less than $300 annual per-capita income). In terms of such social 
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indicators as infant mortality, life expectancy, per capita calorie intake, and access to safe water, Nigeria is 
considered among the poorest countries of sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 1994, 1). Between 1960 and 
1980, Nigeria’s gross domestic income grew at the extraordinary annual rate of 81 percent, propelled by 
export earnings from petroleum up by more than 1,500 percent during these years (Olayiwola 1987, 1, 
108). By 1985, this wealth had largely vanished, leaving the country increasingly in foreign debt, 
amounting to over $32 billion by 1992 (Maier 1992, 44).  
There is a natural tendency to blame all Nigeria’s troubles on the wealthy countries of the world; 
as in “the poor are poor,” because “the rich are rich.” Some believed in what might be called an “ICRC 
theory” (International, Capitalist, Racist Conspiracy). Some Nigerian scholars partly agree with this. Oil 
importing countries, according to Olayiwola (1987, 175) had deliberately used strategies to cause excess 
supply and depressed prices and to discourage industrialization. Yet, a comparison of Nigeria and 
Indonesia suggests a very different answer. Nigerian leaders are far less serious about development than 
their Indonesian counterparts. In other words, the level of governance has increased in Indonesia and 
decreased in Nigeria. The evidence can be summarized by applying the notion of political elasticity and 
software.  
In the case of Indonesia, corruption has clearly had a serious impact on the quality of Indonesian 
life: industrial pollution is extensive; the urban poor continue to depend on polluted or expensive private 
water sources; human and solid waste disposal and drainage are badly neglected; and funds that could go 
for better living conditions are wasted on general administration and office buildings. This corruption is 
intensified by low salaries, an emphasis on seniority and loyalty rather than competence, an inadequate 
legal system, and unreliable taxation and cost-recovery efforts (Mehmet 1993; World Bank 1991; Devas 
1989).  
Indonesian leaders in recent years, however, have attempted to limit the damage of corruption to 
construct good governance in the following two ways. The first is the encouragement of private sector 
development and functional differentiation of bureaucracy. Following the decline of oil prices during the 
1980s, Indonesia deliberately decreased dependence on oil income (from 45 percent in the early 1970s to 
38 percent in the 1990s), whereas Nigeria increased its dependence from about two-thirds of income in the 
early 1970s to more than 90 percent (Lewis 1994, 11). A number of useful steps were taken to open up the 
economy: decreasing protection of the industrial and agricultural sectors; reducing non-tariff barriers; 
improving the incentive system for the private sector; keeping inflation and government related debt 
relatively limited; and supporting essential infrastructure and agricultural services. President Suharto had 
taken a personal interest in certain industries, such as textiles, overcoming existing problems and barriers 
(MacIntre 1991). While the President had no intention of democratizing Indonesia, he had used and 
protected a highly respected group of U.S.-trained economists and technical experts for purposes of socio-
economic development (Lewis 1994, 17; Bhattacharya and Pangestu 1993). He had also used and protected 
Chinese business groups, encouraging a productive alliance of Chinese business interests and retired 
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military officers. The second way Indonesia attempted to construct good governance was human resource 
development and public engagement in political processes. Between 1970 and 1990, the percentage of the 
Indonesian population in absolute poverty has declined from 60 percent to 15 percent, thereby achieving 
“one of the fastest reductions in poverty and improvements in key social indicators among all developing 
countries” (Bhattacharya and Pangestu 1993, 43). Great progress has been made in infant survival, life 
expectancy, literacy, school enrollments, and access to health services. The fact that females now constitute 
48 percent of primary school enrollment and 45 percent of secondary school enrollment partly explains the 
greater success of family planning in Indonesia than Nigeria (World Bank 2000).  
While Indonesia remains a highly authoritarian regime and in Nigeria, following nearly 16 years 
of military rule, a new constitution adopted in 1999, and a peaceful transition to civilian government was 
completed, these evidences critically show the different levels of quality of governance between Indonesia 
and Nigeria. In Indonesia, the employment of university graduates in the civil service rose by 48 percent 
between 1988 and 1992, suggesting the slow shift to a meritocratic administration and fortifying political 
software. President Suharto had faced considerable opposition to his reform efforts, but, in contrast to his 
Nigerian counterparts, he had been more persistent and resourceful in surmounting intra-state resistance 
(Lewis 1994, 25). On the other hand, in Nigeria, Lindauer and Roemer (1993, 6), in their comparison of 
Asia and Africa, suggest that there is a greater willingness of Asian leaders than there is of African leaders 
to elevate public goals over private gains. As we narrow our comparison to Indonesia and Nigeria, we 
certainly find this to be the case. While corruption exists in both countries, Lewis (1994, 15) sees it as 
“primitive accumulation” in Nigeria and “productive accumulation” in Indonesia. Using Wolin's two 
definitions of politics, we can say that in Nigeria partisan politics prevails over consensus politics far more 
than in Indonesia. In Nigeria, politics is seen “as a competition between ruling-class factions over access to 
state resources” (Forrest 1993, 4). This is the case about “political illness” (Werlin 1995, 128). 
During the 1960s, the federal civil service in Nigeria was relatively well respected, in accord with 
the British Westminster-Whitehall model (Metz 1992, 239). Since then, it has become “reputedly the most 
bureau pathologic in the area” (Caiden 1991, 257). The deterioration of the civil service is acknowledged 
by a leading Nigerian business organization (the Organized Private Sector Group): “corruption has become 
institutionalized at all levels of government affecting industrial and business operations” (Maier 1992, 44). 
The country’s oil wealth has been undermined by corruption and siphoned into bureaucratic expansion, 
entrenchment, and enrichment (Koehn 1990, 275-276). “The World Bank estimated that $2.1 billion in 
petroleum receipts were diverted in 1990 and 1991 to extra-budgetary accounts, much of which were 
disbursed to regime loyalists and strategic constituents” (Lewis 1994a, 330). Despite improvements in 
import-export system under the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) introduced in 1986, businesses that 
abide by the rules continue to be penalized, suffering from arbitrary and unexpected shifts in prohibitions, 
controls, fees, and tariffs (World Bank 1994, 13). Even getting in and out of the Murtala Muhammed 
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Airport in Lagos without being robbed or forced to pay bribes can be so difficult that the American 
government no longer allows direct flights between the United States and Nigeria (French 1994, A4).  
The undermining of governance in Nigeria can be seen as a deliberate process. “The ruling class 
has shown remarkably little capacity or inclination to restrain itself” (Koehn 1990, 283). Much of the 
progress that was made under the SAP has been reversed by the recent “descent into unbridled corruption 
and patronage politics” (Lewis 1994a, 338). A World Bank report (1994, 22-23) notes that, since 1982, 
“Nigeria has not published audited, final budgetary accounts,” and that extra-budgetary spending has 
increased from 22 percent of total spending in 1986 to 65 percent in 1992. Much of the military equipment 
sold to Nigeria is intended for pay-off purposes, not for real use (Coll and Shiner 1994). While, in some 
respects, the Nigerian elite may be less authoritarian than the Indonesian elite, it is clearly far less interested 
in constructing good governance, as well as sustaining development. “Technical insolvency and financial 
distress in Nigeria appear to be pervasive and increasing” (World Bank 1994, 47).  
In trying to explain why African ruling classes seem so much more counterproductive than their 
Asian counterparts, one of the most compelling arguments is that nationalism has failed to develop in 
Africa, as against ethnic, religious, or other traditional ties. While nationalism has taken various important 
forms in Africa (as anti-colonialism, pride in African culture, and justification for authoritarian rule), it has 
not yet led to a real sense of patriotism and to its own governance. “As the expectations created by the 
promises of militant nationalism gave way to disappointment, disillusionment, and by 1900 in much of 
Africa, despair, state-based nationalism had a hollow ring” (Young 1994, 69). Other authors emphasize 
Confucian beliefs, the pre-colonial domination of particular individuals or groups, greater external threats, 
and the influence of traditional work ethics (Perkins and Roemer 1993). While I respect the argument that 
nationalism is less well-developed in Africa than in Asia or that different ethos existed in both continents, I 
remain uncertain why “political illness” seems so much more pervasive in some countries or parts of the 
world than in others. Looking at more or less neighboring countries, we find environmental sustainability 
and socio-economic development more apparent in Zimbabwe (52) than in Zambia (39.8), in Tunisia (43.7) 
than in Algeria (38.9), in Costa Rica (58.8) than in Nicaragua (51.9) or El Salvador (43.7), in Thailand 
(45.2) than in Vietnam (34.2), in the Czech Republic (57.2) than in Romania (44.1), and so forth.30 The 
answers found in the literature point to different historical circumstances, socio-economic factors, and 
choice of policies. Yet, I hesitate to buy these answers. Just as with alcoholism, we are uncertain why it 
affects certain societies, families, and individuals more than others, so it is with political illness. As argued 
in this study, different qualities of governance based on political software and elasticity can provide more 
reliable answers to that question.  
 
 
 
                                                          
30 All scores indicate the level of environmental sustainability quantified by WYC (2001, 13-5). 
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4. Summary 
This chapter discussed conceptual debates and empirical indicators of governance, which provide 
positive heuristic characteristics in research programming. The concept of governance encompasses much 
broader public policy considerations than assessment of government structure, and consequently, as this 
study argues, complex relationships between political and other social spheres must be developed to 
improve the quality of governance. Delineating the notions of political elasticity / software and surveying 
comparative analyses of governance on national levels, this chapter also showed how governance functions 
differently in environmental management and policies. In the next chapter, other explanatory conditions to 
the degree of environmental sustainability will be investigated. They include the level of democracy as a 
socio-political condition, economic growth rate as an economic function, and the level of global economic 
integration as an international factor on environmental sustainability.  
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Chapter Three. Democracy, Economy and the Environment 
This chapter will discuss the impacts of democratic, economic, and international factors on the 
degree of environmental sustainability and survey competing arguments of their relationships. They include 
(1) the function of democracy and democratization as socio-political conditions, (2) the economic impact of 
growth, and (3) the consequences of global economic integration and UN environmental conferences as 
international factors to environmental sustainability in national level analyses. 
 
1 Democracy and the Environment  
Over the past decade the linkages between the environment and socio-political conditions and 
democracy/democratization in particular have increasingly attracted the attention of political analysts. 
Reflection has been stimulated by surveys of changing public attitudes towards environmental protection 
(Inglehart 1995; Dunlap et al. 1993; Dunlap and Mertig 1994; Hofrichter 1991; MacDermid et al. 1991; 
Witherspoon 1993); by debates about the structures, practices and ethos of governmental agencies entrusted 
with environmental management (Lester 1989; Janicke 1992; Glasbergen and Driessen 1994; Weale 1992); 
by discussion of the appropriate balance of lay and expert inputs to environmental decision making and 
environmental risk assessment (Fiorino 1989; Beck 1992; Fischer 1993; Luke 1993); and by arguments 
within / around green and environmental movements over the strategic and tactical orientation of their 
campaigns for social change (Dobson 1990; Goodin 1992; Saward 1993). In a more general sense this 
concern is related to the widespread recognition that the environment has now emerged as a standing locus 
of political conflict (both internationally and within national and local jurisdictions) and to the renewed 
interest in democracy which has accompanied the recent extension of representative-democratic forms to 
new areas in Latin America, East Asia, and East / Central Europe (Dunn 1992; Budge and McKay 1994; 
Copp, et al. 1993). However, despite the increased frequency with which democracy and the environment 
are now associated, surprisingly few political analysts have attempted to examine the general nature of the 
democracy/environment interaction.31  
Are democracy and/or democratization positively associated with better environmental 
sustainability? It is still an open question as to whether environmental policies appreciably improved in 
democratic societies or after democratic transitions.32 The preponderance of the literature supports the 
                                                          
31 A great deal of recent academic debate has been more narrowly focused on the issue of green democracy: 
is the green commitment to democracy principled or tactical; what forms of democracy would best suit 
green communities? For accounts of the historical development of green democracy and green politics 
around the world, see Parkin (1989), Rommel (1989), Kitschelt (1989), Radig (1991), Richardson and 
Routes (1995), O’Neill (1997), and Shull (1999)..  
32 Democratization involves roughly three conceptually distinguishable, but empirically overlapping, 
stages. The first stage involves the demise or termination of the nondemocratic regime (authoritarian 
breakdown). The second occurs when the procedural minimum of democracy is established or recovered 
and the democratic regime is inaugurated (democratic transition). The third phase involves, on the one 
hand, the prevention of an authoritarian regression and, on the other, the protection, preservation, and 
deepening of the democratic system (democratic consolidation). In democratic consolidation, a democracy 
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conclusion that environmental policy outputs and enforcement should significantly improve in a democratic 
society or after a democratic transition. Rodgers states: “the spread of democracy is a prerequisite for the 
achievement of better environmental policies, (and) many scholars agree that the inferior ecological record 
of the Soviet Union and its satellites owed much to the closed nature of communist societies” (Rodgers 
1995, 41-42). There are two core assumptions behind this view. They are (1) the mass public, issue groups 
and pressure groups want better environmental policies; and (2) they will use various procedural structures 
that are normally associated with democratic regimes to push forward their environmental agenda 
(Inglehart 1995; Dunlop, Gallup and Gallup 1993). Some of these structures include laws that guarantee 
increased public participation for individuals or members of groups in the political process, political 
campaigns and elections, free speech, press and assembly, and increased access to information about 
government politics (Meadowcraft 1996). 
In articulating their support for global democratization, U.S. political leaders also have linked 
democracy and the environment. For example, candidate Bill Clinton boasted during the 1992 presidential 
campaign that democracies, among their other virtues, “are more likely to . . . protect the global 
environment.”33 Clinton’s running mate, Albert Gore, Jr., claimed that the spread of democracy is a 
prerequisite for the achievement of better environmental policies (Gore 1992, 179). Even before the extent 
and intensity of ecological damage in the former Soviet bloc became widely known, McCloskey agreed 
with the politicians. He wrote: “Many of the important ecological measures that are being implemented are 
being implemented in democracies . . .. By contrast, if we consider actual totalitarian states - China, Chile, 
the USSR, Argentina, the dictatorships of Africa and the Arab world - we find that they are far from 
ecologically minded . . .. China and the USSR are among the worst ecological offenders” (McCloskey 
1983, 157). 
In a historical perspective, however, many prominent environmentalists and economists since the 
1970s were skeptical of democracy. Even more they have often argued that authoritarianism might be 
needed to cope with “limits to growth” (Ophuls 1977; Ehrlich 1968; Hardin 1977; Heilbroner 1974). Their 
rationale is that liberal democracy’s stress on individual liberty eventually promotes ecological catastrophe. 
It lamented (1) the freedom of individuals to pollute, consume, and procreate; (2) the inability of limited 
government to control the “tragedy of the commons”; and (3) the tendency of the United States, the world’s 
leading democracy, to equate economic development with food aid (Paehlke 1989). Although these critics’ 
arguments were speculative and are rarely heard today, their warnings helped to spark environmental 
movements and legislation in most of MDCs. A contemporary charge is that democracies fail to protect the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down 
(Diamond and Plattner 1996; Linz and Stepan 1996; Dominguez 1998). Political rights are also extended 
more broadly to accommodate traditionally marginalized segments of the populace. Linz and Stepan (1996) 
define democratic consolidation in terms of three dimensions –behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional.  
33 In his address delivered at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 12 December 1991, Presidential 
candidate Clinton proposed a new covenant for American security and new world order, articulating human 
rights, social equality, democratic norms, and environmental protection.  
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environment because of strong business interests and, more broadly, a massive societal stake in continued 
economic growth. Business has vast political and economic resources, clout that is often mobilized on 
behalf of growth and against environmentalism. Indeed, some commentators have concluded that the strong 
and durable position of business within democratic societies leaves environmental causes little chance of 
success (Dryzek 1987, 120-31; Kann 1986, 252-74). Clearly, this is a serious issue that must be confronted.  
At present, however, there is little direct empirical research on the possible affinities between 
democracy and ecology. Previous research consists mainly of case studies of one or a few developed 
democracies. Non-democratic and non-developed states tend to be overlooked altogether. The prospects for 
more broadly based research are poor. Neither scholars nor governments nor international organizations 
have as yet fully assessed environmental conditions and policies across a wide range of nation-states. The 
key barrier is lack of consensus about terminologies, standards, and data. No one really knows the quality 
of environmental conditions in most countries, especially outside North America and Western Europe 
(Vogel and Kun 1987; Knoepfel, Lundqvust, Prudhomme, and Wagner 1987; Gleditsch and Sverdrup 
1995).34  
Given the absence of better data, the best empirical evidence about the link between regime type 
and ecology comes from fairly recent case studies of nondemocratic systems. Specifically, the most 
interesting work focuses on the poor environmental records of former Soviet bloc states and China. Many 
scholars agree that the inferior ecological record of the Soviet Union and its satellites owed much to the 
closed nature of communist societies. Consequently, environmentalism initially gained strength in Russia 
after Mikhail Gorbachev instituted “glasnost” and democratization allowed greater expression of 
ecological concerns (Waller and Millard 1992; Ziegler 1987; 1992; Pryde 1991, 246-65; Goldman 1992; 
Ross 1988). Protests against environmental destruction became an important part of the general opposition 
to the communist regimes in Eastern Europe that eventually resulted in their collapse (Desai and Snavely 
1995; Jancar-Webster 1993). For instance, in the former Soviet Union, the Chernobyl disaster “opened the 
public’s eyes not only to environmental degradation, but to the bankrupt policies that had brought on the 
catastrophe” (Jancar-Webster 1993:211). A broad consensus that the overthrow of the communist regime 
was the only fundamental solution helped environmental movement groups recruit mass support for their 
protests against the totalitarian regime (Jancar-Webster 1993:214). Similar to the case of the former Soviet 
Union, environmentalists in most newly democratized states, through the global trends of the Third Wave 
democratization, provided the cradle for the democratic movement, helping people learn democratic tactics 
with which to challenge and oppose the authoritarian regime (Jancar-Webster, 1993:217).  
However, the pervasiveness of evidence also seems to support the view that environmental 
conditions have only marginally improved in most post-communist states after democratic transitions and 
                                                          
34 The work of Gleditsch and Sverdrup (1995) is considered one of the first efforts to make use of global 
quantitative data.   
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have not improved at all in others. The power of environmental groups in Eastern and Central European 
countries “fractured” after the democratic transition (Harashima and Morita 1998; Kim 2000).  
China’s case also challenges the Western-oriented normative and conventional wisdom that 
democracy should be constructed first and should function as the prime explanatory variable to societal 
phenomena including social integration, economic and political development, and environmental protection 
(Albrecht 1987; Alcamo 1992; Bolan 1992; Feffer 1992; Singleton 1987; Ziegler 1987). Since the early 
1970s, China has produced a large body of environmental laws and regulations and institutionalized a 
massive national environmental bureaucracy. China also has long been a willing participant in international 
global ecological politics (Lee et al. 1995; Harashima and Morita 1998). Through the 1973 national 
conference on the environment, the principles of environmental protection were introduced into the 
Chinese Constitution of 1978 when the Chinese government launched the “Reforming and Opening up to 
the Outside World” policy (Zhang and Jin 1992). At the same time, the government initiated a campaign 
for comprehensive utilization of three industrial wastes (gas, water, and solids) to reduce the hazards of 
pollution (Ou 1991, 261-7). The Party Central Committee also approved the “Main Points of a Work 
Report on Environmental Protection” drafted by the Environmental Protection Leading Group of the State 
Council. This report states that elimination of pollution and protections of the environment were important 
components of China’s socialist construction and modernization (Harashima and Morita 1998). The 
Environmental Protection Law indicates that the polluter must be responsible for pollution treatment, an 
environmental impact assessment system, a “polluter pays” fee system, and the “Three Simultaneity 
System.”35 Since the mid-1980s, China has adopted a positive stance on environmental diplomacy in an 
effort to maintain good international relations. For instance, in 1991, in preparation for the “Earth Summit” 
of 1992, the Chinese government hosted the Ministerial Conference of the Environment and Development. 
This conference adopted the Beijing Declaration, which demanded that new and additional financing and 
technology be transferred from MDCs to LDCs.  If the prevailing view about the democracy / 
democratization hypothesis is true, then “China should not have made as much progress as it has made in 
the past three decades” (Harashima and Morita 1998, 42).  
Does the evolution of environmental interest in governments always require outside domestic 
social movement stimulus? Again, China’s case brings this generalized question into question. Its 
environmental efforts have moved forward with little or no direct domestic extra-governmental influence 
such as a social environmental movement. Furthermore, the connection between political democracy and 
environmental protection appears less compelling when focus is on the rich industrial countries. 
Environmental pollution and ecological destruction have reached very high levels in the Western 
democracies. Most of the greenhouse gasses responsible for global warming, most of the chemicals 
                                                          
35 The Three Simultaneity System states that for all newly built, rebuilt, or expanded projects or projects 
undergoing technological transformation, facilities for preventing pollution or other public hazards should 
be designed, constructed, and put into operation simultaneously with the main project (Ou 1991). 
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responsible for the hole in the ozone layer, and most of the hazardous and toxic wastes are produced by the 
democratic industrial countries.  
The historical record of ecological destruction in democracies does not inspire much confidence in 
their ability to protect the environment. In this debate, the nexus of democracy and the environment should 
be analyzed with incorporating economic variables.   
 
2. The Nexus of Economic Growth and the Environment 
This is perhaps the central issue in the global environment debate. What is the relationship 
between expanding human economy and environmental sustainability? The relationship between economic 
activities and the level of environmental quality is extremely complex. There are two competing arguments 
about the relationship in spite of analyzing the same phenomena and of using the same data. While 
researchers of negative arguments, known as the Limit to Growth (LG) hypothesis, contend that expanding 
human economy should be associated with an increase in environmental degradation (Schnaiberg and 
Gould 1994; Redclift and Goodman 1991; Daly 1979; 1996; Wilson 1988; 1992), positivists - advocates of 
the Inverted U Curve (IUC) hypothesis - delineate that expanding economic activities do not necessarily 
harm the environment (Grossman and Krueger 1993; 1995; Selden and Song 1994; Holtz-Eakin and Selden 
1995; Shafik and Bandyopadhyay 1992). The IUC hypothesis suggests that although environmental quality 
may worsen with economic growth in LDCs, it eventually improves with growth once countries become 
sufficiently rich.  
For the positivists, the dominant model of economic growth, based on neoclassical economics, 
does not consider the environment to be relevant to economics or economic development. It assumes that 
“there is not only an infinite supply of natural resources but also of sinks for disposing of the waste from 
exploiting these resources - provided that the free market is operating” (Porter and Brown 1991, 27). In this 
view, “the problems of raw materials exhaustion or pollution are minor diversions”; environmental 
pollution is an example of “negative externality” and only a matter of “minor resource misallocation” 
(Pearce 1986,15). On the other hand, for the negativists, the environment is in an enduring conflict with this 
model of growth (Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). Economic growth requires exploitation of natural resources 
for expanding production of material goods and dumping of the waste products of this production into the 
environment. The modern “treadmill of production” inexorably degrades the environment (Schnaiberg and 
Gould 1994, v). In MDCs, mass production and consumption are a major cause of environmental 
degradation and destruction of natural resources. In LDCs, “the creation of value and access to subsistence 
are typically linked to sacrificing environmental quality for short-term economic gain” (Redclift and 
Goodman 1991,5). Let us look at more precisely the rationales of two schools.  
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Limits-to-Growth (LG) Hypothesis 
Clearly, current human activities are causing environmental destruction at a scale and pace 
unprecedented in human history (Daly 1979; 1996; Wilson 1988; 1992; Reid and Miller 1989). Moreover, 
any specific natural resource is finite and therefore there are absolute limits on its use. In addition, 
biological and physical systems underlie all economic activity and form constraints to which the human 
economy must adapt. For most biologists, environmentalists, and ecological economists, the dominant 
paradigm for understanding the interactions between human economic activities and the environment is the 
concept of limits. Their idea is that there are biological and physical limits to economic growth beyond 
which both ecological and economic collapse would occur. In this view, limits are seen as absolute 
constraints on economic activity, not just as a point beyond which economic growth results in 
environmental destruction. This concept of limits is a common theme, from limits on arable land (Malthus 
1836), to energy and material limits (Meadows et al. 1972; 1992), to the economic scale and 
thermodynamic limits proposed by ecological economists (Daly 1979; 1996).  
What is meant by ecological limits to economic growth can best be seen in the rivet metaphor 
developed by Paul and Anne Ehrlich (1981). In this well-known metaphor, an airplane is analogous to 
Earth. Each act of environmental destruction (loss of a species, in the original metaphor) is like pulling a 
rivet from the plane’s wing. The wing has lots of rivets, so nothing happens when the first few rivets go. 
But eventually and inevitably, as more rivets are pulled, the wings break off and the plane crashes. In a 
related metaphor, environmental destruction is likened to speeding toward a cliff in a car. If the car does 
not stop, it will eventually go over the cliff. Four essential aspects of the rivet and cliff metaphors shape 
thinking about environmental problems. First, the transition from no effect to effect is abrupt. That initial 
changes have little effect contributes to a false sense of security and unwillingness to recognize limits and 
change course. Second, when limits are reached, the results are catastrophic-the plane crashes; the car goes 
over the cliff. Limits theorists generally predict that, if limits are reached or exceeded, there will be an 
ecological collapse which will in turn force a collapse of the human economy. Both economic scale and 
environmental quality collapse when limits are reached. Limits are seen as absolute constraints on 
economic activity, not just as points beyond which economic growth results in environmental degradation. 
Either we will limit growth in ways of our choosing or it will be limited in ways not of our choosing 
(Ludwig 1996: 16). The third essential component of these metaphors is that, in the event of a catastrophe, 
everyone suffers and therefore everyone has a clear self-interest in avoiding a crash. The last essential 
aspect of the metaphors is their irreversibility. Once the plane has crashed or the car goes over the cliff 
there is no return to the prior conditions.  
The limits metaphor is a statement about the nature of both biophysical and human economic 
systems; therefore, limits need to be analyzed from both natural and social science perspectives. And, 
because human economies transport both inputs and wastes across the globe, the issue of biophysical limits 
to economic activity is best examined at a global scale. There are three types of possible limits. 
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a. Input Limits 
Until recently, input limitations received the most attention. Malthus (1836) predicted that limited 
arable land would restrict the size of the human population through food shortages and starvation. LG 
models of Meadows et al. (1972) focused on a broader array of inputs but retained the basic Malthusian 
message: limited natural resources must limit human population and economic activity. Similarly, in The 
Population Bomb, Ehrlich (1968) predicted that hundreds of millions of people would starve to death in the 
1970s from absolute food shortages. These predictions of absolute limits to the size of the economy due to 
resource exhaustion have repeatedly not been borne out. For example, despite over 150 years of predictions 
to the contrary, food production has consistently kept up with population growth. Between 1950 and 1985, 
total production of major food crops increased by more than 160%, more than matching population growth 
(Brown 1995). Millions of people starve or are malnourished every year, but not because of an absolute 
shortage of food (Sen 1981). Predictions of economic limits imposed by limited resources generally fail 
because they are based on the assumption that limits can be calculated according to current resource use 
and current resource stocks. 
 
b. Waste Absorption Limits 
In the 1980s, as the specter of aggregate material or energy shortages diminished, thinking on 
limits turned to the issue of waste absorption. Problems of waste absorption are potentially much more 
difficult to address than input constraints because pollution has the potential to cause irreversible and 
irreparable environmental harm and because there can be long time lags in detecting adverse affects. 
Furthermore, although economic incentives may at times encourage substitution for depleted inputs, 
economic incentives often also discourage reduction of pollution and encourage firms to locate in areas 
with lax environmental regulations (Daly 1996). For all of these reasons, environmental degradation caused 
by waste production is a difficult ecological, technical, and social problem. However, the problem is not 
well illuminated by the concept of limits. Clearly, pollution is causing massive environmental destruction 
and affecting human well-being. For example, widespread emissions of toxic chemicals may be responsible 
for soaring cancer rates. Industrial chemicals are found in the bodies of wildlife in even the most remote 
parts of the globe (Colborn et al. 1993). However, the fact that pollution is causing environmental 
degradation does not necessarily mean that there are catastrophic limit points. If there is a continuum of 
adverse effects, humans have to decide how much pollution we are willing to emit and what levels of 
environmental impacts we can live with. However, there may be no threshold point at which we must stop 
to avoid spiraling destruction.  
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c. Entropy and Primary Productivity Limits 
Daly (1979; 1996) has developed a limits analysis that combines input and waste limits into 
constraints on throughput and the scale of the economy. Throughput is the total volume of material and 
energy flowing through the economy, starting as inputs and leaving as waste. Unlike Meadows et al. (1972) 
in The Limits to Growth, Daly does not assert that we are running out of material inputs. He recognizes the 
flexibility of production and does not want to tie limits to the use of any specific resource for which there 
may be substitutes. Instead, building on work by Georgescu-Roegen (1971), Daly appeals to limits on 
aggregate throughput based on thermodynamics and entropy, for which there is no substitution escape. He 
idea is that the earth and sun constitute a closed system. The total amount of matter and energy in the 
system is fixed and constant; however, there is a continuous, irreversible decline in the level of entropy.36 
Although entropy or thermodynamic limits are, theoretically, absolute, they are meaningful only if the 
human economy has a chance of approaching the limit. To be useful, the idea of entropy limits needs to be 
at least roughly quantifiable. What are the limits, and what is the size of the current global economy 
relative to those limits? Daly attempts to quantify these limits by referring to an analysis by Vitousek et al. 
(1986) of human use of net primary productivity (NPP). NPP is the solar energy captured by plants and 
other photosynthetic organisms minus that used by the organisms themselves for respiration. Vitousek et al. 
(1986) estimate that humans currently “appropriate” 25% of potential total global NPP and 40% of 
potential terrestrial NPP. Daly (1996) concluded that humans are therefore only 80 years away or less (two 
population doubling times) from appropriating the entire NPP, which he contends would be a biological 
disaster.37  
Environmentalists have often predicted impending catastrophes (e.g., oil depletion, absolute food 
shortages and mass starvation, or biological collapse). This catastrophism is ultimately damaging to the 
cause of environmental protection. First, predictions of catastrophe, like the boy who cries wolf, at first 
motivate people's concern, but when the threat repeatedly turns out to be less severe than predicted, people 
ignore future warnings. Secondly, the belief in impending catastrophe has in the past led some 
                                                          
36 Humans use low-entropy energy from the sun and fossil fuel stocks and release high-entropy wastes. 
Early human societies relied primarily on energy from the sun; industrialized economies now depend 
primarily on the limited stock of fossil fuels.  
37 However, there are a number of serious problems with the NPP argument. First, human use of NPP is not 
an appropriate metric to assess possible entropy or thermodynamic limits. Entropy represents a theoretical 
limit to the economy because it encompasses all available energy. NPP, on the other hand, represents only a 
small fraction of even just the solar energy available on Earth. An entropy or thermodynamic limit to the 
economy implies that total human energy use is in danger of exceeding energy availability. Yet solar 
energy flow to Earth is many thousands of times greater than current global energy use (Dunn 1986). 
Although Daly (1996) appeals to entropy and thermodynamic limits, his NPP argument is more akin to 
earlier input limitation scenarios. The argument that NPP is an input limit suffers from the same flaws as 
other input limit arguments. Unlike entropy, total NPP is not fixed and may be increased in agriculture. 
More important, other inputs can be substituted for the products of primary producers. Direct solar energy 
can be used instead of firewood, and adobe, concrete, or steel can be used instead of wood for building 
materials. 
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environmentalists to support withholding food and medical aid to LDCs (Hardin 1972), forced sterilization 
(Ehrlich 1968), and other repressive measures. Not only are these positions repulsive from a social justice 
perspective, they also misdirect energy away from real solutions. And, by blaming people in LDCs for 
global environmental problems, these views have tended to limit support for environmentalism to the 
affluent in the highly industrialized world. Fortunately, environmentalists of widely differing political 
perspectives, including some leading limits thinkers, now see alleviating human misery and poverty as 
essential to solving global environmental problems (Athanasiou 1996, Daily and Ehrlich 1996, Ehrlich 
1997). In addition to recognizing the need to address poverty and inequality, recent limits writing has 
reduced its focus on catastrophe.  
Historically, the limits metaphor has been part of a broader environmental and social analysis 
developed by authors such as Donella and Dennis Meadows, Paul and Anne Ehrlich, and Herman Daly. By 
focusing on aggregate quantities of natural resources, consumption, and population, the limits perspective 
depoliticizes our understanding of environmental destruction. What we consume, how much we consume, 
and how goods are produced are all political decisions that change over time and vary from country to 
country. Yet in the limits perspective, consumption and production technology are seen as more or less 
fixed, and significant social change is not even considered a possibility. 
 
Inverted U-Curve Hypothesis38  
A simple theoretical model of pollution was developed that generated an Inverted U-Curve (IUC) 
relationship between per capita income and environmental quality.39 Substantial evidence points to an IUC 
relationship between per capita income and various types of pollution, suggesting that while the early 
stages of economic growth causes the problem, later ones bring the remedy. For example, Grossman and 
Krueger (1993, 1995) find the IUC relationship for two measures of air pollution (sulphur dioxide and 
smoke) and several measures of water pollution (oxygen loss and concentrations of several heavy metals). 
Selden and Song (1994), Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1992, 1995), and Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) also 
find similar patterns to Grossman and Krueger’s evidence in related work and suggest the IUC relationship 
is a statistical regularity. As seen in Table 3.1, there are five models of the IUC hypothesis between various 
economic activities and environmental quality and/or performance. Although there is a little difference in  
 
                                                          
38 S. Kuznets constructed the original Inverted U-Curve (IUC) hypothesis in a different context. Economics 
Nobel prizes winner Kuznets hypothesized the relationship between economic growth and income 
inequality (Kuznets 1955). He argued that income inequality seems to emerge as an inverted u-curve 
relationship with economic growth: that is, personal income inequality first increases and then decreases in 
the course of economic growth. 
39 Although I use the term environmental sustainability in its broadest sense to include biological diversity, 
resilience, and aesthetic, recreation, refuge, and ecosystem service values to humans, for IUC theorists 
environmental quality refers to various categories of pollutants. See chapter I for more details of conceptual 
and operational definitions and the scope. 
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Table 3.1. Selected Studies of the IUC Relationship 
   
Grossman and 
Krueger (1995, 
1993) 
 Yit = Git β1 + Git2β2 + Git3β3 + Git- β4 + Git-2β5 + Git-3β6 + Xit′β7 + εit, 
 
IUC relationships between urban incomes and two measures of air pollution (sulphur 
dioxide and smoke) and several measures of water pollution (oxygen loss and 
concentrations of several heavy metals) in 4 to 32 countries during 1977-1988. 
 
Pollution data from the Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS) 
Econonimc data from Penn World Table :Mark V (Summers and Heston 1991) 
   
Selden and 
Song (1994) 
 mit = β0 + β1yit + β2yit2 + βddit + β79T79 + β82T82 + ci + uit, 
 
An IUC relationship between per capita GDP and per capita national emissions of 
SO2, SMP, NO2, and CO. National pollution emission of fuel use in 5 to 30 countries 
in 1973-75, 1979-81, and 1982-84. 
 
Pollution data source from World Resources Institute (WRI 1991) 
   
Holtz-Eakin and 
Selden (1992) 
 Cit = β0 +β1 yit +β2 yit2 + γt +fi +∈it 
Cit = α0 +α1 (lnyit) + α2 (lnyit)2 + γt +fi +∈it 
 
IUC: development trajectory for CO2 emissions (main cause of greenhouse gases). 
Their damage to the environment occurs through climate change or ozone depletion 
on global scale. 
 
County-specific pollution data for the years 1951-1986 from Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory. 
   
Shafik and 
Bandyopa-
dhyay (1992) 
 Ei = a1 + a2 log y + a3t   
Ei = a1 + a2 log y + a3 logy2 + a4t   
Ei = a1 + a2 log y + a3 logy2 + a4 logy3 + a5t   
 
IUC relationships between various environmental indicators (SO2 and SPM carbon 
emissions, concentration of dissolved oxygen in river, and municipal solid wastes 
emissions) and national income 
 
Data from World Bank’s database involving up to 149 countries from 1960 to 1980. 
   
Lheem (2001)  Qt  = δ0 + δ1yt + δ2(yt)2 + δ3eopt + δ4mfst + δ5hcp +  εt. 
 
Although this model confirms an IUC between per capita emissions of SO2, NO2, 
CO, and SMP and per capita GDP, economic openness shows different shaped-
curves from the previous studies. The relationship between overall emissions and 
economic openness is a U-shaped curve, and the relationship between per capita 
emissions and economic openness is cubic-shaped curve.     
 
Pollution data from World Resources Institute (WRI 1992/3). 
Economic data from World Development Report (World Bank 1975-1992) & United 
Nations Statistical Yearbook (UN 1985/ 1996) 
Human capital data from Index of (Man) Power Resources (Vanhanen 1997)  
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terms of methodologies, frames, sampling, data sources among these economics-based research, their 
overall arguments support the general IUC relationships.  
Summarizing public concerns about the environmental impacts of expanding economic activities, 
specifically regional econom ic integrations,40 Grossman and Krueger (1993; 1995) outline three possible 
effects from trade liberalization on environmental quality such as scale effect, composition effect and 
technique effect. 41 Contrary to the LG hypothesis, they find no evidence that economic growth does 
unavoidable harm to the natural habitat. Instead they argue that while increases in GDP may be associated 
with worsening environmental conditions in many LDCs, air and water quality appear to benefit from 
economic growth once some critical level of income has been reached. The turning points in the IUC 
relationships vary for the different pollutants, but in almost every case they occur at an annual income of 
less than $8000.42 For a country with per capita income of $10,000 or more, the hypothesis that further 
growth would be associated with deterioration of environmental conditions was also rejected with statistical 
significance. Their findings are broadly consistent with those reported in other studies. For example, the 
World Bank Development Report (1992) also reports an IUC relationship between per capita income and 
concentrations of Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) and Suspended Particulate Matter (SPM) in city air, with turning 
points even lower than those suggested by Grossman and Krueger. Moreover, they find that both the 
percentage of the population without access to safe water and the percentage of urban population without 
adequate sanitation decline steadily at all levels of income increase. 
Selden and Song (1994) examine the relationship between environmental quality and economic 
development by looking at four commonly encountered air pollutants.43 They find that the pollutants 
                                                          
40 There have emerged regional economic integration and/or common markets among countries. They 
include the EU in Europe (15 member states), the NAFTA in North America (3 states), ASEAN in 
Southeast Asia (10 states), the APEC in the Pacific Rim (21 states), the MERCOSUR in Latin America (4 
states). These multinational economic and trade agreements are part of a move for nation-states to 
cooperate with one another more fully. 
41 On the scale effect, international trade and investment liberalization usually expand economic activities 
through market extension. The harmful pollution can thus rise proportionally as a by-product of the 
increase in economic output. The second is composition effect, resulting from a country’s increasing 
specialization in its production according to comparative advantage. If the comparative advantage happens 
to be a country’s loose pollution control regulations, or lower pollution costs, then it is possible to induce 
dirty industry to locate in that area, and to damage environmental quality in that country. On the other hand, 
if the comparative advantage derives from abundant natural resources and raw materials, then 
environmental quality may improve, since raw material industries are in general less polluting intensive 
than manufacturing industries. The last is technique effect. Industrial countries may transfer modern 
technologies to less developed countries during international trade. Modern technologies are in general 
cleaner and more efficient in utilizing natural resources. Therefore, less pollution per unit of output is 
generated. 
42 The income level was standardized in terms of the 1985 U.S. dollar.   
43 They include Sulfur Dioxide (SO2), Suspended Particulate Matter (SPM), Oxides of Nitrogen (NO2) and 
Carbon Monoxide (CO). 
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exhibit IUC relationship with per capita GDP while the turning points estimation is much higher, about 
double Grossman and Krueger’s results.44 
Holtz-Eakin and Selden’s study (1992) focuses on estimating and forecasting the development 
trajectory for one of the greenhouse gases (mainly from CO2 emissions). Unlike pollutants such as SO2, 
SPM, Oxides of Nitrogen (NO2) and Carbon Monoxide (CO), which have significant health and 
environmental effects within the emitting country, the greenhouse gases are less restricted to local areas. 
Their damage to the environment occurs through climate change or ozone depletion on a global scale. The 
global nature of these pollutants reduces the incentive for abating their emissions from any single country 
unilaterally. Also many of these pollutants are substantially more costly to abate, exacerbating the free-
rider problem in countries. It is, therefore, interesting to develop detailed information on the emission-
economic growth link across the world. Their study also confirms the IUC hypothesis for CO2 emissions.45  
Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) investigate eight different environmental indicators for their 
responses to economic growth. These environmental indicators include SO2, SPM, and per capita carbon 
emissions in atmosphere, dissolved oxygen and fecal coliform bacteria in rivers, municipal solid waste 
generation, annual rates of deforestation, and people’s access to sanitation. Although their findings reveal 
four different forms of relationship between environmental quality and per capita GDP, the overall 
conclusion is consistent with the argument of IUC hypothesis. 
Following the previous empirical studies, Lheem (2001) adds economic openness, industrial 
density, and the human capital factor into the model, attempting to provide further evidence to the 
relationships of environmental quality with economic growth and openness to trade, as well as human 
capital development. Economic openness is total trade (imports and exports) as a percentage of real per 
capita GDP in current (2000) US Dollars, while industrial density is calculated by manufacturing share as a 
percentage of GDP. This study also brings the index of manpower resource as an indicator of the human 
capital factor.46 With this variable, Lheem hypothesizes that the more highly developed a civil society, the  
                                                          
44 Selden and Song explain that the large differences might be reasonable. First of all, Grossman and 
Krueger’s income measure is national per capita GDP, not urban residents per capita income. Urban 
incomes are usually higher than the national average. It, therefore, could be downward biased on Grossman 
and Krueger’s estimation. Second, air pollution in urban area is more harmful, more obvious than pollution 
in non-urban area, because of higher population density in urban area. The priority for pollution control 
may, accordingly, first be given to urban area. Finally, it would be relatively easier to reduce urban 
pollution than to reduce the total national pollution. For building higher smokestacks or rising urban land 
rents to force industry to locate in less populated area will improve urban environmental quality without 
changing the national level of pollution (Selden and Song 1994, 148-9).    
45 Unlike the estimations from Grossman and Krueger (1993; 1995) and Selden and Song (1994), the 
turning points in their results are too high to provide any empirical meanings (Holtz-Eakin and Selden 
1992). 
46 The index was constructed by Vanhanen (1997). He constructed the IPR (index of power resources), 
which consists of the index of occupational diversification (IOD), the index of knowledge distribution 
(IKD), and index of the distribution of economic power resources (DER). It is assumed that the higher the 
value of IPR, the more widely socio-politically relevant power resources are usually distributed among 
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Table 3.2. Associations between Economic Growth and Environmental Quality 
 
Simple economic-centric Model 
 
   
Economic Growth  Environmental Quality 
   
 
Multidimensional Complexity of Economic-Environmental Nexus  
 
  <Interactions in the Black Box>   
     
  Role of local governments   
Economic Growth  Information disclosure & public 
participation 
 Environmental 
Quality 
  International pressure   
  Market mechanisms   
  Latecomer status   
     
 
Source: Grossman and Krueger (1993, 1995); Selden and Song (1994); Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1992, 
1995); Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992); and Lheem (2001) 
 
less pollution it emits. The main reason for adding the human capital factor into the model is that most 
economists tend to ignore a political impact on economic growth and environmental regulations. They also 
pay little attention to the possibility of indirect (and sometimes direct) influence of the maturity of civil 
society on environmental quality. As seen in Table 3.2, this suggests that the association between income 
and environmental degradation vary with the extent of political freedoms as well as development of civil 
society. The declining segment of the IUC may thus reflect the increase in political freedom and various 
attributes to civic society associated with higher income. In his equation of the multidimensional 
complexity of the economic-environmental nexus, he confirms an IUC relationship between per capita 
emissions of SO2, NO2, CO, and SPM and per capita GDP. Economic openness, however, shows different 
shaped-curves from the previous studies. While the relationship between overall emissions and economic 
openness is a U-shaped curve, the relationship between per capita emissions and economic openness is a 
cubic-shaped curve (Lheem 2001, 5).  
In sum, as seen in Table 3.3, the IUC hypothesis argues that expanding economic activities do not 
necessarily harm the environment, while the LG hypothesis contends that expanding human economy 
should be associated with an increase in environmental degradation simply because of infinity of natural 
resources. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
various sections of the population and the more favorable social conditions are for not only democracy but 
also the maturity of civil society (Vanhanen 1997: 25-66). 
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Table 3.3. Summarization of LG and IUC Hypotheses 
 
The Limits to Growth (LG) Hypothesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Any specific natural resource is finite and therefore there are absolute limits on its use. 
 
Definition of Sustainability (Sustainable Development): 
• It is development, which meets the needs of the present without sacrificing the ability of the 
future to meet its needs (The Bruntland Commission 1987). 
• It is development without growth: growth beyond the regenerative and adsorption capacities 
of the environment (Daly and Cobb 1989; Daly 1995). 
In this context, economic development is differentiated from economic growth: 
• Economic growth – increased use of materials and waste. 
• Economic development – increased human welfare without increased use of materials or 
waste.   
 
The Inverted U Curve (IUC) Hypothesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kuznets’ IUC is adopted to explain the relationship between economic growth and environmental 
quality. Although environmental quality may worsen with economic growth in poor countries, it 
eventually improves with growth once countries become sufficiently rich.  
 
Definition of economic growth: 
• Economic growth (or expanding economic scale) refers to the monetary value of output (i.e., 
GDP), which is not directly related to material use or waste production. 
In this context, economic growth and economic development can be exchangeable.     
 
 
Next we turn from the primarily local nexus of economic growth and the environment to a 
consideration of global and international factors in domestic policy.  
 
3. Globalization and International Factors 
A body of literature emphasizes the importance of global eco-political factors to changes in 
domestic policies (Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane 1986; 1989; Nye 1988; 1993; Vasquez 1995). This 
approach asserts that international factors encourage domestic government interest in positive 
environmental policy making in a number of ways. International actors help to increase knowledge about 
and concern over environmental problems. Also, international factors can offer incentives to states to 
participate in global eco-politics such as capital for environmental transformation or expert contacts that 
encourage domestic capacity building (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Orbuch and Singer 1995; Keohane 
and Levy 1996; Rugman and Kirton 1998). In this section, I will survey the functions of globalization, 
global economic integration and the role of the United Nations in general, and the UN conferences on the 
environment in specific, as international factors of environmental sustainability in national-level analyses.  
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Globalization and Global Economic Integration 
Before analyzing the competing prescriptions about the relationship between globalization and the 
degree of environmental sustainability, the term, globalization, needs to be defined and described. A short 
definition of globalization is the growing liberalization of international trade and investment, and the 
resulting increase in the integration of national economies into the global economy (Henderson 1999).47 
Although globalization has not been the result of some grand design imposed on the global economy, 
global economic integration is phenomenal and becoming established as a trend.48 It has been an ad hoc, 
decentralized, bottom-up process accelerating from the collapse in the 1980s of both “global communism” 
and “the Third World romance” with import-substitution developmental strategies (Griswold 2000, 1). The 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the final disintegration of the Soviet empire released 400 million people from 
the grip of centrally commanded and essentially closed economic systems. Meanwhile, the debt crisis of 
1982 and the resulting “Lost Decade” of the 1980s imposed a painful hangover on many Third World 
countries that had tried and failed to reach prosperity by shunning foreign capital and protecting and 
subsidizing domestic "infant" industries. Beginning with Chile in the mid-1970s and China later that 
decade, LDCs from Mexico and Argentina to India and Malaysia more recently have been opening their 
markets and welcoming foreign investment. The globalization of the last decade has not been the result of a 
“blind faith” in markets imposed from above but of “the utter exhaustion of any alternative vision” 
(Griswold 2000, 3-4). Consequently, global economic integration can be understood as the most critical 
barometer of the current trend of globalization (Delisle 2000).49 
                                                          
47 Henderson (1999) expands the definition into five related but distinct parts. First, there is increasing 
tendency for capitalists to think, plan, operate, and invest for the future with reference to markets and 
opportunities across the world as a whole. Second, this tendency necessarily results in growing ease and 
cheapness of international communications, with the Internet the leading aspect. Third, the trend tends 
towards closer international economic integration, resulting in the diminished importance of political 
boundaries. This trend is fueled partly by the first two trends, but even more powerfully by official policies 
aimed at trade and investment liberalization. Fourth, there is apparently growing significance of issues and 
problems extending beyond national boundaries and the resulting impetus to deal with them through some 
form of internationally concerted action. And last, the tendency goes towards uniformity, or harmonization, 
by which norms, standards, rules, and practices are defined and enforced with respect to regions, or the 
world as a whole, rather than within the bounds of national states.  
48 In fact, the modern “global economic integration” era started with the fateful meetings at Bretton Woods, 
New Hampshire, in July 1944. That was when the world’s leading economists and politicians got together 
to figure out how to mitigate the devastation of World War II. They decided that a new global economic 
system was required to promote global economic development. This would lead away from wars, they 
thought, and would help the poor and the rebuilding process. After the Bretton Woods meetings, many 
international institutions were developed. They are the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 
with other names at that time), and then the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which later 
gave birth to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Later clones of the model included North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Maastricht Agreement in Europe (European Union, EU) , Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the upcoming 
Free Trade Area of the Americas Agreement. 
49 Now, global exports as a share of global domestic product have increased from 14 percent in 1970 to 24 
percent today, and the growth of trade has consistently outpaced growth in global output. In the United 
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Furthermore, along with this tendency of globalization, (characterizing global economic 
integration and economic interdependence on trade, finance, direct investment), educational, technological, 
ideological, and cultural, as well as ecological, environmental, legal, military, strategic, and political 
impulses are now rapidly propagated throughout the world. Money and goods, images and people, 
information and ideas, sports and religions, guns and drugs, and diseases and pollution can now be moved 
quickly across national frontiers. When the global satellite communications system was established, 
instantaneous communication from any part of the world to any other became possible. It is not only the 
creation of a 24-hour money market that became possible but also the flashing of pictures of statesmen and 
film stars across the globe, making these faces more familiar to us than those of our next-door neighbors.  
 
International Trades and the Environment 
Among many preposterous claims, advocates of globalization argue that global economic 
integration and international trades increase long-term environmental protection.50 After the failure of the 
1999 WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle, few topics appear to be more important than the relationship 
between international trade and the environment. With international trade increasingly revolving around 
large economic blocs such as NAFTA, the EU, APEC, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN, the relationship 
between the environment and economic integration in a broad sense, including all forms of regional trade 
liberalization, has become a focal point of interest. At the same time, few issues are as complex and 
multifaceted as this one. Does economic integration cause environmental deterioration? Does free trade 
really induce a downward competition of environmental standards?  
The considerable quantity of literature dealing with this issue tends to adopt one of two traditional 
approaches. The first type of literature offers a political approach to environmental policy, investigating to 
what extent environmental policy can be shaped and abused by interest groups for protectionist purposes. It 
is worth emphasizing that, unlike environmental economics, which argues about what should be an optimal 
environmental policy from the perspective of economic efficiency, this segment of the literature adopts a 
public choice perspective. For that reason, it provides illuminating insights into the origins of diverging 
environmental policies. It also explains why interest groups are so committed to influencing environmental 
                                                                                                                                                                             
States, the ratio of two-way trade and investment income flows as a share of GDP has roughly tripled since 
the 1960s. Annual global flows of foreign direct investment surged to a record $400 billion in 1997, with 
37 percent directed to LDCs, up from 17 percent in 1990 (Greenspan 1999; UN World Investment Report 
1998, 9; UN Human Development Report 1999, 25). In the 1970s, daily foreign exchange transactions 
averaged about $10 billion; today, the average daily activity has reached more than $1.5 trillion (OECD 
1999, 45). 
50 In this vein, advocates of globalization for environmental protection fortified with neoclassical 
economics prescribe in the same path as the environmental positivists of the IUC hypothesis. The simple 
logical line is: although environmental sustainability may worsen with expanding human economy, it 
eventually improves with material wealth, advanced technologies, and interdependence with other countries 
(Grossman and Krueger 1995, 353-4; 376-7). 
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policies in spite of the fact that at the macroeconomic level neither empirical analyses nor model-based 
predictions show a clear impact of environmental policies on trade flows or direct investment choices.  
A second body of literature analyzes the consequences of trade on the environment through 
changes in production and consumption patterns as well as through the impact of trade on national 
economic growth rates in general. Environmental policy in these analyses is viewed as a given. From this 
perspective, economic integration can, in some cases, benefit the environment. Trade liberalization may, 
for instance, reduce market failures, which are responsible for inefficient allocation of scarce resources and, 
therefore, for wasting environmental resources. Trade liberalization can also facilitate the diffusion of 
"greener" technologies. In other cases, economic liberalization can trigger a reaction to "environmental 
dumping" through the systematic exploitation of comparative advantages based not on an intrinsically 
higher efficiency of the economic system, but rather on the externalization of environmental costs allowed 
by current environmental regulations.  
Although independently helpful, these two approaches can be usefully integrated. Bommer (1998) 
offers a bridge between these approaches. According to him, the missing link is found in the answer to the 
question: how does trade liberalization trigger a reformulation of national environmental policies? To give 
an answer, Bommer looks at both the consequences of trade liberalization on the environment, and at how 
the environmental policy-making process reacts to the environmental consequences of trade liberalization. 
His approach constitutes an attempt to combine the two traditional bodies of literature in order to 
investigate the effect of economic integration on environmental policymaking. This study explains how 
economic integration affects the stakes of the interest groups that, in turn, influence environmental policy, 
and at the same time how environmental policy is changed in the process of economic integration. It is 
often said that environmental policies are still mainly national and also somewhat flexible, unlike trade 
policies that are multilateral (WTO) or regional (NAFTA) and more stable.  
Considering that environmental policy basically derives from the interaction between three groups 
of rational actors (the state, producers, and environmental organizations), Bommer’s dynamic analysis, 
largely model-based, offers differentiated answers regarding the overall impact of trade liberalization on 
the environment. In particular, depending on the relative strengths of the interest groups and on the nature 
of the international economy (perfect competition, imperfect competition, and asymmetric information), the 
impact of trade liberalization can vary widely.  
In one example, Bommer combines a simple general equilibrium model with a model of 
endogenous environmental regulation, assuming a situation of perfect competition. Whereas trade 
liberalization may increase environmental disruptions in the short term, its impact on stakeholders’ 
attitudes may later trigger a tightening of environmental standards. For instance, if the export sector that 
benefits from trade liberalization is a larger polluter than the import sector, a tightening of environmental 
regulations could, in the next stage, reverse or mitigate the initial damages. In this view, this scenario 
corresponds quite well to the impact of NAFTA on the United States. In a second example, Bommer offers 
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an original modeling of the European policy formulation process in a situation of imperfect competition. 
His conclusion is stimulating with regard to the issue of regional and global environmental governance. A 
European environmental policy, named the European pollution standard, can prevent politicians from 
lowering national pollution standards, as they would feel tempted to in the sole presence of the single 
market.  
 
The United Nations Conferences on the Environment  
UN conferences contribute to governance and sustainable development by establishing and 
reinforcing some of constructivist themes in international relations.51 Although international conferences 
seldom have direct causal influences on member states’ behavior, their outputs are part and parcel of the 
broader process of multilateral cooperation and may contribute to stronger and more effective 
environmental attitudes and policies by states. Accumulated global environmental conferences over the last 
thirty years have contributed to an aggregate shift in international politics by extending participation and 
access to environmental diplomacy to national environmental agencies, NGOs and networks of scientists, 
forming a “large-scale process of social mobilization” (Fomerand 1996, 364). Over the last thirty years, 
governments have added the inspirational norm of ecological integrity to the traditional goals of wealth and 
power.  
Global UN conferences on the environment are widely understood as an institutional innovation of 
the 1970s. With mounting concern about the degradation of the physical environment, governments 
approached the UN to convene a number of global conferences to address the host of human activities with 
transboundary and global environmental consequences. These environmental conferences became part of a 
broader effort at global problem solving that addressed a new class of challenges associated with 
international interdependence and economic integration. As global interdependence became increasingly 
politicized in the 1970s, the UN system turned to global conferences to highlight the interconnections 
between issues that had previously been treated in isolation. The topics of the global conferences were new 
to the international agenda, whereas previous multilateral conferences had principally addressed issues of 
international economics, human rights, and arms control (Kaufmann 1988; Willetts 1989). The UN, as the 
only venue with global participation, was the logical forum for such meetings. These global conferences 
                                                          
51 Constructivism of IR literature has been focusing on the institutional, discursive, and intersubjective 
procedures by which international governance develops. Ruggie writes, “Social constructivism rests on an 
irreducibly intersubjective dimension of human action.” Constructivism is about “human consciousness and 
its role” in international life. Constructivists hold the view that “the building blocks of international reality 
are ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; 
that they express not only individual but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and 
significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place” (Ruggie 1998, 856, 879). 
Constructivists look at the mechanisms and consequences by which actors, particularly states, derive 
meaning from a complex world, and how they identify their interests and policies for issues that appear 
new and uncertain.  
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performed multiple functions. They were intended to mobilize concern about new problems, to coordinate 
national actions to study and monitor environmental quality and human activities with environmental 
consequences, and to develop joint measures to prevent various sources of environmental degradation and 
attenuate the effects of human actions on the environment.52  
The 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) and the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) directly addressed the subject of environmental protection, but 
special UN conferences devoted to different aspects of human impact on the environment became 
commonplace in the 1970s. The frequency of such global conferences diminished in the 1980s and 1990s. 
What has remained constant are the decadal meetings of conferences on population, women, and food, as 
well as the follow-up annual reviews on UNCED commitments and the more comprehensive and high-
profile UNCED+5 meeting in 1997 and the UNCED+10 meeting in 2002.53 Table 3.4 presents a full list of 
UN global environmental conferences. 
The 1972 UNCHE, held in Sweden, was the first major global environmental conference. 
Sponsored by the UN, it convened 113 countries to discuss contemporary environmental issues. UNCHE 
adopted the Stockholm Declaration, establishing twenty-six principles of behavior and responsibility to 
serve as the basis for future legally binding multilateral accords; and the Action Plan for the Human 
Environment that specified 109 recommendations in the areas of environmental assessment, environmental 
management, and supporting institutional measures (Haas 2002). Implementation was intended for 
governments and international organizations (IOs).  
The 1992 UNCED, held in Rio de Janeiro, marks a significant step toward global environmental 
consensus. UNCED adopted the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, and the Statement of Forest Principles. In addition to those three pieces of hard law, UNCED 
adopted the Rio Declaration, with 287 principles of guiding action, and Agenda 21, a sweeping action plan 
to promote sustainability, with 2,509 specific recommendations applying to states, international institutions, 
and members of civil society. The Commission on Sustainable Development was created to ensure 
effective follow-up of UNCED, to enhance international cooperation and rationalize intergovernmental  
                                                          
52 Preceding a conferences, though, are often several rounds of ad hoc Preparatory Committee sessions, so 
called “Prep Coms,” often spread over one to two years, at which national delegations are presented with 
background papers and preliminary negotiations are conducted on the documents intended for approval at 
the conference. Most of the arduous work of reconciling political differences occurs during the Preparatory 
Committee sessions.  
53 Generally the global UN conferences on the environment have produced declarations and action plans for 
subsequent activities. The most influential conferences endorsed new policy doctrines and policy targets for 
the international community, authorized the creation of new international organizations, approved legal 
commitments, and generated new financial resources. The most productive, in terms of their administrative 
accomplishments, have been 1972 UNCHE, the 1974 World Food Conference, 1992 UNCED, and the 
1994 International Conference on Population and Development (Weiss and Jordan 1976; Caldwell 1996). 
Others, such as the 1977 Conference on Desertification, the 1979 Conference on Science and Technology 
for Development, and the Conferences on Human Settlements, have failed to spark international concern or 
to catalyze robust international commitments and action. 
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Table 3.4. Summarization of Global Environmental and Sustainable Conferences Since 1972  
 
 
Year Name/Location Product/Outcome 
   
1972 UN Conference on the Human 
Environment (UNCHE), Stockholm 
Declaration of Principles, UNEP 
   
1974 World Food Conference, Rome Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger 
and Malnutrition, World Food Council, IFAD 
   
1974 World Population Conference, Bucharest World Population Plan of Action 
   
1975 World Conference on Women  
   
1977 UN Water Conference, Mar del Plata, 
Argentina 
International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation 
Decade (1981-1991) 
   
1977 UN Conference on Desertification, 
Nairobi  
Plan of Action to Combat Desertification 
   
1978 UN Conference on Human Settlements, 
Vancouver 
UN Centre for Human Settlements, Global Strategy 
for Shelter to the Year 2000  
   
1979 UN Conference on Science and 
Technology for Development, Vienna 
Vienna Programme of Action on Science and 
Technology for Development 
   
1979 World Climate Conference, Geneva  
   
1981 UN Conference on New and Renewable 
Sources of Energy, Nairobi 
Nairobi Programme of Action for the Development 
and Utilization of New and Renewable Sources of 
Energy 
   
1984 World Conference on Agrarian Reform 
and Rural Development, Rome 
Programme of Action on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development  
   
1984 Second World Population Conference, 
Mexico City 
 
   
1985 World Conference on Women  
   
1990 Second World Climate Conference, 
Geneva 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
   
1992 The UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro 
Rio Declaration 
Agenda 21 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Convention on Biodiversity 
Statement of Forest Principles   
UN Commission on Sustainable Development 
   
1994 International Conference on Population 
and Development, Cairo 
Programme of Action 
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Table 3.4. Summarization of Global Environmental and Sustainable Conferences Since 1972  
(Continued) 
 
Year Name/Location Product/Outcome 
   
1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, 
Beijing 
Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action 
   
1996 Habitat II, Istanbul The Habitat Agenda and Istanbul Declaration on 
Human Settlements  
   
1996 World Food Summit, Rome Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the 
World Food Summit Plan of Action 
   
1997 UNGA Special Session on Sustainable 
Development 
 
   
2002 UNCED, South Africa The Review of the implementation of Agenda 21 
 
Source: Formerand (1996); Weiss, Forsythe and Coate (1997); Caldwell (1996); Haas (2002). 
 
decisionmaking capacity, and to examine progress in Agenda 21 implementation at the local, national, 
regional, and international levels (Grubb, et al. 1993). 
The aggregation of UN conferences has been to create a diffuse array of pressures on states 
militating for forms of sustainable development. Rio+10 provided opportunity for reforming and 
streamlining multilateral environmental governance. It is intended to refocus international attention on 
sustainable development and to assess accomplishments since 1992. It, however, lacks most of the 
properties of conferences that led to productive outputs that contributed to improved international 
environmental governance. Rio+5 was widely regarded as a failure in this regard, as it did not mobilize any 
long-standing interest. Mass public interest in sustainable development remains weak, and the United States 
appears to be developing a new global diplomatic posture of skeptical multilateralism, at best, as seen by 
the abandonment of the Kyoto Protocol and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (Haas 2002). 
Consequently, there is little political impulse for a productive conference. Multilateral financial and 
technological transfers for sustainable development have dwindled since the early 1990s. Moreover, there 
is growing disenchantment with UN Environment Programme’s (UNEP) remote location in Kenya and its 
lack of resources. The Commission for Sustainable Development lacks the administrative autonomy or 
financial resources to be able to reach out to civil society to develop any of the conference functions 
discussed above that could potentially influence state policies and environmental quality. States also appear 
increasingly concerned about controlling NGO participation at the meetings.  
The best prospects for products from the Rio+10 are probably institutional reforms. The 
international environmental governance system has not been significantly overhauled in three decades. 
After UNCHE, UNEP was the only international institution responsible for environmental protection. Since 
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then, however, most international institutions have assumed some environmental responsibilities. Recent 
evaluations suggest that there are administrative overlaps in the system and inefficiencies, as institutions 
have assumed new responsibilities for the environment. Suggestions for improvements focus on reforming 
UNEP and on creating a Global Environmental Organization (GEO), which can serve as a legal advocate 
for environmental protection and regulations to counterbalance the World Trade Organization (WTO) by 
collecting a roster of international environmental lawyers to participate in WTO panels.  
In sum, UN environmental conferences have helped contribute to a broader shift in international 
environmental governance through educating governmental elites, exposing them to new agendas and 
discourses, and providing them with added resources to pursue sustainable development. While the political 
preconditions appear modest for any dramatic achievements and cognitive transformations at Rio+10, we 
must remember that the conference is part of a thirty-year-long era of multilateral environmental protection. 
The conference can continue to legitimate the participation of NGOs and scientists in international 
environmental governance, improve contact between civil society and states, and streamline institutional 
responsibilities within the UN and Bretton Woods systems for sustainable development. Even in the 
absence of strong political support by member governments for significant multilateral commitments, 
progressive governments and other conference participants can still press for reforms to existing 
arrangements that will ensure more national reporting on their movement toward sustainable development, 
create information clearinghouses about green technologies, and endow UNEP, a new GEO, or another 
international institution with verification authority to monitor international movement toward sustainable 
development. 
 
4. Summary 
In this chapter we discussed the impacts of democratic, economic, and international factors on the 
degree of environmental sustainability and surveyed competing arguments of their relationships. Although 
recent studies have shown democracy is positively associated with better environmental sustainability, the 
historical record of ecological destruction in democracies does not inspire much confidence in their ability 
to protect the environment. The debates about influences of economic growth and globalization in terms of 
global trade integration to environmental sustainability are also complex, controversial and inconclusive. In 
addition, this chapter delineated a brief summarization of the U.N. conferences on the environment and 
suggested reinforcing existing global environmental programs such as UNEP and creating another 
international environmental institution (e.g., GEO). In the next chapter, we will discuss research design, 
variables and their measurement, statistical estimation problems and diagnostic tests of the variables.54   
 
 
                                                          
54 However, since the roles of the U.N. environmental conferences are beyond the scope of this study, the 
proposed environmental model does not hypothesize them in empirical analyses of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four. Research Design and Measurement 
This chapter consists of a discussion of the data and method used. It reviews conceptual and 
operational definitions of variables and discusses the criteria of sample selection and the logic of cross-
national analyses. In addition, the problems of parameter estimates in empirical studies and diagnostic tests 
of the data are analyzed and reported.    
 
1. Sample Selection   
The countries in this research are drawn from the political units in the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP)’s Human Development Index, 2001 and the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, 1997 to 2000. Of the 162 political units (from UNDP’s category) and 147 political 
units, excepting countries with less than one million of population (from the World Bank), some political 
units lacked data on one or both the dependent and independent variables. Accordingly, the analysis is 
based on the remaining 122 political units, listed in Appendix 1, during the time frame from 1997 to 2000. 
The criteria for the sample selection are based on the subject of the research and the availability of data and 
information. The classification of countries into regional groups is to some extent arbitrary because there is 
no stable and universally accepted way to divide countries into continental, cultural, or other regional 
groups. However, in order to analyze the environmental sustainable models on the basis of a regional 
dynamic analysis, the countries selected in this study are divided into six regional-economic groups based 
on geographical, cultural and economic differences (i.e., Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; the 
Middle East and North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; East and Central Europe; and the OECD).55 The 
Middle East and North Africa constitute a heterogeneous group of countries, but they are geographically 
connected with each other and they are culturally united by Islam. However, because Turkey has close 
political and military connections to European countries, this study puts it in this category because of 
historical, cultural, and geographical reasons. As long as Papua New Guinea does not hurt the whole frame 
of empirical estimation, it is in the Asian category for technical simplification.      
 
2. Cross-National Analysis 
Cross-national analyses have been subjected to a number of criticisms (Rostow 1968; O’Donnell 
1973; 1978; Ravenhill 1980; Ragin 1987; Rueschemeyer 1991; Rueschemeyer, et al. 1992). These 
criticisms mainly focus on three issues: over-simplification, demonstration of causality, and the existence 
and treatment of deviant cases. Critics argue that cross-national analyses pay insufficient attention to the 
historical genesis and context of the social phenomena that they study. Cross-national analyses simplify and 
reduce the complexity of the countries being studied to clusters of aggregate information called variables so 
they can subject them to statistical analysis and manipulation. In effect, much of the detail of specific 
countries is lost in a statistical haze that leaves one with little understanding of the actual social processes 
                                                          
55 Countries in the six groups are not necessarily mutually exclusive.   
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operating in individual countries. Critics also contend that efforts to develop causal connections between 
variables are difficult, if not impossible. Rostow minces no words on the matter when he states: “the tally-
ho method of political research” is imperfect because “correlation between contemporary social, economic, 
and political indicators for a series of countries give no clues whatever as to the direction, if any, of 
causality” (Rostow 1968, 48). O’Donnell and Ragin argue that cross-national research is based on non-
experimental designs that deviate substantially from the preconditions such problems as the time ordering 
of variables and the ruling out spurious and confounding variables for demonstrating causality (O’Donnell 
1973; 1978; Ragin 1989). Furthermore, Ravenhill states the matter in no uncertain terms when he observes 
that “for students of comparative politics, it is the exceptional performance that merits attention, whereas 
for those who employ aggregate cross-national analysis the deviant case is a nuisance to be discounted or 
even excluded because of its tendency to bias sample means” (Ravenhill 1980, 120). O’Donnell also adds 
that the dismissal of deviant cases makes hypotheses difficult or impossible to falsify.      
The criticism that cross-national research oversimplifies reality and misses important social 
processes is true at a certain level. It is, however, based on the mistaken idea that we either cannot or 
should not develop generalizations about social regularities that transcend place and time. Przworski and 
Teune argue that social science research should and can lead to a general statement about social 
phenomena. This assumption implies that human behavior can be explained in terms of general laws 
established by observation. Likewise, this presupposition is extremely important in the comparative social 
inquiry if we believe that different systems can be compared and generalizations can be made (Przeworski 
and Teune 1970, 4).56  Indeed, cross-national comparisons have flourished over the past four decades. 
Comparisons of East Asia with Latin America have been especially illuminating for understanding the 
causes and consequences of varying development strategies (Evans 1987; 1989; Haggard 1990; Gereffi 
1983). Other comparisons between Latin America and Europe, either industrial or developing, have been 
revealing in part because the point of departure has been convergence rather than contrast.  
Furthermore, there are two other ways to defend cross-national analyses. First, generalization and 
prediction do not necessarily imply or require a deterministic model. Probabilistic models of the form as X 
increases/decreases the more/less likely is Y are appropriate for most phenomena that social scientists 
study. That is because one exception, or even several exceptions, does not necessarily disprove the 
probabilistic theory on which they are based. Validity is judged by how well the theory accounts for the 
general patterns in the data and whether or not another theory exists that provides a better account 
(Liegerson 1991).  Second, what is being generalized and predicted? Theoretical generalization and 
prediction are distinct from a complete explanation. By definition, complete explanations are historical 
since they only apply to a single, unique instance. On the other hand, theoretical explanations, on which 
                                                          
56 These scholars have a famous fruit analogy. They essentially argue that one can compare qualitatively 
different entities such as oranges and apples, which are both fruit; both have skin, both have juice, both 
have seeds, etc.  
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generalization and prediction are based, identify essential features that are expected to be highly correlated 
in the population of cases. Although no theory can generalize, predict, or even explain anything completely 
(Lieberson 1992; Cohen, B. 1989), it is crucial to clarify to what extent social phenomena can be 
generalized or explained.       
 
3. Variables and Hypotheses. 
Dogan says: “Chariot of science is trailed by three horses: theory, data, and method. If the three 
horses do not run at the same speed, the chariot may lose its equilibrium” (Dogan 1994, 35). According to 
his observations, there is, in the field of comparative politics, a serious gap between substance and method, 
particularly in the arena of quantitative research. Therefore, in order to conduct a proper research, empirical 
studies need to select sound concepts for presenting peculiar social phenomena, to carefully define those 
concepts, to have accurate operational definitions, and then to provide proper quantifying indicators.  
Manheim and Rich also argue that quantitative research should operationalize central theoretical concepts 
into empirical indicators, gather quantitative data on these indicators, and provide probabilistic causal 
explanations to social phenomena (Manheim and Rich 1986, 15-30, 43-67). The quantification of 
dependent, independent and control variables make it possible to use various statistical methods of 
analysis.57   
Furthermore, to reduce the vagueness about the causal inference in social science, independent 
variables have to satisfy certain assumptions of causality. David Hume (1748; 1910) states that a category 
of relation is causality and dependence (i.e., cause and effect).58 It is said to be a function of the 
hypothetical form of judgment. According to Hume, a substance is capable of alteration that is 
successively, in time, having accidents, which are incompatible with each other. The substance at one time 
is in one state and at another time is in a different state. The subsequent state is called an effect when the 
transition from its previous state is lawful. To be lawful, the transition to the new state must be a necessary 
consequence of the initial state of the substance and, perhaps, the states of other substances as well. The 
sum of the states necessary to bring about the effect is the cause. The action of the cause, that is, the 
bringing about of the effect, is called the causality of the cause. The occurrence of the effect, which is 
brought about by the cause, is the dependence of the effect. Additionally, being aware of the criteria of 
                                                          
57 In order to conduct proper quantitative research, SPSS 11, SAS v8, and JMP5 versions of statistic 
software packages are used for reasons of parsimony, accuracy, relevancy, and simplicity. After all, 
statistical techniques are highly related to the nature of data.   
58 Hume is most often cited as a radical empiricist whose reflections on the nature of knowledge led him to 
a skeptical stance in regard to our knowledge of the external world and the Law of Causality. According to 
him, there are four criteria of causality: they are constant conjunction, contiguity, antecedence, and 
necessary conjunction. The necessary conjunction is the main criterion, which implies that in order to know 
x causes y, one must eliminate other possible variables that may cause y. However, in reality, the four 
criteria are not usually satisfied so that most cross-national analyses can only conduct probabilistic causal 
explanation.  
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Hume’s causality, this study follows Popper’s notion of falsification in terms of methodology.59 The 
proposed hypotheses are tested by empirical evidence to see to what extent they are able to explain 
environmental sustainability. The hypotheses are predictions derived from the various theories of 
environmentalism. They are falsifiable statements, and this study’s intention is to see to what extent 
empirical evidence contradicts them. In other words, to what extent they agree with the facts. With the 
research frame adopted in this study, it is possible and inevitable to falsify, as well as to verify the proposed 
hypotheses by empirical observations and evidences.   
 
4. Dependent Variable: Environmental Sustainability   
The dependent variable in this study is environmental sustainability and is quantified by applying 
environmental sustainability index formatted by WYC (2001). Although there are a number of well-known 
definitions of environmental sustainability (WCED 1987; Goodland, et. al. 1991; World Bank 1992; Daly 
and Cobb 1993; WCU 1993; Daly 1996), this study contends that environmental sustainability can be 
presented as a function of five phenomena: (1) the state of the environmental systems, such as air, soil, 
ecosystems, and water; (2) the stresses on those systems, in the form of pollution and exploitation levels; 
(3) the human vulnerability to environmental change in the form of loss of food resources or exposure to 
environmental diseases; (4) the social and institutional capacity to cope with environmental challenges; and 
finally (5) the ability to respond to the demands of global stewardship by cooperating in collective efforts to 
conserve international environmental resources such as atmosphere. In sum, the dependent variable here is 
defined as the ability to produce high levels of performance on each of these five dimensions in a lasting 
manner (see Table 1.3 in Chapter One). The empirical indicator of environmental sustainability in this 
study adopts the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) composed by WYC (2001), which presented a 
full set of 22 indicators for environmental sustainability (see Table 1.4 in Chapter One).60 The indicators 
                                                          
59 Popper’s most important contribution to philosophy of science was to demonstrate the impossibility of 
verifying a general law (Popper 1983). Science proceeds by falsification, not by verification as 
behavioralists argue. Popper repudiates induction, rejects the view that it is the characteristic method of 
scientific investigation and inference, and substitutes falsifiability in its place. It is easy, he argues, to 
obtain evidence in favor of virtually any theory, and he consequently holds that such ‘corroboration,’ as he 
terms it, should count scientifically only if it is the positive result of a genuinely ‘risky’ prediction, which 
might conceivably have been false. For Popper, a theory is scientific only if it is refutable by a conceivable 
event. Every genuine test of a scientific theory, then, is logically an attempt to refute or to falsify it, and one 
genuine counter-instance falsifies the whole theory. In a critical sense, Popper’s theory of demarcation is 
based upon his perception of the logical asymmetry which holds between verification and falsification: it is 
logically impossible to conclusively verify a universal proposition by reference to experience (as Hume 
saw clearly), but a single counter-instance conclusively falsifies the corresponding universal law. In a word, 
an exception, far from proving a rule, conclusively refutes it.  Scientists form hypotheses or make guesses 
about the world, state them in such a way that it is clear under what conditions they might be false, and then 
set out to falsify them. Successful falsification leads to the generation of new guesses or hypotheses and 
therefore more attempts at falsification. And so science proceeds. 
60 The Index eliminated all countries for which the data were insufficient to generate measures for at least 
19 of the 22 indicators. It included all countries for which the data permitted measurements of at least 20 
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and variables were chosen through careful review of the environmental literature and available data 
combined with extensive consultation and analysis. They are finally substantiated by statistical analysis and 
reasoning.61 For instance, covering the 22 indicators had an average bivariate correlation among themselves 
of 0.11. Only 36 out of the 231 possible pairs of indicators had correlation coefficients greater than 0.5. The 
highest such correlations are reported in Table 4.1.62 This data set also determined which individual 
variables had the highest correlation with the ESI and reports those in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.1. Most Highly Correlated Indicator Pairs 
 
  Correlation 
Coefficient 
   
Basic Human Sustenance Environmental Health 0.85 
Environmental Health Reducing Population Stress 0.82 
Basic Human Sustenance Reducing Population Stress 0.72 
Environmental Health Science / Technology 0.69 
Science / Technology Eco-efficiency 0.68 
Science / Technology Reducing Public Choice Distortions 0.66 
Basic Human Sustenance Science / Technology 0.66 
Reducing Population Stress Science / Technology 0.63 
International Commitment Private Sector Responsiveness 0.63 
International Commitment Eco-efficiency 0.62 
Water Quality Science / Technology 0.61 
Regulation and Management International Commitment 0.60 
Reducing Public Choice Distortions Eco-efficiency 0.60 
Basic Human Sustenance Protecting International Commons -0.60 
Reducing Air Pollution Science / Technology -0.63 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
indicators (94 countries). For those countries where the data permitted measurements of no more than 19 
indicators (54 countries), it applied an additional criterion: if their overall data coverage included at least as 
many variables as the lowest number for countries missing two indicators, it included them in the index (28 
countries met this criterion). It ended up with 122 countries in the Index, each of which has data for at least 
62 % of the variables in its analysis. Where it had a sound analytical basis for doing so, it estimated missing 
values. In total, it estimated just over 60 percent of the missing variables, using a variety of computer 
formulations and equations (WYC 2001, 8-10). 
61 If the variables serving as measures of the indicators were empirically related, then they ought to be more 
highly correlated with each other than the average pair of variables in the overall data set. This turns out to 
be true. The average bivariate correlation for variable pairs within the same indicator is 0.36, whereas it is 
0.09 for the data set as a whole (WYC 2001, 13). 
62 In conventional rules, less than 0.8 of correlation value is acceptable. Although there are two pairs of 
indicators out of the 231 possible combinations above the acceptable level, the set of data is considered as 
highly acceptable with statistical significance. This provides confirmation that the set of data is successfully 
formulated as analytical categories that are capable to measuring distinct aspects of environmental 
sustainability.  
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Table 4.2. Variables with Highest Correlation to ESI 
 
Variable Correlation Coefficient N 
   
Reducing Corruption 0.75 122 
Environmental Regulatory Stringency 0.74 56 
Scientific and Technical Articles Per Million Population 0.73 122 
Average Innovest EcoValue 21 Rating of Firms 0.71 20 
Urban TSP Concentration 0.70 122 
 
The fact that Reducing Corruption (0.75) is the variable that has the highest correlation with the 
ESI supports the view that good governance broadly conceived enhances environmental sustainability. 
However, the significance of the high correlation coefficient for the Innovest Eco Value rating (0.71), 
which measures the quality of environmental management within firms, is diminished somewhat by the low 
number of countries for which that variable is available. It is noteworthy, however, that overall the Eco 
Value rating is the second most highly correlated variable with the Environmental System component. 
Among these 20 countries at least, it appears that good environmental management at the firm level is 
associated with environmental performance at the broader national level.  
The Index also shows whether the measure of environmental sustainability was highly correlated with other 
phenomena or measures. The results are presented in Table 4.3. Although the relationship with GDP per 
capita is strong (0.76), other global indices, such as the Consumption Pressure Index (0.56) and the 
Ecological Footprint (0.6), show higher correlations with per capita income. The factors that are not 
strongly correlated with the ESI are equally interesting. Population density and economic growth rates, in 
spite of common complaints about their impacts on the environment, are in general not consistently 
associated with poor environmental performance. These results suggest that countries that are growing 
quickly need not degrade their environments, nor are densely populated countries doomed to pollution 
damage and natural resource shortages.   
In short, these indicators are deemed the most relevant constitutive elements of the five core 
components and are the central elements of analysis for constructing an operational definition of 
environmental sustainability. Each of the indicators, in turn, is associated with a number of variables that 
are empirically measured. The relationship between these Index building blocks is specified in Table 4.4. 
Finally, this Index provides that the large amount of information contained in the data set of environmental 
sustainability is capable of being utilized for a variety of other purposes. For example, it could serve as the 
basis of a watch list of countries facing potential environmental-driven crises.        
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Table 4.3. Correlations Between ESI and Other Comparative Measures 
 Correlation with ESI 
  
WWF Consumption Pressure Index 0.56** 
Ecological Footprint 0.60** 
Percent of GDP from agriculture -0.48** 
GDP per capita (PPP) 0.76** 
1990-1998 GDP per capita growth 0.12 
Human Development Index 0.67** 
Population Density -0.06 
Percent of territory with population density greater than 5 persons per square km. -0.19* 
WEF Current Competitiveness Index 0.65** 
 
**  = < 0.01 (2-tailed). 
*    = < 0.05 (2-tailed). 
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Table 4.4. Environmental Sustainability Index Building Blocks 
 
Component Indicator Variable 
   
Urban SO2 concentration 
Urban NO2 concentration 
 
Air Quality 
Urban TSP concentration 
Internal renewable water per capita Water Quantity 
Water inflow from other countries per capita 
Dissolved oxygen concentration 
Phosphorus concentration 
Suspended solids 
 
Water Quality 
Electrical conductivity 
Percentage of mammals threatened Biodiversity 
Percentage of breeding birds threatened 
Severity of human induced soil degradation 
 
 
 
 
Environmental 
Systems 
Terrestrial Systems 
Land area affected by human activities as a % of total land 
area 
NOx emissions per populated land area 
SO2 emissions per populated land area 
VOCs emissions per populated land area 
Coal consumption per populated land area 
 
Reducing Air 
Pollution 
 
Vehicles per populated land area 
Fertilizer consumption per hectare of arable land 
Pesticide use per hectare of crop land 
Industrial organic pollutants per available fresh water 
 
Reducing Water 
Stress 
Percentage of country’s territory under severe water stress 
Percentage change in forest cover 1990-1995 Reducing Ecosystem 
Stress Percentage of country’s territory in acidification exceedence 
Consumption pressure per capita Reducing Waster & 
Consumption 
Pressures 
Radioactive waster 
Total fertility rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reducing Stress 
Reducing Population 
Pressure % change in projected population between 2000 & 2050 
Daily per capita calorie supply as a % of total requirements Basic Human 
Sustenance % of population with access to improved drinking water 
supply 
Child death rate from respiratory diseases 
Death rate from intestinal infectious diseases 
 
 
Reducing Human 
Vulnerability Environmental 
Health 
Under 5 mortality rate 
 
Continued on next page. 
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Table 4.4. Environmental Sustainability Index Building Blocks (Continued). 
 
 
 
Component Indicator Variable 
   
R & D scientists and engineers per million population 
Expenditure for R & D as a percentage of GNP 
 
Science / Technology 
Scientific and technical articles per million population 
IUCN member organizations per million population Capacity for Debate 
Civil and political liberties 
Stringency and consistency of environmental regulations 
Degree to which environmental regulations promote 
innovation 
Percentage of land area under protected status 
 
Regulation and 
Management 
Number of sectoral EIA guidelines 
Number of ISO 14001 certified companies per million 
dollars GDP 
Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index membership 
Average Innovest EcoValue 21 rating of firms 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
members 
 
 
Private Sector 
Responsiveness 
Levels of environmental competitiveness 
Availability of sustainable development information at the 
national level 
Environmental strategies and action plans 
 
Environmental 
Information 
Number of ESI variables missing from selected data sets 
Energy efficiency (total energy consumption per unit GDP) Eco-Efficiency 
Renewable energy product as a % of total energy 
consumption 
Price of premium gasoline 
Subsides fro energy or materials usage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social and 
Institutional 
Capacity 
Reducing Public 
Choice Distortions 
Reducing corruption 
Number of memberships in environmental intergovernmental 
organizations 
Percentage of CITES reporting requirements met 
Levels of participation in the Vienna Convention / Montreal 
Protocol 
 
 
International 
Commitment 
Compliance with environmental agreements 
Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund participation Global-Scale Funding 
& Participation Global Environmental Facility participation 
FSC accredited forest area as a % of total forest area 
Ecological footprint “deficit” 
CO2 emission (total times per capita) 
Historic cumulative CO2 emissions 
CFC consumption (total times per capita) 
 
 
 
 
 
Global 
Stewardship 
 
Protecting 
International 
Commons 
SO2 exports 
 
Source: 2001 Environmental Sustainability Index (WYC 2001, 10-1) 
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5. Independent Variables 
The conceptual definitions and operational measurements of five independent variables (quality of 
governance, democracy, economic growth, global economic integration as a major form of globalization 
and population growth rate) are analyzed in this section. 
 
Quality of Governance. 
In recent years, the growing interest of academics and policymakers in governance has been 
reflected in the proliferation of cross-country indices measuring various aspects of governance. Several 
recent innovative studies have attempted to quantify the quality of governance and its contribution to 
sustainable development (Mauro 1995; Ades and DiTella 1996; Wei 1997; Rodrik 1997; Johnson, 
Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton 1999; 2000). However, to arrive at concrete policy recommendations for 
using the concept of governance as a development tool, more comparative research is required that uses 
precise measures of governance to examine within-country and across-country variations in poverty 
reduction, government performance, ethnic conflict, social integration, corruption control, economic 
growth, and environmental protection.  
Assuming that available indicators shed light on a fairly small number of broad concepts of 
governance, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton provide six measurable indicators (accountability, 
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory framework, rule of law, and corruption control).63 
Based on the work of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, this study defines governance as the traditions 
and institutions that determine how authority is exercised in a particular country. These include (1) the 
process by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored, and replaced; (2) the capacity of 
governments to manage resources efficiently and formulate, implement, and enforce sound policies and 
regulations; and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions among them. The logical connectedness between the conceptual definition and quantifiable 
indicators of governance asserts the following: 1) within each of the six Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-
Lobaton’s indicators, the data are coherent in the sense that each individual indicator provides some useful 
information about the broader concept of governance to which it is assigned; and 2) although different 
sources measure governance in very different units, statistical techniques are available that allow us to 
anchor each source in a common set of units, making them comparable (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton 2000, 126-8).64 Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton use an “unobserved components model” to 
                                                          
63 See table 1.5 in Chapter One.     
64 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton explain how a simple variant of an unobserved components model 
can be used to combine the information from these different sources into aggregate governance indicators. 
The main advantage of this method is that it allows us to quantify the precision of the both individual 
sources of governance data as well as the aggregate governance indicators. Their study illustrates the 
methodology by constructing aggregate indicators of bureaucratic quality, rule of law, and graft for a large 
sample of 160 countries. However, as they note, although these aggregate governance indicators are more 
informative about the level of governance than any individual indicator, the standard errors associated with 
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extract a statistical consensus from the many available indicators corresponding to each of the six broad 
governance concepts mentioned previously. Primarily measured in qualitative units identifying several 
hundreds of governance-related indicators, these six indicators are produced by a range of organizations. 
They include the perspectives of diverse observers and encompass a wide range of topics (e.g., political 
stability and the business climate, the efficacy of public service provision, experiences with corruption, and 
so on).65  
The resulting aggregate governance indicators efficiently summarize the data available and cover 
virtually all countries in the world.66 The six governance indicators are measured in units ranging from 
about –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. As seen in Appendix 2 
and 3, the indicators reflect the statistical compilation of perceptions of the quality of governance of a large 
number of survey respondents in MDCs and LDCs, as well as NGOs, multilateral organizations, 
commercial risk rating agencies, and think-tanks during 1997 and 1998 (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton, 1999, 1; 2000). Consequently, the Index of quality of governance applied in this study is created 
by simple addition of the six indicators (ranged from –2.5 to 2.5) and arrayed between –15, the lowest 
quality of governance to 15, the highest.      
 
Democracy 
During the past several decades, a structural definition of democracy has emphasized the 
arrangement of election procedures and political institutions that place policy-makers under popular 
control. For example, Schumpeter writes: “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive 
struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1975, 269). Lipset defines democracy as “a political system 
which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials” (Lipset 1959, 71). 
Olson regards political democratization as “the institutionalization of political organizations and 
procedures” (Olson 1968, 699). Huntington states: “A political system is defined as democratic to the 
extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through periodic elections in which 
candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote” 
(Huntington 1984, 195). Recent studies on democracy and democratization, however, show a considerable 
degree of consensus on what constitutes the “procedural minimum” of democracy (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986, 7). The studies show that the procedural minimum of democracy encompasses, among 
other things, “secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
estimates of governance are still large relative to the units in which governance is measured (Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999). 
65 For the details, see Appendix 2, Aggregate Governance Indicators Dataset Sources. 
66 Because they draw on information from many different sources, the aggregate governance indicators are 
more precise than any individual indicator of governance. For the details, see Appendix 3, Illustrative 
Governance: Six Operational Indicators of Good Governance.  
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associational recognition and access, and executive accountability” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 7-8). 
This procedural minimum is equivalent to Dahl’s eight “institutional requirements” (Dahl 1971).67 Such 
definitions of democracy based on the procedural minimum are broader than earlier definitions and 
therefore avoid what Schmitter and Karl call the “fallacy of electoralism” (Schmitter and Karl 1993, 42)  
Adopting a definition of democracy focused on the procedural minimum or the institutional 
requirements, this study defines democracy as “a (socio-)political system in which, first, decision-makers 
are chosen through relatively free, fair, and regular elections in which virtually all the adult population is 
eligible to vote, and second, there exists a considerable level of civil and political liberties - for example, 
freedom of thought and expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and demonstration, 
freedom to form and join organizations, and freedom from terror and unjustified imprisonment” 
(Huntington 1991, 7; Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1995, 6-7).  
In terms of measurement, the procedural minimum definition of democracy consists of three 
attributes: participation, competition, and civil liberties.68 This allows researchers to formulate operational 
measures of democracy in comparative studies. However, due to the shortage of accessible political data 
and the lack of agreement about the three attributes and their components, the measurement varies 
considerably on the assessment of democracy. It is said that there are four limitations for measurement of 
democracy. First, most of the studies rely on data compiled before the eighties and a few were collected 
after the end of the Cold War. These data exclude many countries, which became independent in the late 
eighties and nineties, leaving biased samples. Second, they are cumulative in nature: that is, they mostly 
measure the democratic performance of political development over a time period, one or more decades, or 
around one time point (e.g. circa 1980, circa 1990). This reduces disparities within time periods and 
prevents any meaningful analysis of change. Third, most of the previous studies on quantifying democracy 
limit themselves to specific regions or to certain development levels and economic systems, hence 
excluding a considerable number of countries. Last, in an effort to maximize the number of cases in the 
samples, data for missing value for some countries, typically less developed or those with centrally planned 
economies, are generated through the employment of strategies that rely heavily on presumed high 
correlation among components. Evidence shows that although they are highly correlated, the scores for all 
components do not go hand in hand for all cases. In fact, this is the reason for including several attributes 
and components in such measures (Arat 1991, 22-23; Gastil 1991; Freedom House 2000). 
To prevent the above deficiencies from recurring, this study does not construct another democracy 
index, but instead, employs the Freedom House democracy index. There are crucial reasons to adopt the 
                                                          
67 According to Dahl, they include: “(1)freedom to form and join organizations; (2) freedom of expression; 
(3) right to vote; (4) eligibility for public office; (5) right of political leaders to compete for support and 
votes; (6) alternative sources of information; (7) free and fair elections; (8) institutions for making 
government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference” (Dahl 1971, 3). 
68 There are, however, various quantitative studies of the attributes and components of democracy. For the 
details, see Appendix 4.  
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index as following. First, it proposes working and practical definitions of democracy annually and has two 
primarily quantified attributes (political rights and civil liberties).69 Second, it recognizes a systematic error 
in subjective measures of democracy, so that this index is statistically reliable and valid to analyze 
quantified concepts. Third, it presents overall poli-social characteristics with 22 components rather than 
strict political attributes. The index provides a candid assessment of how far individual states have come in 
realizing fundamental human rights and poli-social conditions for their citizens, and how far they must go. 
Fourth, it replicates the results across every year. And last, it estimates the degree of democracy as socio-
political conditions in more than 190 countries, almost all political systems in the world.70 In the two 
attributes for measuring democracy used by Freedom House, political rights are assessed, on the one hand, 
by the right to vote, election meaningfulness, multiple political parties, opposition power, and government 
independence from foreign or military control. On the other hand, civil liberties are covered with the 
freedom of speech, assembly, and religion and freedom from terrorism or blatant inequality. The Survey 
rates political rights and civil liberties separately on a seven-category scale, 1 representing the most free 
and 7 the least free. A country is assigned to a particular numerical category based on responses to the 22 
checklist (or 22 components) and the judgments of the Survey team at Freedom House. Consequently, the 
Freedom House Index perfectly addresses the procedural minimum definition of democracy used here as 
the conceptual definition, which encompasses the overall poli-socio concepts (Gastil 1978; Freedom House 
2000). 
 
Economic Growth 
The economic function of environmentalism is measured as the annual growth rate in a country’s 
GDP per capita by adopting the World Development Report, World Bank (1999). Since the primary 
measure of environmental sustainability refers to 2000-2001, annual growth rate, like the other explanatory 
variable is measured by an average rate of economic growth for 1990-1998, which satisfies the four criteria 
of causality by Hume mentioned before. World Bank-calculated economic growth rates are treated as the 
most reliable indicator in the area of environmental as well as developmental studies. The series for each 
country are generated by regression equations, which “take the form of log. Xt = a + bt + et, where this is 
equivalent to the logarithmic transformation of the compound growth rate equation: Xt = Xo (1+r)t.”  In this 
                                                          
69 There are 9 components of political rights and 13 components of civil rights used by Freedom House. For 
the details of the components, see Appendix 5.  
70 The Freedom House index can be compared with Bollen’s liberal democracy index, which is one of the 
most popular operational definitions of democracy in sociology and comparative politics literature. The 
Bollen index also has two attributes: political liberties and democratic rule. Bollen defines liberal 
democracy as “the extent to which a political system allows political liberties and democratic rule” (Bollen 
1980; 1993). Political liberties exist to the extent that the people of a country have the freedom to express a 
variety of political opinions in any media and the freedom to form or to participate in any political group. 
Democratic rule (or political rights) exists to the extent that the national government is accountable to the 
general population, and each individual is entitled to participate in the government directly or through 
representatives (Bollen 1993, 1208-1209).     
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equation, “Xt is the variable (t is time),  a=log Xo  and b=log(1+r) are the parameters to be estimated; and et 
is the error term. If b* is the least squares estimate of b, then the annual average growth rate, r, is obtained 
as [antilog (b* )] - 1” (World Bank 1986, 242; 1999).  Jackman states: “An advantage of percentage growth 
rates calculated in this way is that it minimizes the chances of observing heteroscedastic disturbances” 71 
(Jackman 1980, 606). 
 
Global Economic Integration  
One obvious phenomenon of globalization is the state of a country’s exposure to the international 
economy. It refers not only to the absolute and relative size of the economic flows in and out of a country, 
but also to the configuration of their economic environment as well. The discussion of global economic 
integration has largely treated trade integration and financial integration separately. For example, the May 
1997 World Economic Outlook (WEO) addressed trade issues, while the October 2001 WEO focused on 
international financial integration (IMF 1997, 2001). However, one important and general agreement in the 
literature is that trade liberalization is a precondition for capital account liberalization and a crucial 
barometer to indicating global economic configuration (WEO 2002, 108-9). To capture the experience of as 
many countries over as long a period as possible, this study focuses on quantity-based measures of global 
economic integration. Although global economic integration is not easy to quantify, reflecting difficulties 
in measuring the nature, extent, intensity, and effectiveness of barriers to transactions involving goods and 
assets, global economic integration here is defined as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
divided by GDP and is measured as trade share of GDP in percentage. In other words, this study asserts that 
the level of trade openness represents the level of global economic integration adopting the World Bank 
database. 
 
Population Growth  
Population is based on the de facto definition, which counts all residents, regardless of legal status 
or citizenship, except for refugees not permanently settled in their country of asylum, who are generally 
considered part of the population of their country of origin. The indicators shown are midyear estimates. 
Population estimates are usually based on national censuses. Intercensal estimates are interpolations or 
extrapolations based on demographic models (World Development Report 2000/2001, 319). Accordingly, 
average annual population growth rate is the exponential rate of change for the period. The United Nations 
Population Division and national statistical offices provided the data adopted in this study. 
  
                                                          
71 The assumption of homoscedasticity or equal spread (that is, equal variance) is that the variance of each 
disturbance term uI, conditional on the chosen value of the explanatory variables, is some constant number 
equal to σ2.  In contrast, if there is heteroscedasticity, then the conditional variance of Yi increases as Xi 
increases, that is, the variances of Yi  are not the same.  
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6. Estimation Problems and Diagnostic Tests     
Empirical results from various cross-national studies have been questioned in terms of their basis 
on inattention to one or more estimation difficulties (Jackman 1980, Bollen and Jackman 1985, and Dietz et 
al 1987). A number of these problems lead us to pay careful attention to outliers, multicollinearity 
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and nonnormality. Since Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates are 
reported in this study, it is necessary to be aware that parameter estimates, their standard errors, and the 
results of F and t statistics may be invalidated by violating the assumptions of the Gauss-Markov 
Theorem.72 Hence, before conducting regression models and examining the hypotheses, the results of 
diagnostic tests should be investigated. The logic behind this is that a statistical analysis is based on the 
ratio between the magnitude of the parameter estimate and a measure of its variance, the t-ratio. If the 
parameter estimate is, in general, about two times greater than its standard error,73 the parameter estimate is 
considered as statistically significant and can be interpreted as supporting theories. As another assurance of 
the robustness of the OLS results, the standard errors will be reestimated using a bootstrap technique, 
which generates nonparameteric estimates of the parameter standard errors (Efron 1981). Subsampling 
techniques like the bootstrap are extremely valuable as a tool for assessing the performance of conventional 
estimators in cases where adherence to assumptions underlying regression procedures may be suspect. The 
bootstrap technique can be accomplished by subsampling randomly with replacement numerous times. The 
mean and standard deviation of the parameter estimates from this repeated subsampling provides a second 
estimate of the ratio between the parameter estimate and its standard error (Diez et al. 1987).  This method 
will be also used to gauge the performance of OLS regression procedures when applied to the cross-
national sample and to bolster or reduce confidence in the estimates generated by the regression technique. 
The intuitive appeal and simple logic of the bootstrap method for estimating the statistical significance of 
the parameters may well have carry-over effects to models exhibiting signs of heteroscedasticity. In both 
cases of heteroscedasticity and abnormally distributed residuals, the usual method for determining 
significance of the parameter estimates is suspect. It can be said that the bootstrap method may offer the 
researcher a help in judging and interpreting results from model estimations plagued with either or both of 
these problems.  
The technical problems referred to above can dramatically affect not only F and t statistics, R2 and 
adjust R2 but also interpretation of the empirical results. However, since there is no single solution to all 
                                                          
72 In an intuitive approach to the Gauss-Markov Theorem, the OLS estimators are linear unbiased 
estimators under the assumptions of the classical regression model (CRM). They are as following:  1) there 
is no exact multicollinearity between independent variables; 2) there is no heteroscedasticity problem; 3) 
disturbances are normally distributed; and 4) there is no autocorrelation between the disturbance terms. To 
identify the model that best fits the observed data, we need to conduct assumptions tests in addition to tests 
of significance and R2 comparisons.  
73 The exact value of what constitutes a statistically significant t-ratio depends on the sample size and on 
several a priori decisions of the researcher including the α level and whether the test is to be one or two-
tailed.  
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those problems, a number of techniques to explore and minimize the impact of the problems are employed 
in this study. The following section will analyze the adopted data in this study and report the results of five 
diagnostic tests. 
 
Outlier 
On the one hand, an observation that is markedly different from, or atypical of, the rest of the 
observations of a data set is known as an outlier.74 On the other hand, an observation that causes the 
regression estimates to be substantially different from what they would be if the observation were removed 
from the data set is called an influential observation. Observations that are outliers or have high leverage 
are not necessarily influential, while influential observations usually are outliers and have high leverage 
(Freund and Wilson 1998, 126-133).75   
The standard tool for detecting outliers in the response variable is the residual plot. This is a 
scatter-plot of the residuals (y-µ y/x) on the vertical axis and the estimated values µ y/x on the horizontal axis. 
If all is well, such a plot should reveal a random scattering of points around the zero value on the vertical 
axis.76  Among the data analyzed in this study, two outliers are found in the variables of global economic 
integration and population growth: Singapore in the former and Jordan in the latter. However, those two 
values do not influence the parameter estimate for the data set. In the observation of Singapore in global 
economic integration data, Cook’s D and Hat Diag H values (normally indicative of leverage) are 0.002 
and 0.0139, respectively. That is not statistically significant, and its R student value (normally indicative of 
outlier) is a relatively low -0.9783. Jordan in population growth data also has relatively low leverage value 
0.0302 in Hat Diag H and its R Student value as low as –0.9783 (see Appendix B). Hence, we cannot say 
                                                          
74 An observation may be an outlier with respect to the response variable and/or the independent variables. 
Specifically, an extreme observation in the response variable is called an outlier, while extreme values in 
the independent variables are said to have high leverage and are often called leverage points.  
75 In terms of leverage, outlier, and influential observation, there are seven basic concepts as follows:  
1. Studentized Residuals are the actual residuals divided by their standard errors. Values exceeding 2.5 in 
magnitude may be used to indicate outliers; 
2. Cook’s D is an overall measure of the impact of the i th observation on the set of estimated regression 
coefficients and normally represents the degree of leverage; 
3. Diagonals of the hat matrix are measures of leverage in the space of the independent variables. Values 
exceeding 2(m+1)/n may be used to identify observations with high leverage; 
4. DFFITS are standardized differences between a predicted value estimated with and without the 
observation in question. Value exceeding ±2√p/n in magnitude may be considered large; 
5.  DFBETAS are used to indicate which of the independent variables contribute to large DFFITS. 
Therefore, these statistics are primarily useful for observations with large DFFITS values, where 
DFBETAS exceeding  ± 2/√n  in magnitude may be considered large; 
6. COVRATIO statistics indicate how leaving out an observation affects the precision of the estimates of the 
regression coefficients. Values outside the bounds computed as may be considered large, with values above 
the limit indicating less precision when leaving the observation out and vice versa for values less than the 
lower limit; 
7. hi, the indicator of leverage, is a measure of how far the point is from the center of the data.    
76 For one-variable regressions, it may be more useful to use the x-variable on the horizontal axis. 
 70
that those two data are influential observations or that they distort the parameter estimate either for the full 
model or for the reduced model.   
 
Multicollinearity 
The assumption of the multiple regression models is that there is no perfect collinearity between 
independent variables: perfect collinearity implies an exact linear relationship between two variables. 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld say that a model exhibiting perfect collinearity cannot be solved mathematically 
because the system of equations to be solved contains two or more equations which are not perfectly 
independent anyway (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1981 and 1991, 217). This rule of thumb suggests that if the 
pair-wise or zero-order correlation coefficient between two regressors is high (that is, in excess of 0.8), then 
multicollinearity is a serious problem. However, technically, high zero-order correlations are a sufficient 
but not a necessary condition for the existence of multicollinearity because it can exist even though the 
zero-order of simple correlations is comparatively low -say, less than 0.5- (Gujarati 1995, 335-346). The 
obvious solution to this problem is to remove one or more of the collinear regressors from the model. Since 
these regressors are epoxies of one another (that is, they hold essentially the same information), the 
removal of one will cause no accompanying loss in explanatory power, R2 or predictive power.77  
A more difficult problem confronts a researcher when two or more regressors are highly but not 
exactly correlated with each other. For this case, the condition of multicollinearity has a mathematical 
solution so that all variables may remain in the model, but care must be taken in the interpretation of the 
regression results. Because the regression coefficient (parameter estimate) measures the change in the 
dependent variable due to a change in the particular regressor in question while simultaneously controlling 
for or holding constant all other regressors, the distribution of estimated regression parameters is quite 
sensitive to multicollinearity. This sensitivity shows up in the form of high covariation among parameter 
estimates for the affected regressors and additionally in large standard errors for these same regressors. 
However, this set of data has no sign of multicollinearity in terms of VIF values and correlation matrices. It 
will be more specifically discussed with Tables 5.1 to 5.16 in Chapter Five. 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
The assumption of homoscedasticity, or equal spread, is that the variance of each disturbance term 
ui conditional on the chosen value of the explanatory variables is some constant number, which is equal to 
σ2.  In contrast, if there is heteroscedasticity, then the conditional variance of Yi increases as Xi increases. 
                                                          
77 Furthermore, there are other signs for existence of multicollinearity in the regressors such as 1) if there 
are high but few significant t ratios, and 2) if the Condition Index (CI) is between 10 and 30, there is 
moderate to strong multicollinearity and if it exceeds 30, there is a severe problem of multicollinearity.  
The values of VIF indicate the multicollinearity problem for a particular variable, while CI implies the 
overall multicollinearity problem. According to the conventional wisdom, if there is no collinearity 
between regressors, VIF will be 1, moderate collinearity if VIF is between 5-10, and if more than 10, there 
is a serious collinearity problem.  
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In other words, the variances of Yi  are not the same.  In short, if we persist in using the testing procedures 
despite heteroscedasticity, whatever conclusions we draw or inferences we make may be very misleading 
(Gujarati 1995, 366). In order to detect a heteroscedasticity problem, this study conducts Spearman’s rank 
correlation test.78  The results of the test show there is no serious heteroscedasticy problem among the 
explanatory variables except one variable, global economic integration, which might have a slight 
heteroscedasticity problem with rs value of 0.26366 and t value of 2.4. Furthermore, heteroscedasticity can 
also arise as a result of the presence of outliers. An outlying observation, or outlier, is an observation that is 
much different in relation to the other observations in the sample in terms of R-student, Cook’s D, or Hat 
Diag D. However, as discussed before, there are no serious outliers in the data. Hence we may say that this 
set of data does not distort or misinterpret the parameter estimate of the OLS analyses.  
 
Autocorrelation 
The term autocorrelation can be defined as correlation between the members of the series of 
observations ordered in time (as in time series data) or space (as in cross-sectional data).79 In the regression 
context, the classical linear regression model assumes that such autocorrelation does not exist in the 
disturbances ui.: symbolically, E ( ui. uj. ) = 0, i≠ j (Gujarati 1995, 400-401). A salient feature of most 
economic time series is inertia or sluggishness. As is well known, time series data (for instance, GNP, 
employment, inflation, etc.) exhibit economic cycles or time-trend. Starting at the bottom of a recession, 
when economic recovery starts, most of these series start moving upward. Thus, there is a momentum built 
into them, and it continues until something happens to slow them down. Therefore, in regressions involving 
time series data, successive observations are likely to be interdependent. There are also other causes of this 
problem. They can be summarized as the following: specification biases, cobweb phenomena, lags, and 
manipulation of data.80  It should be also noted that autocorrelation can be positive as well as negative, 
although most economic time series generally exhibit positive autocorrelation because most of them either 
move upward or downward over extended time periods and do not exhibit a constant up-and-down 
movement. 
It is apparent from the equation of d = 2 (1 - ρ). In this formula, if there is no serial correlation (ρ 
=0), d is expected to be about 2. Therefore, as a rule of thumb, if d is found to be 2 in an application, one 
                                                          
78 For Spearman’s rank correlation test, we need rs =1-6[Σdi2/n(n2-1)] : where di = difference in the ranks 
assigned to two different characteristic of i th individuals or phenomena and n = number of individuals or 
phenomena ranked,  and t value, t=rs√n-2/√1-rs2. If the computed t value exceeds the critical t value, we 
may accept the hypothesis of heteroscedasticity, otherwise we may reject it.  
79 Some authors call autocorrelation in cross-sectional data as spatial autocorrelation, that is, correlation in 
space rather than over time (Gujarati 1995). 
80 Each case may be described as excluded variables case (some variables that were originally candidates 
but were not included in the model for a variety of reasons should be included.) and incorrect functional 
form, Cobweb phenomenon (with a lag of one time period because some decisions take time to implement 
and are influenced by the situation prevailing last year), Lags (one of the explanatory variables is the 
lagged value of the dependent variable), and Manipulation of data (the raw data are often manipulated). 
 72
may assume that there is no first-order autocorrelation, either positive of negative. If ρ = +1, indicating 
perfect positive correlation in the residuals, d =0. Thus, the closer d is to 0, the greater the evidence of 
positive serial correlation. If ρ = -1, implying perfect negative correlation among successive residuals, d=4. 
Hence, the closer d is to 4, the greater the evidence of negative serial correlation.  In the full-data equation 
with Durbin-Watson d value 1.836, we may assume that there is no autocorrelation.  ρ = 1- (d/2) = 1- 
(1.836/2) = 0.082. The ρ values are also closer to 0, which indicate no autocorrelation. It may be stated as a 
general principal that whenever we use an estimator in place of the true value, the estimated OLS 
coefficients have the usual optimum properties only asymptotically, which is in the condition of the large 
samples. Also, the conventional hypothesis testing procedures are, strictly speaking, valid asymptotically. 
In small sample (the conventional wisdom says 20), therefore, one has to be careful in interpreting the 
estimated results. In this study, data of 122-sample size are obviously more than 20. Therefore, the 
interpretation of no autocorrelation problem is fairly acceptable.       
 
Nonnormality 
Dietz et al. caution researchers that OLS may perform poorly when used with cross-national data 
due to violations of the assumption of normally disturbed residuals in the population from which the 
sample was drawn (Dietz et al.1987).  They argue that nonnormality of the residuals may make parameter 
estimates inefficient, similar to the effects of heteroscedasticity, and may even under some circumstances 
yield biased estimates. Like the case for heteroscedasticitic disturbances, probabilistic tests for the 
statistical significance of the parameter estimates may be invalid because estimates of the standard errors 
for the coefficients may be inaccurate. They continuously claim the lack of normally distributed errors 
reduces the value of the conventional rule, the t ratio greater than 1.5 rule, since the rationale for this rule 
rests on an assumption of normal errors.  
One method for testing normality is the Jarque-Bera (JB) test. The JB test of normality is an 
asymptotic, or large-sample, test. It is also based on the OLS residuals, which is skewness and kurtosis 
measures of the OLS residuals.81 A normal distribution implies that the value of skewness is zero and the 
value of kurtosis is 3 (it can also be zero). Under the null hypothesis that the residuals are normally 
distributed, Jarque and Bera show that asymptotically (i.e. in large samples) the JB statistic given in the 
equation of JB = n[ s2/ 6 + (k-3)2 / 24]  (S: skewness  K: kurtosis) follows the chi-square distribution with 2 
degree of freedom (Gujarati 1995, 65-68, 143-144). In addition, this study conducts the JB normality test 
with k instead of k-3, that is, JB = n[ s2/ 6 + k2 / 24]. Accordingly, after conducting the JB test, we have the 
p values of obtaining such chi-square values for 2 degrees of freedom are less than about 0.005 for the k-3 
option and about 0.62 for the k option, with the JB values of 19.94 from the k-3 option and 0.8913 from the 
k option. Thus, in the k-3 option, the p value of the computed chi-square is sufficiently low, so we can 
                                                          
81 Skewness is a measure of the asymmetry of the distribution shape, and Kurtosis is a measure of the 
relative shape of the middle and tails, in other words, a measure of the peakedness of the distribution. 
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reject the hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed. However, if we take the k option, the p 
value, about 0.62 of the chi-square, is reasonably high enough not to reject the normality assumption.  
Thus, if we take the k option, we may say that the residuals are normally distributed. 
 
7. Summary 
This chapter discussed the utility of cross-national analysis in the comparative research and 
identified independent and dependent variables. Especially, the various operational definitions in the logic 
of world environmentalism, governance, and domestic / international economic conditions are deeply 
associated with the trials of reconceptualization of those issues in Chapter One.  Even though some 
indicators proposed here do not perfectly match the desired measurement, which I willingly admit, these 
trials are worth enough to encourage the further empirical studies, and more importantly, these measures 
have better explanatory power on the dynamic interactions of environmental politics on both national and 
international levels. Moreover, the several problems of quantitative research are discussed and the set of 
data is analyzed with proper statistical techniques for diagnostic tests. In the next chapter, accordingly, with 
the refined data, the investigation of the relationship between the multifaceted conditions of international 
and domestic factors and the level of environmental sustainability in national level analyses and critical 
tests of the major hypotheses in the competing theories of environmentalism will be pursued.  
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Chapter Five. Environmental Sustainability Models and Empirical Results 
 
1 Introduction 
The impact of multifaceted characteristics of political, economic and international influences on 
environmental sustainability in national-level analyses is evaluated by using bivariate descriptive statistics 
(correlation matrix) and multivariate analyses (OLS regression) in this chapter. Bivariate descriptive 
statistics addresses the zero-order correlations among all variables, which consist of one for all 122-sample 
country and six regional-economic groups, i.e. Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, The Middle East 
and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, East and Central Europe and the OECD member states. And then, 
multivariate analyses with five independent variables are presented.  
The estimation framework in this study is formulated such that the key issues relating to 
environmental sustainability are unfolded. These issues include: (1) the factors that have contributed to the 
expansion and achievement of a national-level sustainability; (2) the effect of improvement in social and 
political conditions on environmental policies and standards; and (3) the spillover effects of economic 
growth and global economic integration on the environment. In other words, the estimation framework 
encompasses competing theories and arguments such as political elasticity theory, pro-democracy 
environmentalism, the anti-democracy environmental movement, the LG (Limit-to-Growth) hypothesis, the 
IUC (Inverted U-Curve) hypothesis, neoclassical economic argument of the World Bank and the argument 
of anti-globalist movement. The discussion of the estimation framework highlighting each of the key issues 
and the structural equations to be tested are discussed as follows. The level of environmental sustainability 
(ES) is hypothesized to be influenced by quality of governance (QG), the level of democracy (DEM), 
economic growth (EG), the level of global economic integration (GEI) and population growth (PG). Hence 
the equation is summarized as ES = β0+ QGβ1+ DEMβ2+ EGβ3+ GEIβ4+ PGβ5+ ε. This chapter, 
accordingly, portrays a total of fifty six environmental sustainability models, along with seven correlation 
matrixes, and analyzes multidimensional dynamics of environmental politics based on the literature.  
 
2 Bivariate Analyses 
Pearson correlation, mean, standard deviation and coefficient of the variation for all variables 
included in 122-sample country and six regional analyses are presented in Table 5.1 to 5.7. Each is 
discussed in turn.  
 
Correlation Matrix for All Sample Countries 
Examination of Table 5.1 reveals that correlations between predictor variables range from a low of 
.008 to .776 for all sample countries. Multicollinearity does not appear because no correlation coefficient is  
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Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analysis for 122 Sample Countries 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
ES 49.4148 11.48337 122 
QG 2.5851 .77747 122 
DEM 9.3443 3.63584 122 
EG 2.2974 3.95249 116 
GEI 32.7726 33.55113 113 
PG 1.6693 1.34481 114 
 
    ES QG DEM EG GEI PG 
ES Pearson 
Correlation 
1      
  Sig. (2-tailed) .      
  N 122      
QG Pearson 
Correlation 
.776** 1     
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .     
  N 122 122     
DEM Pearson 
Correlation 
.691** .769** 1    
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .    
  N 122 122 122    
EG Pearson 
Correlation 
.008 .162 -.037 1   
  Sig. (2-tailed) .932 .082 .693 .   
  N 116 116 116 116   
GEI Pearson 
Correlation 
.410** .618** .355** .121 1  
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .200 .  
  N 113 113 113 113 113  
PG Pearson 
Correlation 
-.428** -.421** -.409** .454** -.239* 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .012 . 
  N 114 114 114 113 110 114 
 
**  = < 0.01 (2-tailed). 
*    = < 0.05 (2-tailed). 
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greater than .8 between two predictor variables, although the absence of a high correlation does not 
absolutely rule out the existence of collinearity.82   
The highest correlation (r=.77) is the relationship between quality of governance and 
environmental sustainability, which is consistent to the theoretical expectation of political elasticity theory 
with statistical significance. This result implies that the more government or those in authority can integrate 
and alternate soft forms of political power, linking incentives to persuasion, with hard forms of power, 
including disincentives and coercion, the more effective they will be and the more achieved environmental 
sustainability will be. The democracy variable also has a strong, positive relationship with environmental 
sustainability (r=.69). This result is consistent to the argument of pro-democracy environmentalism, which 
contends that environmental policy outputs and sustainability should significantly improve in a democratic 
society or after a democratic transition. Contrary to the a priori expectations, the variables of economic 
growth and global economic integration are positively related to environmental sustainability although only 
global economic integration variable is statistically significant (r=-.00; r=-.41, respectively).  These results 
can support the argument of IUC hypothesis, suggesting that although environmental quality may worsen 
with economic growth and/or expansion, it eventually improves with accumulated technology, information, 
capital and interdependence with other countries. Finally the variable of population growth is negatively 
associated with environmental sustainability in the expected direction with statistical significance (r=-.42). 
In an overall view, these results imply that social and political conditions have more explanatory power for 
environmental sustainability than economic conditions have.  
 
Correlation Matrix for Asia 
Findings in Table 5.2 show that correlations between predictor variables range from a low of .032 
to a high of .722 for sample Asian countries. Although no one guarantees the non-existence of 
multicollinearity in the data, the rules of thumb say that there is no serious problem here.  
The highest correlation is found in the relationship between the variables of quality of governance 
and global economic integration with statistical significance (r=.72). This result can support the argument 
of World Bank’s neoclassical economics that the consequences of trade liberalization and expansion 
change state capability in promoting efficiency and effectiveness of governmental functions, subjecting 
state institutions to greater competition, making the state more responsive to people’s needs and bringing 
government closer to the people through broader participation and decentralization of government 
activities.83 This result also supports the Bank’s programs of economic structural reforms after the 1997 
financial crisis in East and Southeast Asia. The variables of economic and population growth are negatively 
related to environmental sustainability (r = -.51; r = -29 respectively), while quality of governance,  
                                                          
82 A correlation coefficient less than .8 is acceptable level by “rules of thumb” of statistical analyses 
(Gujarati 1995, 4; Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991, 217). 
83 Tussie (1995) and Tussie and Fernanda (1997) well summarize the arguments of the MDBs’ neoclassical 
economic view on global economic integration and improvement of state capability.   
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Table 5.2. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analysis for Asia 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
ES 44.4647 6.41258 17 
QG 2.4609 .65052 17 
DEM 8.1765 3.52199 17 
EG 5.4875 2.69614 16 
GEI 36.0063 64.17702 16 
PG 1.9688 .72454 16 
 
    ES QG DEM EG GEI PG 
ES Pearson 
Correlation 
1      
  Sig. (2-tailed) .      
  N 17      
QG Pearson 
Correlation 
.352 1     
  Sig. (2-tailed) .166 .     
  N 17 17     
DEM Pearson 
Correlation 
.384 .392 1    
  Sig. (2-tailed) .128 .119 .    
  N 17 17 17    
EG Pearson 
Correlation 
-.513* -.039 -.687** 1   
  Sig. (2-tailed) .042 .885 .003 .   
  N 16 16 16 16   
GEI Pearson 
Correlation 
.172 .722** -.163 .289 1  
  Sig. (2-tailed) .525 .002 .547 .277 .  
  N 16 16 16 16 16  
PG Pearson 
Correlation 
-.290 -.281 -.338 .032 .106 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .275 .292 .201 .906 .697 . 
  N 16 16 16 16 16 16 
 
**  = < 0.01 (2-tailed). 
*    = < 0.05 (2-tailed). 
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democracy and global economic integration variables are positively associated with the dependent variable 
(r=.35; r=.38; r=.17 respectively), although only economic growth variable has statistical significance. 
These results are consistent with the theoretical expectation of the LG hypothesis, which contends that 
expanding human economy should be associated with an increase in environmental degradation. In an 
overall view of the Asian case, economic conditions have more explanatory power for environmental 
sustainability than social and political conditions. Although these results support the arguments of political 
elasticity theory, pro-democracy environmentalism and IUC hypothesis, the relationships are not 
statistically significant.  
 
Correlation Matrix for Latin America and the Caribbean 
The examinations in Table 5.3 show that correlations between predictor variables range from a 
low of .039 to a high of .678 for the case of Latin America and the Caribbean. Multicollinearity does not 
appear in this region.  
The highest correlation (r=.67) is the relationship between quality of governance and democracy, 
while the association between democracy and environmental sustainability is positive (r=.27) but weak 
relationship without statistic significance. The second highest correlation (r=.65) is found in the 
relationship between economic growth and the dependent variable with statistical significance. The 
relationship (r=.61) between quality of governance and environmental sustainability is also highly 
associated, which is consistent with the theoretical expectation of political elasticity theory with statistical 
significance. These results imply that the arguments of IUC hypothesis and political elasticity theory are 
statistically confirmed in this region. Contrary to the a priori expectations, the variable of global economic 
integration is positively related to environmental sustainability without statistical significance (r=.03). As 
expected, the variable of population growth is negatively associated to the dependent variable without 
statistical significance (r=-31). In an overall view, one interesting thing in this region is there are positive 
and strong relationships between socio-political and economic conditions and environmental sustainability. 
Unlike the Asian case, these results imply that quality of governance and economic growth should be given 
attention to explain the degree of environmental sustainability. 
 
Correlation Matrix for the Middle East and North Africa 
Findings in Table 5.4 show that correlations between predictor variables range from a low of .023 
to a high of .645 for the case of the Middle East and North Africa. Although no one guarantees the non-
existence of multicollinearity in the data, the rules of thumb say that there is no serious problem here.  
The highest correlation is found in the relationship between the variables of quality of governance 
and global economic integration with statistical significance (r=.64). This result is consistent to the 
argument of World Bank’s neoclassical economics, which has a pattern similar to the Asian case, as we 
have seen. The relationship (r=.31) between quality of governance and environmental sustainability is  
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Table 5.3. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analysis for Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
ES 51.0045 8.42844 22 
QG 2.4259 .48263 22 
DEM 9.9545 2.69881 22 
EG 3.5524 2.04294 21 
GEI 29.3143 20.53291 21 
PG 2.2000 .66886 20 
 
    ES QG DEM EG GEI PG 
ES Pearson 
Correlation 
1      
  Sig. (2-tailed) .      
  N 22      
QG Pearson 
Correlation 
.615** 1     
  Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .     
  N 22 22     
DEM Pearson 
Correlation 
.277 .678** 1    
  Sig. (2-tailed) .213 .001 .    
  N 22 22 22    
EG Pearson 
Correlation 
.650** .520* .299 1   
  Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .016 .188 .   
  N 21 21 21 21   
GEI Pearson 
Correlation 
.039 .356 .602** -.049 1  
  Sig. (2-tailed) .867 .113 .004 .833 .  
  N 21 21 21 21 21  
PG Pearson 
Correlation 
-.318 -.576** -.358 -.073 -.125 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .172 .008 .121 .759 .598 . 
  N 20 20 20 20 20 20 
 
**  = < 0.01 (2-tailed). 
*    = < 0.05 (2-tailed). 
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Table 5.4. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analysis for the Middle East and North Africa 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
ES 38.4500 5.12666 14 
QG 2.0886 .64644 14 
DEM 5.0000 2.48069 14 
EG 4.1667 2.25281 12 
GEI 17.2909 9.69582 11 
PG 2.5583 1.69944 12 
 
    ES QG DEM EG GEI PG 
ES Pearson 
Correlation 
1      
  Sig. (2-tailed) .      
  N 14      
QG Pearson 
Correlation 
.310 1     
  Sig. (2-tailed) .280 .     
  N 14 14     
DEM Pearson 
Correlation 
.526 .586* 1    
  Sig. (2-tailed) .054 .028 .    
  N 14 14 14    
EG Pearson 
Correlation 
.095 .023 -.214 1   
  Sig. (2-tailed) .768 .943 .505 .   
  N 12 12 12 12   
GEI Pearson 
Correlation 
-.198 .645* .158 -.190 1  
  Sig. (2-tailed) .559 .032 .643 .576 .  
  N 11 11 11 11 11  
PG Pearson 
Correlation 
.180 -.272 -.064 -.051 .500 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .575 .392 .845 .883 .141 . 
  N 12 12 12 11 10 12 
 
**  = < 0.01 (2-tailed). 
*    = < 0.05 (2-tailed). 
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positive but without statistical significance. It implies that although political elasticity theory can explain 
the degree of environmental sustainability in the region of the Middle East and North Africa, it fails 
confirmation statistically. The variables of democracy and economic growth are also positively related to 
the dependent variable, but they do not have statistical significance (r=.52; r=.09 respectively). As 
expected, global economic integration variable is negatively associated, while population growth variable is 
positively related to the dependent variable (r=-.19; r=.18 respectively). In an overall view of this region, 
theses results imply that social and political conditions have more explanatory power for environmental 
sustainability than economic conditions have.   
 
Correlation Matrix for Sub-Saharan Africa 
Examination of Table 5.5 reveals that correlations between predictor variables range from a low of 
.051 to .655 for the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. Multicollinearity does not appear because no correlation 
coefficient is greater than .8 between two predictor variables. 
The highest correlation (r=.65) is the relationship between quality of governance and democracy, 
which is consistent to the theoretical expectation of political elasticity theory with statistical significance. 
This result implies that good governance includes much broader public policy considerations than 
assessment of government structure or location of public service production or provision. And also it 
integrates institutional incentives, interests and information with citizens’ involvement in political 
processes. The relationship (r=.54) between quality of governance and environmental sustainability is 
positive and statistically significant. This result also statistically confirms that political elasticity theory has 
strong explanatory power for the dependent variable in this region. Contrary to the a priori expectations, 
the variable of global economic integration is positive and statistically significant. This result supports the 
argument of World Bank’s neoclassical economic theory. The variable of democracy and economic growth 
are also positively related to environmental sustainability, but they do not have statistical confirmation. As 
expected, population growth is negatively associated with the dependent variable. In an overall view of this 
region, there are positive and strong relationships between socio-political and economic conditions and 
environmental sustainability. This pattern has been seen in the case of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
These results imply that political elasticity theory and World Bank’s neoclassical economic arguments have 
strong explanatory power for environmental sustainability in this region.   
 
Correlation Matrix for East and Central Europe 
Findings in Table 5.6 show that correlations between predictor variables range from a low of .015 
to a high of .849 for the case of East and Central Europe. Multicollinearity problems are found in the two 
relationships between quality of governance and democracy, and between quality of governance and global 
economic integration (r=.84; r=.81 respectively). Since all the problematic variables are independent ones,  
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Table 5.5. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analysis for Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
ES 42.3542 6.84544 24 
QG 2.1676 .45868 24 
DEM 7.7917 2.91889 24 
EG 2.7583 2.44165 24 
GEI 18.7870 12.61036 23 
PG 2.9043 .41503 23 
 
    ES QG DEM EG GEI PG 
ES Pearson 
Correlation 
1      
  Sig. (2-tailed) .      
  N 24      
QG Pearson 
Correlation 
.547** 1     
  Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .     
  N 24 24     
DEM Pearson 
Correlation 
.382 .655** 1    
  Sig. (2-tailed) .065 .001 .    
  N 24 24 24    
EG Pearson 
Correlation 
.391 .606** .458** 1   
  Sig. (2-tailed) .059 .002 .024 .   
  N 24 24 24 24   
GEI Pearson 
Correlation 
.496* .439* .283 .135 1  
  Sig. (2-tailed) .016 .036 .191 .541 .  
  N 23 23 23 23 23  
PG Pearson 
Correlation 
-.087 -.051 .173 .286 .090 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .692 .816 .429 .186 .691 . 
  N 23 23 23 23 22 23 
 
**  = < 0.01 (2-tailed). 
*    = < 0.05 (2-tailed). 
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Table 5.6. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analysis for East and Central Europe 
 
  Mean Std. Deviation N 
ES 49.4952 7.82390 21 
QG 2.3707 .55192 21 
DEM 9.5238 3.24991 21 
EG -3.1714 4.91713 21 
GEI 27.9750 16.58036 20 
PG .0571 .86924 21 
 
    ES QG DEM EG GEI PG 
ES Pearson 
Correlation 
1      
  Sig. (2-tailed) .      
  N 21      
QG Pearson 
Correlation 
.667** 1     
  Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .     
  N 21 21     
DEM Pearson 
Correlation 
.552** .849** 1    
  Sig. (2-tailed) .009 .000 .    
  N 21 21 21    
EG Pearson 
Correlation 
.332 .436* .218 1   
  Sig. (2-tailed) .141 .048 .343 .   
  N 21 21 21 21   
GEI Pearson 
Correlation 
.769** .813** .609** .378 1  
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .004 .100 .  
  N 20 20 20 20 20  
PG Pearson 
Correlation 
-.342 -.516* -.468* .015 -.434 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .129 .017 .032 .947 .056 . 
  N 21 21 21 21 20 21 
 
**  = < 0.01 (2-tailed). 
*    = < 0.05 (2-tailed). 
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we should carefully interpret the empirical results and should not apply the pairs of variables, which 
contain the problem, to multivariate analyses in next section.  
The relationship (r=.66) between quality of governance and environmental sustainability is 
positive and statistically significant. This result is consistent with the theoretical expectation of political 
elasticity theory. The variable of democracy also positively related to the dependent variable and has 
statistical confirmation (r=.55). This result supports the argument of pro-democracy environmentalism. 
Contrary to the a priori expectations, the economic conditions such as economic growth and global 
economic integration variables (r=.33; r=.76 respectively) are positively associated with environmental 
sustainability although only the latter variable has statistical significance. These results confirm that the 
arguments of IUC hypothesis and neoclassical economics have strong explanatory power for environmental 
sustainability in this region. Population growth variable (r=-.34) is negatively related to the dependent 
variable in the expected direction without statistical confirmation.  In an overall view, these results show 
that socio-political and economic conditions are equally important to explain the dependent variable. 
Unlike the cases of other regions, these results imply that quality of governance, democracy and global 
economic integration should be given attention to explain the degree of environmental sustainability in this 
regional analysis.  
 
Correlation Matrix for the OECD 
Examination of Table 5.7 reveals that correlations between predictor variables range from a low of 
.021 to .861 for the OECD member states. Multicollinearity problems are found in the two relationships 
between quality of governance and democracy, and between quality of governance and environmental 
sustainability (r=.86; r=.81 respectively). Since the problematic pair of independent variables is in the 
relationship between quality of governance and democracy, we should not apply this pair of variables to 
multivariate analyses in next section. In the member states of the OECD, the variable of quality of 
governance is the most important variable to explain the dependent variable with statistical significance. 
This result is consistent with the theoretical expectation of political elasticity theory. As expected, the 
variable of democracy (r=.66) is also positive and statistically significant for the relationship with 
environmental sustainability. This result supports the argument of pro-democracy environmentalism. 
Contrary to the a priori expectations, global economic integration variable (r=.33) is positively related to 
the dependent variable, while economic growth variable (r=-.08) has negative impact on environmental 
sustainability. However, both variables fail to confirm the arguments of World Bank’s neoclassical 
economics and LG hypothesis statistically in this category. Contrary to the a priori expectation, population 
growth variable (r=.09) is positively associated with the dependent variable without statistical significance. 
In an overall view, these results imply that social and political conditions have more explanatory power for 
the degree of environmental sustainability than economic conditions in the member states of the OECD.  
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Table 5.7. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analysis for the OECD 
 
  Mean Std. Deviation N 
ES 62.0267 11.10616 30 
QG 3.5529 .55748 30 
DEM 13.0000 1.55364 30 
EG 2.4000 1.72792 29 
GEI 52.7379 31.17234 29 
PG .6172 .59586 29 
 
    ES QG DEM EG GEI PG 
ES Pearson 
Correlation 
1      
  Sig. (2-tailed) .      
  N 30      
QG Pearson 
Correlation 
.816** 1     
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .     
  N 30 30     
DEM Pearson 
Correlation 
.660** .861** 1    
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .    
  N 30 30 30    
EG Pearson 
Correlation 
-.088 .058 -.055 1   
  Sig. (2-tailed) .649 .765 .776 .   
  N 29 29 29 29   
GEI Pearson 
Correlation 
.331 .520** .417* .167 1  
  Sig. (2-tailed) .079 .004 .024 .388 .  
  N 29 29 29 29 29  
PG Pearson 
Correlation 
.090 -.021 -.347 .468* -.059 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .641 .915 .065 .011 .760 . 
  N 29 29 29 29 29 29 
 
**  = < 0.01 (2-tailed). 
*    = < 0.05 (2-tailed). 
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Bivariate Comparisons of Regional Analyses 
Table 5.8 summarizes the bivariate statistics of Table 5.1 through 5.7 and shows three the highest 
correlated pairs of relationships in seven categories. For the case of all sample countries, the environmental 
sustainability variable is positively related to the variables of quality of governance and democracy with 
statistical significance. Quality of governance is also positively associated with democracy. The Asian case 
reveals that quality of governance is positively related to the variable of global economic integration, while 
economic growth is negatively associated with both variables of environmental sustainability and 
democracy. The case of Latin America and the Caribbean shows that environmental sustainability is 
positively related to quality of governance and economic growth, and democracy also positively relates to 
quality of governance. All three relationships are statically confirmed. The Middle East and North African 
case shows that quality of governance is positively related to democracy and global economic integration 
with statistical significance, and environmental sustainability is also positively associated with democracy 
without statistical confirmation. The case of Sub-Saharan Africa shows that quality of governance 
positively relates to environmental sustainability, democracy and economic growth. All relationships are 
statically confirmed. East and Central European case shows that quality of governance is positively related 
to democracy and economic growth with statistical significance, and environmental sustainability is also 
positively associated with the global economic integration variable with statistical confirmation. Finally, 
the case of the OECD countries shows that quality of governance is positively related to environmental 
sustainability and democracy, and environmental sustainability also positively relates to democracy. All 
three highest correlated pairs are statistically confirmed.       
 
3  Multivariate Analyses 
In this section, I test and analyze a total of fifty-six environmental sustainability models based on 
the competing theoretical assumptions and computerized-selections of statistics.84  Parameter estimates, 
standard errors, beta coefficients, and VIFs for all models included in the 122-sample country and six 
regional analyses are presented in Tables 5.9 to 5.15. 
 
Multivariate Analysis for All Sample Countries  
Table 5.9 contains the eight best environmental sustainability models of all the 122-sample 
country with full data and shows various combinations of the dependent and independent variables. The 
diagnostic testing performed on the equations reveals no serious problem. In regard to the variance of the 
disturbance terms, overall, the results show no strong evidence of heteroscedasticity. Also, there is little  
 
                                                          
84 Technically, a computer-software program (SASv8) can compose a total of 217 different models with 
five independent variables and seven categories: the equation can be described as 2k-1, where k stands for 
the number of independent variables.  For more details, see Appendix 8.   
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Table 5.8. Bivariate Comparisons of Regional Analyses 
 
All Sample Asia LAC MENA SSA ECE The OECD 
       
+** 
ES-QG 
 
+** 
QG-GEI 
+** 
QG-DEM 
+* 
QG-GEI 
+** 
QG-DEM 
+** 
QG-DEM 
+** 
QG-DEM 
+** 
DEM-QG 
 
-** 
DEM-EG 
+** 
ES-EG 
+* 
QG-DEM 
+** 
QG-EG 
+** 
QG-GEI 
+** 
ES-QG 
+** 
ES-DEM 
-** 
ES-EG 
+** 
ES-QG 
+ 
ES-DEM 
+** 
ES-QG 
+** 
ES-GEI 
+** 
ES-DEM 
       
  
**  = < 0.01 (2-tailed); *    = < 0.05 (2-tailed). 
 
ES (Environmental Sustainability) 
QG (Quality of Governance) 
DEM (Democracy) 
EG (Economic Growth) 
GEI (Global Economic Integration) 
PG (Population Growth) 
LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean) 
MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) 
SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa) 
ECE (East and Central Europe) 
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) 
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Table 5.9. Results of Parameter Estimates of the OLS Regression for 122 Sample Countries 
 
  1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8 
          
QG b 9.79*** 10.43*** 8.85*** 9.56*** 12.25*** 12.94*** 9.87*** 9.48*** 
 s.e. 1.70 1.62 1.42 1.56 1.28 1.09 1.58 1.33 
 β 0.64 0.70 0.58 0.63 0.81 0.87 0.66 0.63 
 vif 4.10 3.72 2.94 3.47 2.26 1.63 3.50 2.59 
          
DEM b 0.63** 0.62** 0.72** 0.65**   0.72** 0.70** 
 s.e. 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.29   0.29 0.28 
 β 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.19   0.22 0.21 
 vif 2.52 2.63 2.42 2.47   2.47 2.52 
          
EG b -0.07 -0.24 -0.11  -0.13 -0.32*  -0.25 
 s.e. 0.21 0.17 0.20  0.21 0.16  0.16 
 β -0.02 -0.08 -0.03  -0.04 -0.11  -0.08 
 vif 1.68 1.08 1.67  1.65 1.02  1.09 
          
GEI b -0.03 -0.02  -0.03 -0.04* -0.03 -0.02  
 s.e. 0.02 0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  
 β -0.09 -0.08  -0.09 -0.12 -0.11 -0.07  
 vif 1.71 1.70  1.71 1.63 1.62 1.70  
          
PG b -1.17*  -1.03 -1.31** -1.27*    
 s.e. 0.67  0.67 0.54 0.68    
 β -0.13  -0.11 -0.15 -0.14    
 vif 1.97  1.94 1.28 1.96    
          
Constant  21.28*** 18.11*** 21.59*** 21.80*** 21.64*** 18.05*** 18.01*** 18.79*** 
          
R2  .67 .65 .67 .67 .66 .63 .64 .65 
adj. R2  .66 .63 .66 .66 .64 .62 .63 .64 
RMSE  6.66 6.83 6.66 6.63 6.78 6.93 6.86 6.80 
          
 
* = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01 
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evidence of autocorrelation in the residuals, which is, indeed, a very common problem in timeseries 
regressions. The test for normality reveals little evidence to suggest rejecting the null hypothesis.  
Parameter estimates of equations 1 to 8 indicate that the variables of quality of governance and 
democracy have a strong effect on the dependent variable, environmental sustainability. In particular, the 
quality of governance variable, as the most important determinant in the models, is consistently positive 
and statistically significant through all equations (p=0.01) and has an acceptable highest VIF score (4.10). 
This result confirms the proposed hypothesis in this study, which notes the quality of national governance 
is intrinsically related to, and even generates pressure for, environmental sustainability. This implies that 
improvement of national governance quality leads to changes in exercising power patterns that positively 
impact the efficiency and effectiveness of environmental policies as well as governmental process, capacity 
and interactions with the public. This is consistent to the theoretical expectation of political elasticity theory 
as we have seen in chapter two. 
Among other independent variables chosen, the democracy variable is also statistically significant 
(p=0.05), whose effect is stable and consistent across six equations. The highest VIF (2.63) is not 
problematic. This result suggests strong support for the proponents of pro-democracy environmentalism. 
However, economic growth, global economic integration and population growth have little influence on the 
dependent variable, although they are in the expected directions. The highest VIF of all three variables are 
below conventional levels. These results reveal some support for the arguments of LG hypothesis and anti-
globalist movement over the proponents of IUC hypothesis and neoclassical economic frames on the 
debates of environmental sustainability. 
The overall results suggest that social and political conditions are more likely to explain the degree 
of environmental sustainability than economic conditions. This result is also consistent with the results of 
previous bivariate analyses. Consequently, equation 1-4 can be chosen the best model for delineating 
environmental sustainability analysis for all 122-sample country. The justification includes statistical 
significance for three parameter estimates of national governance quality, democracy and population 
growth rate; the highest adjusted R2 of .66; and the lowest RMSE of 6.63. It explains 66 percent of the 
variation of the different degree of environmental sustainability achievement.  
 
Multivariate Analysis for Asia  
Table 5.10 contains the eight best environmental sustainability models for sample Asian countries 
and shows various compositions of the dependent and independent variables. The diagnostic testing 
performed on the equations reveals no serious problem. The test of variance of the disturbance terms 
indicates little evidence of heteroscedasticity. And also, the tests of autocorrelation and normality in the 
residuals reveal little evidence to suggest rejecting the null hypotheses.  
Parameter estimates of equations 1 to 8 indicate that the variable of economic growth is the 
greatest determinant for explaining the variations of environmental sustainability in the case of Asia. This  
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Table 5.10. Results of Parameter Estimates of the OLS Regression for Asia 
 
  2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6 2-7 2-8 
          
QG b 1.53 1.12  4.16 4.55 3.80 3.89  
 s.e. 4.98 4.62  2.67 2.60 3.84 2.51  
 β 0.13 0.10  0.37 0.40 0.33 0.34  
 vif 3.77 3.53  1.14 1.11 2.42 1.08  
          
DEM b -0.23  -0.17 -0.30 -0.07    
 s.e. 0.71  0.66 0.68 0.62    
 β -0.11  -0.09 -0.15 -0.03    
 vif 2.52  2.35 2.46 2.10    
          
EG b -1.61* -1.44** -1.66* -1.46* -1.28 -1.28* -1.21** -1.50** 
 s.e. 0.85 0.62 0.80 0.79 0.75 0.60 0.52 0.53 
 β -0.65 -0.58 -0.67 -0.59 -0.52 -0.52 -0.49 -0.61 
 vif 2.29 1.34 2.23 2.11 1.96 1.26 1.00 1.09 
          
GEI b 0.02 0.03 0.04   0.00  0.03 
 s.e. 0.04 0.04 0.02   0.03  0.02 
 β 0.27 0.29 0.38   0.07  0.38 
 vif 3.66 3.58 1.11     1.10 
          
PG b -2.73 -2.51 -3.10 -2.00   -1.61 -2.84 
 s.e. 2.62 2.42 2.24 2.28   2.04 1.93 
 β -0.30 -0.27 -0.34 -0.21   -0.17 -0.31 
 vif 1.58 1.47 1.25 1.26   1.08 1.01 
          
Constant  55.75** 53.31*** 59.71*** 48.42*** 40.57*** 41.53*** 44.39*** 56.86*** 
          
R2  .47 .47 .47 .45 .42 .42 .44 .47 
adj. R2  .21 .28 .28 .26 .27 .27 .31 .33 
RMSE  5.85 5.61 5.60 5.69 5.63 5.62 5.49 5.38 
          
 
* = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01 
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variable is consistently negative and statistically significant across all equations except the model 2-5 and 
has an acceptable highest VIF score (2.29). This result confirms the proponents of LG hypothesis frame, 
which argues that economic growth requires exploitation of natural resources for expanding production of 
material goods and dumping of the waste products of this production into the environment. The modern 
“treadmill of production” inexorably degrades the environment (Schnaiberg and Gould 1994, v).  
Among other independent variables, quality of governance is positively related to environmental 
sustainability and is consistent with the arguments of political elasticity theory, but has no statistical 
confirmation. The variables of democracy and global economic integration reveal interesting patterns in 
this region. Contrary to the a priori expectations, democracy is negatively associated with the dependent 
variable without statistical significance, while global economic integration has some positive, but weak 
influence on environmental sustainability. These results support the proponents of anti-democracy 
environmentalism and World Bank’s neoclassical economic frame over the arguments of pro-democracy 
environmentalism and anti-globalist movement.  
The overall results, unlike the findings of multivariate analysis for all sample countries, suggest 
that economic conditions are more likely to explain the variations of environmental sustainability than 
social and political conditions. This result is also consistent with the finding of bivariate analyses. 
Accordingly, equation 2-8 can be chosen the best model for delineating environmental sustainability 
analysis for the case of Asia. The justification includes statistical significance for the parameter estimate of 
economic growth (p=0.05); the highest adjusted R2 of .33; and the lowest RMSE of 5.38. It explains 33 
percent of the variation of the different degree of environmental sustainability achievement in Asian 
countries.  
 
Multivariate Analysis for Latin America and the Caribbean  
Table 5.11 contains the eight best environmental sustainability models for Latin America and the 
Caribbean and shows various combinations of the dependent and independent variables. The diagnostic 
testing performed on the equations reveals no serious problem. The test of variance of the disturbance 
terms, overall, shows no strong evidence of heteroscedasticity, neither does the test of autocorrelation in the 
residuals. And also, the test for normality reveals little evidence to suggest rejecting the null hypothesis.  
Parameter estimates of equations 1 to 8 indicate that the variables of quality of governance and 
economic growth have some effect on the dependent variable, environmental sustainability. On the one 
hand, the quality of governance variable is consistently positive and statistically significant from equations 
5, 8, 4 and 7 (p=0.01 for former two; p=0.05 for latter two) and has a mild problem with the VIF score 
(6.30 for the equation 1). On the other hand, contrary to the a priori expectations, the variable of economic 
growth is consistently positive and has four parameter estimates with statistical significance (p=0.05 for 
equations 6 and 8; p=0.1 for equations 2 and 5). The highest VIF (2.36) of economic growth variable is 
satisfactory. Unlike the previous two cases, these results suggest three interesting points as follows: 1) there  
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Table 5.11. Results of Parameter Estimates of the OLS Regression for Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
  3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4 3-5 3-6 3-7 3-8 
          
QG b 8.59 6.54 8.94 10.44* 8.21** 6.98 9.25* 7.22** 
 s.e. 7.92 5.40 7.74 5.89 3.70 5.29 5.29 3.25 
 β 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.57 0.46 0.39 0.50 0.41 
 vif 6.30 3.46 6.27 3.69 1.71 3.42 3.12 1.37 
          
DEM b 0.51 0.58 0.06   0.06   
 s.e. 1.41 1.33 1.19   1.11   
 β 0.12 0.14 0.01   0.01   
 vif 3.67 3.82 2.71   2.74   
          
EG b 1.29 1.70* 1.40 1.22 1.68* 1.84** 1.39 1.83** 
 s.e. 1.13 0.85 1.09 1.08 0.83 0.82 1.01 0.78 
 β 0.30 0.40 0.32 0.28 0.40 0.43 0.32 0.43 
 vif 2.36 1.50 2.30 2.29 1.49 1.43 2.10 1.37 
          
GEI b -0.05 -0.06  -0.04 -0.04    
 s.e. 0.09 0.09  0.08 0.07    
 β -0.13 -0.15  -0.09 -0.10    
 vif 1.62 1.74  1.20 1.25    
          
PG b 0.01  -0.08 0.26   -0.03  
 s.e. 3.24  3.16 3.07   2.94  
 β 0.00  -0.00 0.02   -0.00  
 vif 0.05  2.05 1.96   1.89  
          
Constant  21.97 24.72*** 23.85 21.97 26.10*** 26.55*** 23.75 26.67 
          
R2  .58 .56 .57 .57 .55 .54 .57 .54 
adj. R2  .43 .45 .45 .46 .47 .46 .49 .49 
RMSE  6.58 6.36 6.45 6.39 6.20 6.27 6.24 6.09 
          
 
* = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01 
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is no single dominant determinant to explain the variations of environmental sustainability in this region; 2) 
although political elasticity theory and IUP hypothesis frame provide some explanations for the degree of 
environmental sustainability, their arguments are marginal; and 3) more importantly, the case of Latin 
America and the Caribbean reveals more complexity of intertwined patterns of the environment, politics 
and economy.  
Among other independent variables chosen, democracy variable has stable and positive impact on 
the dependent variable but fails to have statistical significance. This result also suggests some support to 
pro-democracy environmentalism. Global economic integration variable, as expected, is negatively 
associated with environmental sustainability, while population growth variable has little effect on the 
dependent variable since the relational patterns are instable through the equations. The highest VIF of both 
variables is acceptable level (2.05). This result suggests some support for the proponents of anti-globalist 
movement in research of the environment in this region.  
The overall results suggest that socio-political and economic conditions as a whole should be 
given attention to explain the degree of environmental sustainability rather than any single factor in the 
studies of the environment. This result from multivariate analysis is also consistent with the results of 
previous bivariate analyses. Consequently, equation 3-8 can be chosen the best model for delineating 
environmental sustainability analysis for this region. The justification includes statistical significance for 
two parameter estimates of national governance quality and economic growth rate p=0.05 for both); the 
highest adjusted R2 of .49; and the lowest RMSE of 6.09. It explains 49 percent of the variation of the 
different degree of environmental sustainability achievement in the case of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 
 
Multivariate Analysis for the Middle East and North Africa  
Table 5.12 contains the eight best environmental sustainability models for the Middle East and the 
North Africa and shows various compositions of the dependent and independent variables. The diagnostic 
testing performed on the equations reveals no serious problem. For the variance of the disturbance terms, 
overall, the results show no strong evidence of heteroscedasticity. Also, there is little evidence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals. The test for normality reveals little evidence to suggest rejecting the null 
hypothesis.  
Parameter estimates of equations 1 to 8 indicate that the variable of democracy is the greatest 
determinant for explaining the variations of environmental sustainability in the case of this region. This 
variable is consistently positive and statistically significant for five models and has an acceptable highest 
VIF score (1.71). This result suggests some support to the proponents of pro-democracy environmentalism, 
which argues that “spread of democracy” is a prerequisite for the achievement of better environmental 
policies (Rodgers 1995, 41). However, the relationship of democracy to environmental sustainability has 
somewhat weak characteristics since the equations of democracy are not stable in statistical confirmation.  
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Table 5.12. Results of Parameter Estimates of the OLS Regression for the Middle East and North Africa 
 
  4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4 4-5 4-6 4-7 4-8 
          
QG b -0.58 0.46  0.22 4.84    
 s.e. 2.98 2.58  3.19 2.60    
 β -0.06 0.05  0.02 0.63    
 vif 3.70 1.41  1.28 2.32    
          
DEM b 1.45** 1.37** 1.40*** 1.01 0.78 1.41** 1.41** 1.03 
 s.e. 0.46 0.54 0.32 0.73 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.63 
 β 0.73 0.68 0.70 0.46 0.42 0.71 0.70 0.47 
 vif 1.71 1.21 1.03 1.19 1.39 1.03 1.03 1.00 
          
EG b 1.53* 0.37 1.45**    0.42  
 s.e. 0.69 0.65 0.49    0.55  
 β 0.49 0.15 0.47    0.17  
 vif 1.62 1.23 1.03    1.00  
          
GEI b 0.00  -0.02  -0.33* -0.01   
 s.e. 0.17  0.09  0.14 0.14   
 β 0.00  -0.04  -0.67 -0.02   
 vif 3.47  1.34  1.81 1.34   
          
PG b -2.84 -2.06 -2.70** 0.64  -2.37 -2.07 0.62 
 s.e. 1.23 1.14 0.87 0.95  1.30 1.05 0.86 
 β -0.61 -0.45 -0.58 0.21  -0.50 -0.45 0.21 
 vif 2.23 1.03 1.40 1.08  1.38 1.03 1.00 
          
Constant  36.68*** 36.01*** 36.05*** 31.37*** 31.44*** 39.84*** 36.66*** 31.81*** 
          
R2  .87 .87 .87 .68 .65 .65 .87 .65 
adj. R2  .71 .77 .77 .52 .48 .48 .80 .56 
RMSE  2.63 5.55 5.61 11.72 12.81 12.64 4.72 10.86 
          
 
* = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01 
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Among other independent variables, the variable of governance quality is inconsistently related to 
environmental sustainability. This result reveals that the arguments of political elasticity theory have little 
explanatory power in this region. Contrary to the a priori expectation, the economic growth variable is 
positively and consistently associated with the dependent variable. This result supports the proponents of 
IUC hypothesis frame without statistical confirmation. The variables of global economic integration and 
population growth also show weak and inconsistent characteristics. In other words, these two variables 
have little explanatory power for the variations of environmental sustainability in the Middle East and 
North Africa.  
Unlike the findings of previous three cases, the overall results suggest that social and economic 
conditions are more likely to explain the variations of environmental sustainability than political conditions 
in this region. This result, however, shows slightly different patterns from the findings of bivariate 
analyses, which reveal that social and political conditions are equally important factors to explain the 
degree of environmental sustainability. Accordingly, the equation 4-3 can be chosen the best model for 
delineating environmental sustainability analysis for the case of the Middle East and North Africa. The 
justification includes statistical significance for the parameter estimates of democracy (p=0.01), economic 
growth (p=0.05) and population growth (p=0.05); the second highest adjusted R2 of .77; and the RMSE of 
5.61. It explains 77 percent of the variation of the different degree of environmental sustainability 
achievement in Middle East and North African countries. 
 
Multivariate Analysis for Sub-Saharan Africa 
Table 5.13 contains the eight best environmental sustainability models for Sub-Saharan Africa and 
shows various combinations of the dependent and independent variables. The diagnostic testing performed 
on the equations reveals no serious problem. The test of variance of the disturbance terms, overall, shows 
no strong evidence of heteroscedasticity, neither does the test of autocorrelation in the residuals. And also, 
the test for normality reveals little evidence to suggest rejecting the null hypothesis.  
Parameter estimates of equations 1 to 8 indicate that there is no single dominant determinant to 
explain the variations of environmental sustainability in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. This result 
shows a similar pattern with the case of Latin America and the Caribbean. The variable of quality of 
governance is consistent and positive relationship with the dependent variable although there is no 
statistical confirmation. This result suggests some support the proponents of political elasticity theory with 
marginal mold. As expected, the democracy variable is also consistently and positively related to 
environmental sustainability, but the relationship is weak. Contrary to the a priori expectations, the 
variables of economic growth and global economic integration are positively associated with the dependent 
variable, and the relational patterns are consistent across all equations. These results reveal that IUC 
hypothesis and World Bank’s neoclassical economic frames have a limited explanatory power for the 
dynamic of environmental sustainability in the region. The population growth variable is also in the  
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Table 5.13. Results of Parameter Estimates of the OLS Regression for Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
  5-1 5-2 5-3 5-4 5-5 5-6 5-7 5-8 
          
QG b 2.77 3.57  4.99 4.31 4.43 5.72  
 s.e. 6.07 5.28  4.84 4.35 3.73 3.99  
 β 0.18 0.23  0.32 0.27 0.28 0.37  
 vif 3.94 3.15  2.59 2.15 1.66 1.86  
          
DEM b 0.17  0.30 0.16 0.03    
 s.e. 0.60  0.52 0.59 0.57    
 β 0.07  0.12 0.07 0.01    
 vif 1.65  1.32 1.65 1.57    
          
EG b 0.51 0.50 0.72  0.34 0.34  0.84 
 s.e. 0.81 0.78 0.64  0.70 0.68  0.59 
 β 0.16 0.16 0.23  0.10 0.10  0.27 
 vif 1.74 1.74 1.15  1.37 1.37  1.03 
          
GEI b 0.18 0.18 0.23* 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.26** 
 s.e. 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.12 
 β 0.29 0.29 0.38 0.22 0.35 0.35 0.22 0.42 
 vif 0.08 2.07 1.19 1.77 1.25 1.25 1.77 1.02 
          
PG b -3.68 -3.40 -4.72 -2.66   -2.40 -4.76 
 s.e. 4.11 3.89 3.34 3.71   3.50 3.28 
 β -0.21 -0.20 -0.28 -0.15   -0.14 -0.28 
 vif 1.46 1.39 1.02    1.16 1.02 
          
Constant  40.90** 39.78** 47.51*** 35.33** 28.36*** 28.35*** 34.35** 49.20*** 
          
R2  .35 .35 .34 .33 .35 .35 .33 .33 
adj. R2  .15 .19 .19 .18 .20 .24 .22 .22 
RMSE  6.13 5.97 5.99 6.02 5.99 5.83 5.87 5.87 
          
 
* = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01 
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expected direction. One interesting finding in this result is that all determinants chosen in this study have 
positive and consistent relationships with the dependent variable. This implies that socio-political and 
economic conditions of Sub-Saharan African countries are below the world average, and institutional and 
infra-structural conditions should be achieved prior to ameliorating the condition of environmental 
sustainability.  
This overall result is consistent with the findings of bivariate analyses, although there are slightly 
different emphases on political and international conditions in bivariate results. Consequently, the equation 
5-5 can be chosen the best model for delineating environmental sustainability analysis for this region. The 
justification includes the consideration of all socio-political and economic variables in spite of relatively 
low value of adjusted R2 .20; the highest R2 value of .35; and relatively low value of RMSE, 5.99. It 
explains 20 percent of the variation of the different degrees of environmental sustainability achievement in 
the case of Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
Multivariate Analysis for East and Central Eurpoe  
Table 5.14 contains the eight best environmental sustainability models for East and Central 
Europe and shows various compositions of the dependent and independent variables. The diagnostic testing 
performed on the equations reveals no serious problem. The test of variance of the disturbance terms 
indicates little evidence of heteroscedasticity. And also, the tests of autocorrelation and normality in the 
residuals reveal little evidence to suggest rejecting the null hypotheses.  
Parameter estimates of equations 1 to 8 indicate that the variable of global economic integration is 
the greatest determinant for explaining the variations of environmental sustainability in the case of this 
region. This variable is consistently positive and statistically significant through all equations, and has 
acceptable highest VIF score (3.27). This result suggests strong support for the proponents of World Bank’s 
neoclassical economic frame and pro-globalist movement, which is consistent to the theoretical orientation 
of Bommer’s simple general equilibrium model applied to explanation of the impact of NAFTA on the 
United States. According to him, whereas trade liberalization may increase environmental disruptions in the 
short term, its impact on stakeholders’ attitudes may later trigger a tightening of environmental standards. 
For instance, if the export sector that benefits from trade liberalization is a larger polluter than the import 
sector, a tightening of environmental regulations could, in the next stage, reverse or mitigate the initial 
damages (Bommer 1998). 
Among other independent variables, the governance quality variable is inconsistently related to the 
dependent variable. This result implies that the proponents of political elasticity theory have no explanatory 
power in this region. As expected, democracy variable is consistently and positively related to 
environmental sustainability although it has no statistical confirmation. Contrary to the a priori expectation, 
economic growth variable is consistently and positively associated with the dependent variable. It suggests 
some support to IUC hypothesis frame to analyze the degree of environmental sustainability in the case of  
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Table 5.14. Results of Parameter Estimates of the OLS Regression for East and Central Europe 
 
  6-1 6-2 6-3 6-4 6-5 6-6 6-7 6-8 
          
QG b -6.28 -6.56  -1.71 -2.03 1.03   
 s.e. 6.82 6.43  5.90 5.73 3.77   
 β -0.46 -0.48  -0.12 -0.15 0.07   
 vif 10.53 10.02  7.59 7.51 3.23   
          
DEM b 1.09 1.09 0.51 0.68 0.64  0.45 0.52 
 s.e. 0.79 0.76 0.46 0.73 0.71  0.43 0.46 
 β 0.47 0.47 0.22 0.29 0.28  0.19 0.22 
 vif 4.92 4.92 1.75 4.10 4.04  1.58 1.75 
          
EG b 0.39 0.49 0.24   0.23 0.26  
 s.e. 0.31 0.29 0.26   0.27 0.25  
 β 0.25 0.26 0.15   0.15 0.16  
 vif 1.66 1.55 1.19   1.28 1.16  
          
GEI b 0.35** 0.35** 0.28** 0.33** 0.33** 0.30** 0.27** 0.31*** 
 s.e. 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.09 
 β 0.77 0.77 0.60 0.73 0.72 0.65 0.58 0.67 
 vif 3.27 3.27 1.87 3.22 3.21 2.95 1.76 1.65 
          
PG b 0.30  0.64 0.82    0.87 
 s.e. 1.64  1.59 1.62    1.56 
 β 0.03  0.07 0.09    0.10 
 vif 1.46  1.39 1.37    1.36 
          
Constant  45.88*** 46.64*** 38.13*** 38.10*** 39.43*** 39.94*** 39.01*** 36.29*** 
          
R2  .66 .66 .64 .62 .61 .61 .64 .62 
adj. R2  .54 .57 .54 .52 .54 .54 .57 .55 
RMSE  5.16 5.00 5.14 5.27 5.15 5.16 5.00 5.12 
          
 
* = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01 
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East and Central Europe. The population growth variable is also positively related to the dependent 
variable, which is opposite to the a priori expectation. 
Unlike the cases of the other regions, the overall results suggest that social and economic 
conditions are more likely to explain the variations of environmental sustainability than political conditions 
in this region. Interestingly, this result is not consistent with the finding of bivariate analyses, in which 
socio-political and economic conditions equally determine the dynamics of environmental sustainability in 
the region. Accordingly, the equation 6-2 can be chosen the best model for delineating environmental 
sustainability analysis in the case of East and Central Europe. The justification includes statistical 
significance for the parameter estimate of global economic integration (p=0.05); the highest adjusted R2 of 
.57; and the lowest RMSE of 5.00. This model explains 57 percent of the variation of the different degree 
of environmental sustainability achievement in East and Central European countries. 
 
Multivariate Analysis for the OECD  
Table 5.15 contains the eight best environmental sustainability models for OECD member states 
and shows various combinations of the dependent and independent variables. The diagnostic testing 
performed on the equations reveals no serious problem. In regard to the variance of the disturbance terms, 
the results show no strong evidence of heteroscedasticity. Also, there is little evidence of autocorrelation in 
the residuals. The test for normality reveals little evidence to suggest rejecting the null hypothesis.  
Parameter estimates of equations 1 to 8 indicate that the variable of quality of governance is the 
most important determinant to explain the variations of environmental sustainability. This variable is 
consistently positive and statistically significant through all equations (p=0.01) and has acceptable highest 
VIF score (6.79). This result confirms the proposed hypothesis in this study and implies that improvement 
of national governance quality leads to changes in exercising power patterns that positively impact the 
efficiency and effectiveness of environmental policies as well as governmental process, capacity and 
interactions with the public. This is consistent to the theoretical expectation of political elasticity theory.   
Among other independent variables chosen, the democracy variable is inconsistently related to the 
dependent variable. It reveals that the democratic factor has little effect on the debates of environmental 
sustainability. Indeed, all OECD member states are categorized as democratic societies by Freedom House 
(Freedom House 2000). As expected, the variables of economic growth and global economic integration 
are consistently and negatively related to the dependent variable although the former has some statistical 
significance. These results suggest some support for the arguments of LG hypothesis frame and anti-
globalist movement over those of IUC hypothesis frame and pro-global environmentalism. However, the 
population growth variable is positively associated with the dependent variable.  
The overall results suggest that political and economic conditions are more likely to explain the 
degree of environmental sustainability than social conditions. This result is, in general, also consistent with 
the results of previous bivariate analyses, although there are slightly different emphases on conditions.  
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Table 5.15. Results of Parameter Estimates of the OLS Regression for the OECD 
 
  7-1 7-2 7-3 7-4 7-5 7-6 7-7 7-8 
          
QG b 17.23*** 17.30*** 21.53*** 16.09*** 19.00*** 20.31*** 17.44*** 16.60*** 
 s.e. 5.71 2.51 4.68 5.20 5.85 4.41 2.60 2.12 
 β 0.86 0.86 1.08 0.80 0.95 1.01 0.87 0.83 
 vif 6.79 1.37 4.44 5.80 6.58 3.99 1.37 1.00 
          
DEM b 0.02  -1.67 0.21 -0.60 -1.63   
 s.e. 2.06  1.59 2.00 2.11 1.58   
 β 0.00  -0.23 0.03 -0.08 -0.22   
 vif 6.86  3.99 6.66 6.65 3.99   
          
EG b -1.46* -1.46* -0.95 -1.57  -1.04 -0.79 -1.56* 
 s.e. 0.84 0.81 0.75 0.80  0.73 0.73 0.78 
 β -0.22 -0.22 -0.14 -0.24  -0.16 -0.12 -0.23 
 vif 1.39 1.34 1.07 1.31  1.04 1.03 1.28 
          
GEI b -0.02 -0.02 -0.03  -0.04  -0.03  
 s.e. 0.04 0.04 0.04  0.04  0.04  
 β -0.07 -0.07 -0.10  -0.12  -0.10  
 vif 1.48 1.44 1.40  1.40  1.40  
          
PG b 3.98 3.95  4.35 1.38   4.15* 
 s.e. 3.11 2.33  2.99 2.85   2.27 
 β 0.21 0.21  0.23 0.07   0.22 
 vif 2.25 1.31  2.14 1.73   1.28 
          
Constant  2.79 2.93 11.65 3.12 3.89 13.51 3.91 4.21 
          
R2  .72 .72 .70 .71 .68 .69 .68 .71 
adj. R2  .66 .67 .65 .67 .63 .65 .65 .68 
RMSE  6.54 6.41 6.63 6.44 6.81 6.59 6.64 6.31 
          
 
* = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01 
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Consequently, the equation 7-8 can be chosen the best model for delineating environmental sustainability 
analysis for this category. The justification includes statistical significance for three parameter stimates of 
national governance quality (p=0.01), economic growth (p=0.10) and population growth rate (p=0.10); the 
highest adjusted R2 of .68; and the lowest RMSE of 6.31. It explains 68 percent of the variation of the 
different degree of environmental sustainability achievement in the case of OECD member states. 
 
Multivariate Comparisons of Regional Analyses 
Table 5.16 summarizes the statistic results of Table 5.9 through 5.15 and shows multivariate 
comparisons of all sample countries and six regional-economic categorizations. The case of all sample 
countries statistically confirms a priori expectations of this study85 and the main proposed hypothesis that 
the more quality of governance, the more environmental sustainability. The regional variations of 
determinant to explain the environment, however, show that different conditions of each category should be 
given attention.  
For the case of Asia, the economic growth is the main determinant and negatively relates to the 
sustainability. This result implies that rapidly economic expansion and growth of East and Southeast Asian 
countries, in particular, eventually hinder environmental sustainability, and the economic functions in the 
environment should be given priority for further studies. The case of Latin America and the Caribbean 
shows that there is no predominant determinant to explain the variations of the sustainability; instead, this 
region reveals more complexity of intertwined patterns of the environment, politics and economy. The case 
of the Middle East and North Africa shows that political democratization, economic growth programs and 
reinforcement of global economic integration are equally important to explain the sustainability, and further 
studies should be given attention these factors. The case of Sub-Saharan Africa shows that governmental 
and institutional arrangement along with development of social, economic and international corporations 
should be emphasized to ameliorate the environment. This statistic result also confirms the fact that all 
conditions of this region are below the world average. For the case of East and Central Europe, the global 
economic integration variable is the most important determinant to explain the sustainability. This result 
also reflects the fact that the former communist countries in this region have been accelerating global 
economic integration and international corporation after the collapse of Berlin Wall and trying to meet the 
Western European criteria of the environment, which is one of the most important barometer to become a 
member state of European Union. Finally, the case of the OECD states confirms a priori expectations of 
explanatory variables in this study. The statistic result suggests that the case of the OECD is similar to the 
case of all sample countries. However, population growth does not hinder environmental sustainability in 
this category.        
 
 
                                                          
85 For the details, see Table 1.1 in Chapter One. 
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Table 5.16. Multivariate Comparisons of Regional Analyses 
 
 All 
Sample 
Asia LAC MENA SSA ECE The 
OECD 
        
 ES ES ES ES ES ES ES 
        
QG +*** + + - + - +*** 
DEM +** - + +** + + + 
EG - -* + + + + -* 
GEI - + - + + +** - 
PG -* - + - - + + 
        
adj. R2 .66 .21 .43 .71 .15 .54 .66 
        
 
* = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01 
 
ES (Environmental Sustainability) 
QG (Quality of Governance) 
DEM (Democracy) 
EG (Economic Growth) 
GEI (Global Economic Integration) 
PG (Population Growth) 
LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean) 
MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) 
SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa) 
ECE (East and Central Europe) 
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) 
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4. Summary 
In this chapter we proposed seven correlation matrixes and fifty six environmental sustainability 
models and discussed the results and their implications, using bivariate descriptive statistics and OLS 
regressions. The dynamics of environmental sustainability is hypothesized to be influenced by five 
independent variables, which are drawn from competing theories and arguments on the debates of the 
environment. The variables include quality of governance, the level of democracy, economic growth rate, 
the level of global economic integration and population growth rate.  
The overall results suggest five important points. First, technically the data set used in this study is 
well qualified through rigorous diagnostic tests, so that the results have a guarantee of reliability and 
validity. Second, although there are a few exceptions based on regional analyses, the variable of national 
governance quality is the most important determinant for explaining the variations of environmental 
sustainability studies. This result statistically confirms the main proposition of the study, which notes that 
the quality of national governance is intrinsically related to, and even generates pressure for, environmental 
sustainability. Third, the results of bivariate and multivariate analyses are consistent and provide similar 
patterns of analytical descriptions. These results also fortify the reliability and validity of the proposed 
environmental sustainability models. Forth, although often depicted as conflicting and incompatible 
theories of environmental sustainability, the results of data analyses and models imply that the proponents 
of pro-democracy and anti-democracy environmentalisms, LG and IUC hypotheses frames, pro-globalist 
and anti-globalist movements are not incompatible, but rather complementary. And, last and most 
importantly, the general results of empirical analyses suggest that further research should tend to a 
combination of comparative case studies with cross-national and longitudinal research. Beyond either 
particularistic case studies or generalizing cross-national studies of the environment, environmental studies 
should encompass the complex process of social, political, economic and international conditions and their 
interactions.    
In the next chapter, summarizing a brief overview of the study, we offer concluding observations 
and implications on both theory and future of environmental politics. And finally, recognizing potential 
limits of the study, we suggest some guides to further research of governance and environmental 
sustainability.             
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Chapter Six. Comparative Analyses and Conclusion 
 
1. Overview  
The complex web of interrelations among global and national governance, public policies, and 
environmental and socio-economic issues have required scholarly attention as the environment becomes the 
focus of international concern in the new century. Although the term “sustainable development” or 
“environmental sustainability” dates back to the 1970s, accompanied by liberal democracy and free 
markets, sustainable development is now a pillar of contemporary universalism, embraced from the 
industrialized north, to the less-developed south, to the post-communist east. The concept of global 
environmental change arises from concerns about the sustainability of an “earth transformed” and has led to 
international mandates and protocols seeking to reduce the changes in question. It complements sustainable 
development by elevating issues of “sustainable” to the biosphere itself and those of “development” to 
humankind over the long term (Clark and Munn 1986). 
The sustainability principle has been accepted at the highest levels of decision and policy making. 
Woven into the fabric of international agendas, it blurs the distinctions between environment and 
development and fosters a fusion of sustainable development and global change research. This fusion, 
however, creates a paradox that may be resolved not only by reframing the meaning of sustainable and, 
hence, the sustainability principle but also recapturing the dynamics of environmental politics. In the recent 
literature on environmental sustainability, lack of good governance is cited as one of the factors that either 
caused or contributed to the prolonged national environmental degradations. The literature also highlights 
the possible links between good governance, economic stability, and environmental sustainability. Greater 
government capacity and wider openness enable the public to make informed political decisions, improve 
the accountability of governments, and reduce the scope for environmental degradation. 
This study, accordingly, started with recognizing three research questions. First, what determines 
the level of environmental sustainability in national level analyses? Second, how can the quality of 
governance be defined, measured and applied in the dynamics of political processes? And third, how does 
the quality of governance influence the level of environmental sustainability? For the first question, this 
study articulates four predicting variables (quality of governance, democracy, economic growth rate and the 
level of global economic integration) and one control variable (population growth rate) to render an 
explanation of the different levels of achievement of environmental sustainability among nation-states. The 
variables are selected on the basis of competing theories and arguments of previous environmental studies. 
For the second, this study defines the quality of governance as an institutional framework of government. 
In other words, it is traditions and institutions that determine how authority is exercised in a particular 
country. The concept of governance, therefore, encompasses governmental processes, capacities and 
interactibility with the public. For the last question, using new sets of data on environmental sustainability 
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and governance, this study examines and argues critically the thesis that the quality of governance is 
intrinsically related to, and even generates pressure for, environmental sustainability.  
Through the theoretical orientations, this study introduces competing arguments of previous 
environmental research. First, there are two controversial arguments regarding the impact of democracy on 
the environment. Pro-democracy environmentalism, on the one hand, argues that the spread of democracy 
is a prerequisite for the achievement of better environmental policies and more likely to protect the global 
environment. This clout is based on the fact that the extent and intensity of ecological damage in the former 
Soviet bloc and in most totalitarian and authoritarian states are significantly greater. On the other hand, the 
rationale of anti-democracy environmentalism is that liberal democracy’s stress on individual liberty and 
private property eventually promotes ecological catastrophe. This argument laments (1) the freedom of 
individuals to pollute, consume and procreate and (2) the inability of limited government to control the 
“tragedy of the commons.”  
Second, there are two debates on what is the relationship between expanding human economy and 
environmental sustainability. On the one hand, in the view of the LG (Limits-to-Growth) hypothesis, limits 
are seen as absolute constraints on economic activity, not just as a point beyond which economic growth 
results in environmental destruction. This concept of limits is a common theme, from limits on arable land, 
to energy and material limits, to the economic scale and thermodynamic limits proposed by ecological 
economists. On the other hand, the IUC (Inverted U-Curve) hypothesis contends that substantial evidence 
points to an IUC relationship between per capita income and various types of pollutions and the level of 
environmental sustainability, suggesting that while the early stages of economic growth causes the problem 
of the environment, later ones bring the remedy.  
The third debate is about the influence of globalization on the level of environmental 
sustainability. The question here is whether or not international economic factors such as free trade and 
financial interdependence among nation-states encourage domestic government interest in positive 
environmental policy. In a notable deviation from its traditional support of neoclassical economic 
frameworks for development in the Third World, MDBs argue that global economic integration and 
international trade increase long-term environmental protection. Their rationales are that trade liberalization 
may, for instance, reduce market failures, which are responsible for inefficient allocation of scarce 
resources and for wasting environmental resources. Trade liberalization can also facilitate the diffusion of 
“greener” technologies. In other cases, economic liberalization can trigger a reaction to "environmental 
dumping" through the systematic exploitation of comparative advantages based not on an intrinsically 
higher efficiency of the economic system, but rather on the externalization of environmental costs allowed 
by current environmental regulations. On the other hand, for proponents of the anti-globalist movement, the 
environment is in an enduring conflict with the expansion of global economic and financial integration.  
This trend of globalization requires the exploitation of natural resources for expanding production of 
material goods and dumping of the waste products of this production into the environment. The modern 
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“treadmill of production” inexorably degrades the environment. In MDCs, mass production and 
consumption of export-oriented developmental strategy are a major cause of environmental degradation 
and destruction of natural resources. In LDCs, the creation of value and access to subsistence are typically 
linked to sacrificing environmental quality for short-term economic gain. 
Being aware of this inconclusiveness and the nature of multifaceted characteristics of 
environmental sustainability, this study proposes political elasticity theory as a political and institutional 
condition for articulating the determinant of the level of environmental sustainability. Bringing the 
concepts of governance and political software to the debate, the theory consists of the following five 
propositions (Werlin 2000, 439-42; Wolin 1960, 10-1, 434). First, the more governments or those in 
authority can integrate and alternate soft forms of political power, linking incentives to persuasion, with 
hard forms of power, including disincentives and coercion, the more effective they will be. Second, as 
leaders integrate and alternate soft and hard forms of power, their political power takes on “rubber band” 
and “balloon” characteristics, allowing them (1) to decentralize or delegate power in various ways without 
losing control; (2) to expand their influence, reliably and predictably affecting the behavior of wider circles 
of citizens, participants, and subordinates; and (3) to adjust their capacities in the face of anomalies. Third, 
political elasticity depends partly on the selection of appropriate political hardware, including “objective” 
forms of organization, but mostly on political software, recognizing the “subjective” quality of 
relationships between a government and its citizens. In other words, political software articulates the 
interrelationships between leaders and followers, while political hardware implies an “objective” form of 
organization, regulation, procedure, and technology. Fourth, political software can be made more effective 
in the commonsens ways suggested by typical public administration and business administration studies. 
They include establishing acceptable goals, hiring qualified personnel, delegating responsibility, 
stimulating motivation and competition, encouraging training, paying attention to morale, expanding two-
way flows of communication, promoting legitimacy, maintaining supervision, protecting independent 
spheres of authority, cultivating contractors, and developing conflict-resolution procedures. These steps are 
increasingly referred to as “good governance.” And last, the enhancement of political software requires a 
balancing of the two meanings of political power identified by Wolin: the struggle for competitive 
advantage (partisanship) and the struggle for consensus (statesmanship).  
In summary, based on the competing theories and arguments of the environmental phenomena, 
this study is, accordingly, examining the determinants of environmental sustainability with cross-national 
statistical comparisons using national aggregates from 122 countries and arguing that the level of 
environmental sustainability is largely due to the degree of good governance measured by six indicators: 
government accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory framework, rule of law 
and corruption control.   
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2. Comparative Analyses and Implications 
Testing and discussing empirical hypotheses and results, we have established that the causal 
variables for explanations of the dynamics of environmental sustainability rely on not only domestic factors 
but also international conditions. And we have revealed that the multifaceted characteristics and patterns of 
the achievement of environmental sustainability are also idiosyncratic and idographic based on each 
individual nation-state and on each categorized region.   
Several important conclusions and implications for both the theories and policies emerge from the 
results of the testing and discussions.  First, political elasticity theory has a great explanatory power for the 
different achievements of environmental sustainability in the sample countries in general, and in the cases 
of Latin America and the Caribbean and OECD member states in particular. It implies that institutional 
arrangements of governance and improvement of governmental processes, capacities and interactibilities 
with the public are the most important key task for ameliorating environmental policies and sustainability. 
This result also brings “politics” back to the stage of environmental discussions in which environmental 
engineering and economic calculations of environmental externality have predominated so far.  
Second, the level of democracy consistently has a positive impact on the environment with the 
exception of the Asian case. This result demonstrates two important implications. First, social conditions 
such as political rights and civil liberties should be a prerequisite for achieving environmental 
sustainability. Second, from the high level of establishment of the sustainability in Asian countries, Asian 
authoritarian governments have proven their effectiveness and efficiency in environmental policy 
implementations, although their standards of democracy have yet to fit the Western criteria. This 
implication, indeed, sheds a light on the on-going debate on the legitimacy of “Asian style” democracy.  
Third, the impacts of economic growth on the environment go in two directions. In MDCs, 
economic growth is negatively associated with environmental sustainability, while in LDCs the expansion 
of human economy is positively related to the dependent variable. It entails that developing and developed 
countries should have different strategies toward economic activities in regard to improving environmental 
sustainability. Both the frames of LG and ICU hypotheses, therefore, can be adopted in terms of the level of 
economic development. 
Fourth, the roles of global economic integration show different patterns based on categorized 
regions. In Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and East and Central Europe, the global economic integration variable 
promotes and sustains the level of environmental quality, while countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean degrade the environment due to the consequences of global economic integration. These patterns 
suggest some support for different developmental strategies between Asia and Latin America. The results 
of the environmental analyses also have a similar implication for strategies of economic development. 
Traditionally, the export-oriented developmental strategy has been adopted in Asian countries, whereas 
Latin American countries have applied the import-oriented strategy to economic development. Moreover, 
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these results also reflect the current phenomenon as East and Central European countries have tried to 
accelerate global economic integration after the collapse of the Berlin Wall.  
Finally, as a control variable of this study, population growth rate is negatively associated with 
environmental sustainability in most of cases, but in states of the OECD and East and Central Europe, it has 
a positive impact on the environment. This result suggests strong support for birth control policies in most 
LDCs.     
 
3. Suggestions for Further Research 
This study is merely the beginning of a research project. The cross-national design adopted in this 
study attempts to investigate some of the general mechanisms of environmental sustainability and its 
multifaceted conditions. Even though it provides some insights into these mechanisms, it says little about 
the particularistic paths followed by specific countries. In general, cross-national studies, like this study, 
focus almost exclusively on the structural component of environmental sustainability processes, neglecting 
agency components. On the other hand, case studies often say a lot about the agency involved in certain 
sustainability and how agency is able to overcome structural constraints or make use of opportunities 
provided by various conditions. To the extent that agency occurs along regular paths, one should be able to 
capture it in cross-national research.  
Further research, accordingly, should try to combine cross-national studies with longitudinal and 
case studies to encompass the complex and multidimensional nature of environmental studies. The cross-
national research can provide not only a context to interpret the case studies but also hypotheses for further 
studies. The incompatibility of case studies and statistical research is a mere phantom illusion. Both 
complement and inspire each other, capturing different aspects of the phenomenon studies. 
Furthermore, although this study lends credence to the role of governance and political elasticity 
theory in the debates of the environment, we should admit that the concepts of two main variables, quality 
of governance and environmental sustainability have limits in their premature conceptualization and low 
level of operationalization. A trial of embodying the conceptual and operational definitions should not be 
ignored for better delineating the real dynamics of environmental studies. Moreover, endless efforts have to 
be put into improving measurement for cross-national research. It is crucial that more refined measures for 
quality of governance, the level of democracy and the scale of global economic integration are developed in 
order for cross-national research to provide a continuing contribution to this arena. 
Finally, since recent case studies have again and again stressed the role of environmental 
technologies and short-term economic calculations in environmental research questions and their 
explanatory variables, further research, both comparative case studies and cross-national statistical studies 
should examine the nexus of multidimensional conditions in the environment with more rigorous 
methodological refinement, and research questions should be formulated using a combination of various 
determinants from comparative case studies and cross-national and longitudinal research. In so doing, one 
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can possibly figure out the complexity of the environmental mechanism and its consequences for our daily 
lives.  
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Appendix 1. List of Sample Countries 
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Asia Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 
The Middle 
East and North 
Africa 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
East and 
Central Europe 
OECD 
Member States 
 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
China 
India 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Korea, Rep. 
Malaysia 
Mongolia 
Nepal 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Vietnam  
 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador 
El 
Salvador 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Trinidad 
and 
Tobago 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, 
RB 
 
 
 
Algeria 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Mali 
Morocco 
Niger 
Saudi Arabia
Sudan 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Tunisia 
 
 
 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burundi 
Burkina 
Faso 
Cameroon 
Central 
African Rep.
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Madagascar
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Mozambique
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
South Africa
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
Albania 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech 
Republic 
Estonia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Macedonia, 
FYR 
Moldova 
Poland 
Romania 
Russian 
Federation 
Slovak 
Republic 
Slovenia 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
 
 
 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Czech 
Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea, Rep. 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
New Zealand
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovak 
Republic 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
United 
Kingdom 
United States
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Appendix 2. Aggregate Governance Indicators Dataset Sources 
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Aggregate Governance Indicators Dataset Sources: 
The composite governance indicators are based on 1997-1998 data from selected variables provided by the following sources 
 
 
Source Name: Internet Address: Publication: Coverage: 
 
 
Business Environment Risk Intelligence www.beri.com Business Risk Service 50 mostly developed countries 
 
Economist intelligence Unit www.eiu.com Country Risk Service 114 developed and developing countries 
 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development www.ebrd.com Transition Report 26 transition economies 
 
Freedom House www.freedomhouse.org Freedom in the World/Nations in Transit 172 developed and developing countries 
 
Gallup International www.gallup-international.com 50th Anniversary Survey 44 mostly developed countries 
 
Institute for Management Development www.imd.ch World Competitiveness Yearbook 46 mainly developed countries 
 
Political Economic Risk Consultancy www.asiarisk.com Asia Intelligence 11 Asian countries 
 
Political Risk Services www.prsgroup.com International Country Risk Guide 140 developed and developing countries 
 
Standard and Poor's DRI/McGraw-Hill www.dri.standardandpoors.com Country Risk Review 106 developed and developing countries 
 
Wall Street Journal http://www.wsj.com/ Central European Economic Review 27 transition economies 
 
World Bank www.worldbank.org World Development Report 1997 74 developed and developing countries 
 
World Economic Forum www.weforum.org Global Competitiveness Survey/Africa 77 developed and developing countries 
 
Source: :  "Governance Matters" by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, May 1999. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/06/kauf.htm 
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Appendix 3. Illustrative Governance: Six Operational Indicators of Good Governance 
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Illustrative Governance: 1. Voice and Accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  "Governance Matters" by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay 
and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, May 1999. 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/gov_data.htm 
 
Voice and Accountability 
Performance: 
Indicator not available. 
“Red Light”: Bottom group. 
Next-to-bottom group. 
“Yellow Light”: Vulnerable group. 
Less  vulnerable group. 
“Green Light”: Out of danger.
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Illustrative Governance: 2. Political Stability and Lack of Violence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Stability/Lack of Violence Performance: 
Indicator not available. 
“Red Light”: Bottom group. 
Next-to-bottom group. 
“Yellow Light”: Vulnerable group. 
Less  vulnerable group. 
“Green Light”: Out of danger. 
“Dark Green”: Top 5% in the world.
Source:  "Governance Matters" by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay 
and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, May 1999. 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/gov_data.htm 
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Illustrative Governance: 3. Government Effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government Effectiveness Performance: 
Indicator not available. 
“Red Light”: Bottom group. 
Next-to-bottom group. 
“Yellow Light”: Vulnerable group. 
Less  vulnerable group. 
“Green Light”: Out of danger. 
“Dark Green”: Top 5% in the world.
Source:  "Governance Matters" by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay 
and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, May 1999. 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/gov_data.htm 
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Illustrative Governance: 4. Regulatory Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory Framework 
Performance: 
Indicator not available. 
“Red Light”: Bottom group. 
Next-to-bottom group. 
“Yellow Light”: Vulnerable group. 
Less  vulnerable group. 
“Green Light”: Out of danger. 
Source:  "Governance Matters" by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay 
and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, May 1999. 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/gov_data.htm 
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Illustrative Governance: 5. Rule of Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rule of Law Performance: 
Indicator not available. 
“Red Light”: Bottom group. 
Next-to-bottom group. 
“Yellow Light”: Vulnerable group. 
Less  vulnerable group. 
“Green Light”: Out of danger. 
Source:  "Governance Matters" by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and 
Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, May 1999. 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/gov_data.htm 
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Illustrative Governance: 6. Corruption Control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corruption Control 
Performance: 
Indicator not available. 
“Red Light”: Bottom group. 
Next-to-bottom group. 
“Yellow Light”: Vulnerable group.
Less  vulnerable group. 
“Green Light”: Out of danger. 
Source:  "Governance Matters" by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay 
and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, May 1999. 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/gov_data.htm 
  
 140
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4. Quantitative Studies of Data Sets on Democracy 
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Name of Index Attributes & Components Measurement 
Level 
Aggregation 
Rule 
    
Contestation Nominal  ACLP: Alvarez, 
Cheibub, Limongi, 
&Przeworski (1996) 
Offices  
- election executive 
- election legislature 
Nominal  
Multiplicative 
at the level of 
attributes and 
components 
Participation  
- executive selection 
- legislative selection 
- legislative effectiveness 
- competitiveness of the nomination process 
Ordinal  
Inclusiveness Ordinal  
Competitiveness  
- party legitimacy 
- party competitiveness 
Ordinal  
 
 
 
 
Arat (1991) 
Coerciveness  Interval  
 
Additive at 
the level of 
components; 
combined 
additive and 
multiplicative 
at the level of 
attributes 
Political Liberties 
- press freedom 
- freedom of group opposition 
- government sanctions  
Interval   
 
 
Bollen (1980; 1993) 
Democratic Rule 
- fairness of elections 
- executive selection 
- legislative selection and effectiveness  
Interval  
 
 
Factor scores 
(weighted 
averages) 
 
Coppedge & Reinicke: 
Polyarchy (1991) 
Contestation  
- free and fair elections 
- freedom of organization 
- freedom of expression 
- pluralism in the media 
Ordinal  Guttman scale 
(hierarchical) 
at the level of 
components 
Political Rights (9 components) Ordinal Freedom House (2000) 
Civil Rights (13 components) Ordinal 
Additive at 
the level of 
components 
Competitiveness  
Inclusiveness  
Gasiorowski: Political 
Regime Change (1996) 
Civil and Political Liberties 
Ordinal with 
residual 
category 
 
None  
Election  
-suffrage 
- elected offices 
- meaningful elections 
Interval and 
ordinal  
 
 
 
Hadenius (1992) 
Political Freedom 
- freedom of organization 
- freedom of expression 
- freedom of coercion 
Ordinal  
Combined 
additive and 
multiplicative 
(of weighted 
scores) at the 
level of 
attributes 
Competitiveness of Participation Ordinal 
Regulation of Participation Ordinal 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment Ordinal 
Openness of Executive Recruitment Ordinal 
 
Marshall and Jaggers: 
Polity IV (2001) 
Constraints on Executive Ordinal 
 
Additive (of 
weighted 
scores) 
Competition  Interval  Vanhanen (2000) 
Participation  Interval  
Multiplicative 
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Appendix 5. Components of Freedom House Democracy Index 
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Components of Political Rights   
 
- Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and fair 
elections?  
- Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?  
- Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest tabulation of 
ballots?  
- Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power?  
- Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political 
groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or 
groupings?  
- Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the 
opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?  
- Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious 
hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?  
- Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-
government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process? 
 
Components of Civil Liberties  
 
Freedom of Expression and Belief  
- Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: in cases where the 
media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the Survey gives the system credit.)  
- Are there free religious institutions and is there free private and public religious expression?  
 
Association and Organizational Rights  
- Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?  
- Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? (Note: this includes political parties, civic 
organizations, ad hoc issue groups, etc.)  
- Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective 
bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?  
 
Rule of Law and Human Rights  
- Is there an independent judiciary?  
- Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Is the population treated equally under the law? 
- Are police under direct civilian control?  
- Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that 
support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies? (Note: freedom from war and 
insurgencies enhances the liberties in a free society, but the absence of wars and insurgencies does not in 
and of itself make a not free society free.)  
- Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption?  
 
Personal Autonomy and Economic Rights  
- Is there open and free private discussion?  
- Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence, or choice of employment? - 
- Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependency on the state?  
- Are property rights secure? Do citizens have the right to establish private businesses? Is private business 
activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or organized crime?  
- Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of 
family?  
- Is there equality of opportunity, including freedom from exploitation by or dependency on landlords, 
employers, union leaders, bureaucrats, or other types of obstacles to a share of legitimate economic gains? 
 
 144
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6. Model Selections and Summarizations (JMP output) 
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The REG Procedure 
 
Environmental Sustainability Model for All Sample Countries 
                                     Dependent Variable: ES 
 
                                    R-Square Selection Method 
 
       Number in                Adjusted 
         Model      R-Square    R-Square        C(p)            MSE    Variables in Model 
 
              1       0.5718      0.5679      5.1545       50.18355    QG 
              1       0.4448      0.4397     38.4390       65.07665    DEM 
              1       0.1288      0.1208    121.2031      102.10946    GEI 
              1       0.0364      0.0275    145.4250      112.94753    PG 
              1       0.0031      -.0061    154.1402      116.84715    EG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              2       0.5891      0.5815      2.6399       48.60943    QG DEM 
              2       0.5825      0.5747      4.3736       49.39236    QG GEI 
              2       0.5741      0.5662      6.5594       50.37945    QG EG 
              2       0.5720      0.5641      7.1058       50.62619    QG PG 
              2       0.4624      0.4524     35.8242       63.59522    DEM GEI 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              3       0.5954      0.5840      2.9968       48.31475    QG DEM GEI 
              3       0.5946      0.5832      3.1973       48.40614    QG DEM EG 
              3       0.5891      0.5776      4.6394       49.06347    QG DEM PG 
              3       0.5836      0.5720      6.0660       49.71377    QG EG GEI 
              3       0.5825      0.5708      6.3503       49.84334    QG GEI PG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              4       0.5991      0.5840      4.0158       48.31922    QG DEM EG GEI 
              4       0.5954      0.5801      4.9945       48.76949    QG DEM GEI PG 
              4       0.5947      0.5794      5.1647       48.84784    QG DEM EG PG 
              4       0.5839      0.5682      7.9961       50.15058    QG EG GEI PG 
              4       0.4843      0.4648     34.0891       62.15635    DEM EG GEI PG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              5       0.5992      0.5801      6.0000       48.77204    QG DEM EG GEI PG 
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The REG Procedure 
 
Environmental Sustainability Model for Asia 
                                     Dependent Variable: ES 
 
                                    R-Square Selection Method 
 
       Number in                Adjusted 
         Model      R-Square    R-Square        C(p)            MSE    Variables in Model 
 
              1       0.2633      0.2106      2.1406       34.60055    EG 
              1       0.1814      0.1229      3.7117       38.44493    DEM 
              1       0.1726      0.1134      3.8818       38.86116    QG 
              1       0.0843      0.0189      5.5763       43.00743    PG 
              1       0.0294      -.0399      6.6288       45.58270    GEI 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              2       0.4197      0.3305      1.1373       29.34811    QG EG 
              2       0.3750      0.2789      1.9958       31.61042    EG GEI 
              2       0.3383      0.2365      2.7006       33.46765    EG PG 
              2       0.2812      0.1706      3.7959       36.35391    QG DEM 
              2       0.2735      0.1617      3.9440       36.74423    DEM EG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              3       0.4706      0.3382      2.1614       29.00788    EG GEI PG 
              3       0.4486      0.3108      2.5831       30.21183    QG EG PG 
              3       0.4221      0.2776      3.0922       31.66505    QG EG GEI 
              3       0.4204      0.2756      3.1239       31.75545    QG DEM EG 
              3       0.3821      0.2276      3.8601       33.85725    DEM EG GEI 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              4       0.4740      0.2828      4.0953       31.43921    DEM EG GEI PG 
              4       0.4734      0.2819      4.1069       31.47534    QG EG GEI PG 
              4       0.4583      0.2613      4.3982       32.38233    QG DEM EG PG 
              4       0.4222      0.2121      5.0896       34.53554    QG DEM EG GEI 
              4       0.2899      0.0316      7.6301       42.44726    QG DEM GEI PG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              5       0.4790      0.2185      6.0000       34.25660    QG DEM EG GEI PG 
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The REG Procedure 
 
Environmental Sustainability Model for Latin America and the Caribbean 
                                     Dependent Variable: ES 
 
                                    R-Square Selection Method 
 
       Number in                Adjusted 
         Model      R-Square    R-Square        C(p)            MSE    Variables in Model 
 
              1       0.5080      0.4806      0.4958       39.78477    QG 
              1       0.4153      0.3828      3.6016       47.27555    EG 
              1       0.2716      0.2311      8.4193       58.89489    DEM 
              1       0.1011      0.0512     14.1346       72.67929    PG 
              1       0.0057      -.0495     17.3322       80.39124    GEI 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              2       0.5711      0.5206      0.3789       36.71925    QG EG 
              2       0.5278      0.4723      1.8297       40.42414    QG GEI 
              2       0.5208      0.4644      2.0652       41.02560    QG PG 
              2       0.5094      0.4517      2.4463       41.99884    QG DEM 
              2       0.5013      0.4427      2.7173       42.69076    DEM EG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              3       0.5783      0.4992      2.1375       38.35930    QG EG GEI 
              3       0.5712      0.4908      2.3763       39.00713    QG DEM EG 
              3       0.5711      0.4907      2.3788       39.01390    QG EG PG 
              3       0.5426      0.4568      3.3341       41.60582    QG GEI PG 
              3       0.5331      0.4455      3.6533       42.47214    DEM EG PG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              4       0.5824      0.4710      4.0000       40.51861    QG DEM EG GEI 
              4       0.5785      0.4661      4.1305       40.89626    QG EG GEI PG 
              4       0.5712      0.4568      4.3756       41.60567    QG DEM EG PG 
              4       0.5473      0.4266      5.1764       43.92327    DEM EG GEI PG 
              4       0.5435      0.4217      5.3047       44.29468    QG DEM GEI PG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              5       0.5824      0.4333      6.0000       43.41273    QG DEM EG GEI PG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 148
The REG Procedure 
 
Environmental Sustainability Model for the Middle East and North Africa 
                                     Dependent Variable: ES 
 
                                    R-Square Selection Method 
 
       Number in                Adjusted 
         Model      R-Square    R-Square        C(p)            MSE    Variables in Model 
 
              1       0.3921      0.3161     13.4660       16.90521    DEM 
              1       0.1627      0.0580     20.8111       23.28410    PG 
              1       0.1566      0.0512     21.0064       23.45371    EG 
              1       0.1498      0.0435     21.2255       23.64398    QG 
              1       0.0782      -.0370     23.5157       25.63293    GEI 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              2       0.6583      0.5607      6.9419       10.86000    DEM PG 
              2       0.5306      0.3964     11.0318       14.91929    DEM EG 
              2       0.5142      0.3754     11.5549       15.43846    QG GEI 
              2       0.4718      0.3209     12.9139       16.78728    DEM GEI 
              2       0.4208      0.2553     14.5476       18.40874    QG DEM 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              3       0.8726      0.8089      2.0802        4.72465    DEM EG PG 
              3       0.6838      0.5257      8.1252       11.72426    QG DEM PG 
              3       0.6589      0.4883      8.9229       12.64793    DEM GEI PG 
              3       0.6545      0.4817      9.0644       12.81181    QG DEM GEI 
              3       0.6349      0.4524      9.6893       13.53539    DEM EG GEI 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              4       0.8751      0.7751      4.0006        5.55893    QG DEM EG PG 
              4       0.8739      0.7730      4.0381        5.61097    DEM EG GEI PG 
              4       0.7227      0.5009      8.8795       12.33829    QG DEM GEI PG 
              4       0.7080      0.4744      9.3508       12.99306    QG DEM EG GEI 
              4       0.5607      0.2093     14.0668       19.54606    QG EG GEI PG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              5       0.8751      0.7189      6.0000        6.94760    QG DEM EG GEI PG 
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The REG Procedure 
 
Environmental Sustainability Model for Sub-Saharan Africa 
                                     Dependent Variable: ES 
 
                                    R-Square Selection Method 
 
       Number in                Adjusted 
         Model      R-Square    R-Square        C(p)            MSE    Variables in Model 
 
              1       0.2997      0.2646     -0.6510       32.67103    QG 
              1       0.1957      0.1555      1.9245       37.52105    GEI 
              1       0.1222      0.0783      3.7450       40.94937    DEM 
              1       0.0927      0.0473      4.4756       42.32522    EG 
              1       0.0445      -.0033      5.6707       44.57593    PG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              2       0.3176      0.2458      0.9045       33.50954    QG GEI 
              2       0.3068      0.2339      1.1711       34.03785    QG PG 
              2       0.3005      0.2268      1.3289       34.35072    QG DEM 
              2       0.3003      0.2266      1.3343       34.36136    QG EG 
              2       0.2590      0.1810      2.3566       36.38801    GEI PG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              3       0.3350      0.2242      2.4730       34.46829    QG GEI PG 
              3       0.3331      0.2219      2.5211       34.56893    EG GEI PG 
              3       0.3214      0.2083      2.8110       35.17548    QG EG GEI 
              3       0.3181      0.2045      2.8919       35.34479    QG DEM GEI 
              3       0.3094      0.1944      3.1067       35.79408    QG EG PG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              4       0.3506      0.1978      4.0877       35.64216    QG EG GEI PG 
              4       0.3457      0.1918      4.2081       35.90882    DEM EG GEI PG 
              4       0.3382      0.1824      4.3953       36.32369    QG DEM GEI PG 
              4       0.3217      0.1621      4.8028       37.22644    QG DEM EG GEI 
              4       0.3121      0.1502      5.0416       37.75544    QG DEM EG PG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              5       0.3541      0.1523      6.0000       37.66332    QG DEM EG GEI PG 
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The REG Procedure 
 
Environmental Sustainability Model for East and Central Europe 
                                     Dependent Variable: ES 
 
                                    R-Square Selection Method 
 
       Number in                Adjusted 
         Model      R-Square    R-Square        C(p)            MSE    Variables in Model 
 
              1       0.5920      0.5693      0.9889       25.22739    GEI 
              1       0.4561      0.4259      6.6459       33.62764    QG 
              1       0.3486      0.3124     11.1261       40.28045    DEM 
              1       0.1860      0.1408     17.8932       50.32911    EG 
              1       0.0916      0.0411     21.8268       56.17021    PG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              2       0.6157      0.5705      2.0030       25.16125    DEM GEI 
              2       0.6150      0.5697      2.0315       25.20604    EG GEI 
              2       0.5993      0.5522      2.6837       26.23147    QG GEI 
              2       0.5932      0.5453      2.9392       26.63322    GEI PG 
              2       0.4731      0.4111      7.9408       34.49711    QG EG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              3       0.6396      0.5720      3.0071       25.07004    DEM EG GEI 
              3       0.6231      0.5524      3.6945       26.21851    DEM GEI PG 
              3       0.6187      0.5472      3.8782       26.52531    QG DEM GEI 
              3       0.6168      0.5449      3.9571       26.65718    QG EG GEI 
              3       0.6151      0.5429      4.0270       26.77390    EG GEI PG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              4       0.6629      0.5730      4.0354       25.00989    QG DEM EG GEI 
              4       0.6434      0.5483      4.8479       26.45777    DEM EG GEI PG 
              4       0.6252      0.5252      5.6067       27.80991    QG DEM GEI PG 
              4       0.6176      0.5156      5.9242       28.37556    QG EG GEI PG 
              4       0.4804      0.3419     11.6344       38.55079    QG DEM EG PG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              5       0.6638      0.5437      6.0000       26.72880    QG DEM EG GEI PG 
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The REG Procedure 
 
Environmental Sustainability Model for the OECD 
                                     Dependent Variable: ES 
 
                                    R-Square Selection Method 
 
       Number in                Adjusted 
         Model      R-Square    R-Square        C(p)            MSE    Variables in Model 
 
              1       0.6625      0.6500      2.9185       44.34807    QG 
              1       0.4315      0.4104     22.0341       74.71293    DEM 
              1       0.1099      0.0769     48.6434      116.98140    GEI 
              1       0.0082      -.0286     57.0549      130.34310    PG 
              1       0.0078      -.0289     57.0865      130.39322    EG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              2       0.6810      0.6565      3.3917       43.53533    QG EG 
              2       0.6741      0.6491      3.9600       44.47277    QG GEI 
              2       0.6741      0.6490      3.9650       44.48099    QG PG 
              2       0.6695      0.6441      4.3442       45.10652    QG DEM 
              2       0.5467      0.5118     14.5053       61.86802    DEM PG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              3       0.7186      0.6848      2.2822       39.94205    QG EG PG 
              3       0.6939      0.6572      4.3211       43.43989    QG DEM EG 
              3       0.6886      0.6512      4.7652       44.20179    QG EG GEI 
              3       0.6844      0.6465      5.1091       44.79191    QG GEI PG 
              3       0.6824      0.6443      5.2777       45.08116    QG DEM GEI 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              4       0.7220      0.6757      4.0002       41.10241    QG EG GEI PG 
              4       0.7187      0.6718      4.2711       41.58657    QG DEM EG PG 
              4       0.7023      0.6526      5.6332       44.02065    QG DEM EG GEI 
              4       0.6855      0.6331      7.0203       46.49957    QG DEM GEI PG 
              4       0.6121      0.5474     13.0932       57.35198    DEM EG GEI PG 
       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              5       0.7220      0.6616      6.0000       42.88911    QG DEM EG GEI PG 
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Response ES for All Sample Countries 
Actual by Predicted Plot 
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RMSE=6.6666
 
 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.675858
RSquare Adj 0.660274
Root Mean Square Error 6.66663
Mean of Response 50.04727
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 110
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 5 9637.523 1927.50 43.3693
Error 104 4622.171 44.44 Prob > F
C. Total 109 14259.694 <.0001
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term  Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept  21.283503 3.584545 5.94 <.0001
QG  9.7962916 1.707749 5.74 <.0001
DEM  0.6362836 0.296113 2.15 0.0340
EG  -0.071272 0.209856 -0.34 0.7348
GEI  -0.030576 0.024753 -1.24 0.2195
PG  -1.173449 0.67789 -1.73 0.0864
 
Effect Tests 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F  
QG 1 1 1462.4742 32.9060 <.0001  
DEM 1 1 205.2097 4.6173 0.0340  
EG 1 1 5.1263 0.1153 0.7348  
GEI 1 1 67.8131 1.5258 0.2195  
PG 1 1 133.1748 2.9965 0.0864  
Scaled Estimates 
Continuous factors centered by mean, scaled by range/2 
Term Scaled Estimate Plot Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept 50.047273 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++++++++ 
0.635638 78.74 <.0001
QG 14.92819 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++++++++ 
2.602372 5.74 <.0001
DEM 3.8177018 ++++++++ 1.776681 2.15 0.0340
EG -0.848133 -- 2.497284 -0.34 0.7348
GEI -4.054351 -------- 3.282244 -1.24 0.2195
PG -3.813709 -------- 2.203144 -1.73 0.0864
Durbin-Watson 
Durbin-Watson Number of Obs. AutoCorrelation
1.491166 110 0.0972
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Response ES for Asia 
Actual by Predicted Plot 
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Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.478995
RSquare Adj 0.218493
Root Mean Square Error 5.852913
Mean of Response 44.425
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 16
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 5 314.94404 62.9888 1.8387
Error 10 342.56596 34.2566 Prob > F
C. Total 15 657.51000 0.1929
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term  Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept  55.75424 17.77453 3.14 0.0106
QG  1.5387835 4.984044 0.31 0.7639
DEM  -0.233076 0.712796 -0.33 0.7504
EG  -1.618921 0.849705 -1.91 0.0859
GEI  0.0284606 0.045104 0.63 0.5422
PG  -2.739136 2.624134 -1.04 0.3211
 
Effect Tests 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F  
QG 1 1 3.26539 0.0953 0.7639  
DEM 1 1 3.66275 0.1069 0.7504  
EG 1 1 124.35393 3.6301 0.0859  
GEI 1 1 13.63971 0.3982 0.5422  
PG 1 1 37.32496 1.0896 0.3211  
Scaled Estimates 
Continuous factors centered by mean, scaled by range/2 
Term Scaled Estimate Plot Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept 44.425 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++++++++ 
1.463228 30.36 <.0001
QG 1.6948796 ++++++ 5.489631 0.31 0.7639
DEM -1.281916 ---- 3.920378 -0.33 0.7504
EG -8.904066 ------------------------------------ 4.673376 -1.91 0.0859
GEI 3.7738721 ++++++++++++++ 5.980764 0.63 0.5422
PG -3.42392 ------------ 3.280168 -1.04 0.3211
Durbin-Watson 
Durbin-Watson Number of Obs. AutoCorrelation
2.1300051 16 -0.1659
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Response ES for Latin America and the Caribbean 
Actual by Predicted Plot 
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Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.5824
RSquare Adj 0.433257
Root Mean Square Error 6.588834
Mean of Response 51.04
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 20
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 5 847.6298 169.526 3.9050
Error 14 607.7782 43.413 Prob > F
C. Total 19 1455.4080 0.0200
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term  Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept  21.975496 16.82731 1.31 0.2126
QG  8.5993827 7.92847 1.08 0.2964
DEM  0.5127542 1.419368 0.36 0.7233
EG  1.2973315 1.13577 1.14 0.2725
GEI  -0.058445 0.095362 -0.61 0.5498
PG  0.0151095 3.241574 0.00 0.9963
 
Effect Tests 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F  
QG 1 1 51.070832 1.1764 0.2964  
DEM 1 1 5.665596 0.1305 0.7233  
EG 1 1 56.641949 1.3047 0.2725  
GEI 1 1 16.306791 0.3756 0.5498  
PG 1 1 0.000943 0.0000 0.9963  
Scaled Estimates 
Continuous factors centered by mean, scaled by range/2 
Term Scaled Estimate Plot Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept 51.04 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++++++++ 
1.473308 34.64 <.0001
QG 8.6405888 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++++++++ 
7.966461 1.08 0.2964
DEM 1.7946398 ++++++ 4.967788 0.36 0.7233
EG 6.2271914 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 
5.451696 1.14 0.2725
GEI -2.562825 ---------- 4.181608 -0.61 0.5498
PG 0.0188868  4.051968 0.00 0.9963
Durbin-Watson 
Durbin-Watson Number of Obs. AutoCorrelation
1.895646 20 -0.0650
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Response ES for the Middle East and North Africa 
Actual by Predicted Plot 
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Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.875082
RSquare Adj 0.718935
Root Mean Square Error 2.635829
Mean of Response 39.99
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 10
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 5 194.67862 38.9357 5.6042
Error 4 27.79038 6.9476 Prob > F
C. Total 9 222.46900 0.0599
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term  Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept  36.683156 4.722507 7.77 0.0015
QG  -0.58221 2.984132 -0.20 0.8548
DEM  1.4582293 0.4596 3.17 0.0338
EG  1.5385103 0.696484 2.21 0.0917
GEI  0.0043022 0.173875 0.02 0.9814
PG  -2.848764 1.231541 -2.31 0.0817
 
Effect Tests 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F  
QG 1 1 0.264459 0.0381 0.8548  
DEM 1 1 69.939932 10.0668 0.0338  
EG 1 1 33.901075 4.8795 0.0917  
GEI 1 1 0.004253 0.0006 0.9814  
PG 1 1 37.174913 5.3508 0.0817  
Scaled Estimates 
Continuous factors centered by mean, scaled by range/2 
Term Scaled Estimate Plot Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept 39.99 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++++++++ 
0.833522 47.98 <.0001 
QG -0.483263 -- 2.476974 -0.20 0.8548 
DEM 5.8329174 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++++++++ 
1.838402 3.17 0.0338 
EG 3.6154992 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1.636737 2.21 0.0917 
GEI 0.055283  2.234289 0.02 0.9814 
PG -4.700461 ---------------------------- 2.032042 -2.31 0.0817 
Durbin-Watson 
Durbin-Watson Number of Obs. AutoCorrelation
2.4378848 10 -0.2470
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Response ES for Sub-Saharan Africa 
Actual by Predicted Plot 
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Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.354116
RSquare Adj 0.152278
Root Mean Square Error 6.137045
Mean of Response 42.38636
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 22
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 5 330.39277 66.0786 1.7545
Error 16 602.61313 37.6633 Prob > F
C. Total 21 933.00591 0.1794
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term  Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept  40.907035 17.94026 2.28 0.0366
QG  2.769578 6.071586 0.46 0.6544
DEM  0.178757 0.603579 0.30 0.7709
EG  0.5102073 0.811456 0.63 0.5384
GEI  0.1844936 0.180773 1.02 0.3226
PG  -3.68538 4.113172 -0.90 0.3835
 
Effect Tests 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F  
QG 1 1 7.836850 0.2081 0.6544  
DEM 1 1 3.303517 0.0877 0.7709  
EG 1 1 14.889558 0.3953 0.5384  
GEI 1 1 39.229428 1.0416 0.3226  
PG 1 1 30.236352 0.8028 0.3835  
Scaled Estimates 
Continuous factors centered by mean, scaled by range/2 
Term Scaled Estimate Plot Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept 42.386364 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++++++++ 
1.308422 32.40 <.0001 
QG 2.351788 ++++++++++++ 5.155689 0.46 0.6544 
DEM 0.8937849 ++++ 3.017894 0.30 0.7709 
EG 2.7040985 ++++++++++++++ 4.300717 0.63 0.5384 
GEI 3.4869293 ++++++++++++++++++++ 3.416618 1.02 0.3226 
PG -2.764035 ---------------- 3.084879 -0.90 0.3835 
Durbin-Watson 
Durbin-Watson Number of Obs. AutoCorrelation
1.9471298 22 -0.2428
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Response ES for East and Central Europe 
Actual by Predicted Plot 
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Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.663782
RSquare Adj 0.543704
Root Mean Square Error 5.16999
Mean of Response 50.01
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 20
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 5 738.7748 147.755 5.5279
Error 14 374.2032 26.729 Prob > F
C. Total 19 1112.9780 0.0051
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term  Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept  45.888563 9.561125 4.80 0.0003
QG  -6.280966 6.821099 -0.92 0.3727
DEM  1.0952121 0.789548 1.39 0.1871
EG  0.3944698 0.311204 1.27 0.2256
GEI  0.3578552 0.129515 2.76 0.0152
PG  0.3089256 1.642835 0.19 0.8535
 
Effect Tests 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F  
QG 1 1 22.66332 0.8479 0.3727  
DEM 1 1 51.43027 1.9242 0.1871  
EG 1 1 42.94542 1.6067 0.2256  
GEI 1 1 204.05864 7.6344 0.0152  
PG 1 1 0.94515 0.0354 0.8535  
Scaled Estimates 
Continuous factors centered by mean, scaled by range/2 
Term Scaled Estimate Plot Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept 50.01 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++++++++ 
1.156045 43.26 <.0001 
QG -5.924142 -------------------- 6.43359 -0.92 0.3727 
DEM 5.4760607 ++++++++++++++++++ 3.947741 1.39 0.1871 
EG 3.3924404 ++++++++++++ 2.676354 1.27 0.2256 
GEI 10.019945 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++++++++ 
3.626416 2.76 0.0152 
PG 0.5560662  2.957102 0.19 0.8535 
Durbin-Watson 
Durbin-Watson Number of Obs. AutoCorrelation
1.5981536 20 0.1208
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Response ES for the OECD 
Actual by Predicted Plot 
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Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.721993
RSquare Adj 0.661557
Root Mean Square Error 6.548978
Mean of Response 61.84483
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 29
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 5 2561.8422 512.368 11.9464
Error 23 986.4495 42.889 Prob > F
C. Total 28 3548.2917 <.0001
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term  Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept  2.7981868 13.06378 0.21 0.8323
QG  17.237784 5.716415 3.02 0.0062
DEM  0.0287107 2.066364 0.01 0.9890
EG  -1.468245 0.844831 -1.74 0.0956
GEI  -0.025182 0.048362 -0.52 0.6076
PG  3.9865364 3.119444 1.28 0.2140
 
Effect Tests 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F  
QG 1 1 389.99808 9.0932 0.0062  
DEM 1 1 0.00828 0.0002 0.9890  
EG 1 1 129.54007 3.0203 0.0956  
GEI 1 1 11.62806 0.2711 0.6076  
PG 1 1 70.04614 1.6332 0.2140  
Scaled Estimates 
Continuous factors centered by mean, scaled by range/2 
Term Scaled Estimate Plot Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept 61.844828 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++++++++ 
1.216115 50.85 <.0001 
QG 17.662326 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++++++++ 
5.857202 3.02 0.0062 
DEM 0.1004875  7.232272 0.01 0.9890 
EG -6.166628 ------------ 3.548291 -1.74 0.0956 
GEI -1.497047 -- 2.875115 -0.52 0.6076 
PG 4.9831705 ++++++++++ 3.899305 1.28 0.2140 
Durbin-Watson 
Durbin-Watson Number of Obs. AutoCorrelation
2.3391198 29 -0.1906
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